Modelling the Economic Impact of a Citizen's Basic Income in Scotland by Connolly, Kevin et al.
Modelling the Economic Impact 






Section 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The aim of this report is to provide an assessment of the economic impacts of introducing a 
Citizen’s Basic Income (CBI) in Scotland. 
It has been prepared by researchers at the Fraser of Allander Institute at the University of 
Strathclyde, Manchester Metropolitan University and IPPR Scotland.  
In order to capture a realistic picture of the reality of a CBI in Scotland, we look at both the 
payment of the CBI itself, and the increase in tax that would be required to pay for it.  
The assessment of how it may impact upon the economy is then put together by quantifying 
both the direct impact on people’s incomes and, based on available evidence, the range of 
possible decisions and behaviours that may follow. 
Modelling the potential economic implications of a CBI in Scotland is not straightforward.  
Firstly, there is limited evidence from elsewhere – either internationally or locally – of the 
potential impacts of a substantial, permanent and unconditional CBI on economic, social and 
wider outcomes.  
Secondly, introducing a CBI at scale is by definition an attempt to engineer major structural 
and economic change within society. We were explicitly tasked with modelling a significant 
CBI to best explore the avenues through which it may have an impact upon the economy1.  
How individuals, households, firms and the entire economy respond to such changes – not 
just in their own circumstances but the wider implications for society as a whole – is 
necessarily going to be more uncertain than smaller scale or marginal changes that we 
usually see in policymaking2.  
What is most important therefore to informing the debate on a CBI is to better understand 
the impact on household incomes, the cost of potential schemes, the positive and negative 
avenues through which it might impact upon the economy (such as incentives to work, the 
efficiency of the labour market and links to productivity), the scale of these impacts and the 
actions that government (and others) may take to create a supportive environment.  
                                                          
1 Of course, smaller variations are entirely possible and in reality, might be part of a transition or gradual 
introduction of a CBI to manage some of the effects outlined below.  
2 See for example, the changes in the tax bands and tax rates implemented by the Scottish Government since 
the devolution of income tax in 2016. 
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The structure of our report is as follows.  
In Section 2, we discuss the first stage in our modelling work – a microsimulation exercise – 
which aims to quantify the direct fiscal impacts of implementing a CBI in Scotland.  
In Sections 3 and 4, we model the extent to which these fiscal changes may have an impact 
upon the wider economy – and in particular, through changing the economic incentives (both 
good and bad) that individuals face.  
In Section 5, we bring this all together by combining the results from both our economic 
modelling with our fiscal modelling to highlight the potential long-term changes in the 
income distribution and key measures of inequality and poverty.  
Section 6 provides a conclusion.  
Alongside these sections, the report also contains a series of annexes.  
Before these sections however, we briefly discuss our methodology. The methods that we 
deploy are necessarily complex, with a host of different factors having an impact at any one 
time. This report is necessarily relatively long. The next section therefore provides a brief 
summary.  
 
1.2 Our approach 
To help shed light on some of the key issues that could arise should Scotland wish to 
introduce a CBI, we deploy a number of different analytical techniques.  
These are summarised in the diagram below. 
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In Stage 1, we use a microsimulation model to estimate the likely gross fiscal cost of 
introducing a ‘high’ and ‘low’ CBI and the changes in income tax required to finance it. This 
stage of the analysis also provides a first-round assessment of the reduction in poverty and 
inequality that a CBI is designed to target before any changes in behaviour are considered.  
In Stage 2, we consider how individuals, households and firms might respond to such a major 
change in fiscal policy by using an economic model of the Scottish economy. These models 
take the results from phase 1 and uses them to trace how our economy might perform over 
time, dependent upon a number of scenarios for how key aspects of our economy – most 
notably our labour market – might respond. Here we look at two approaches, one where 
individuals respond to changes in their wages in a more competitive market (micro-to-macro) 
and another where there is bargaining across the economy as a whole (macro-to-macro).  
In Stage 3, we take the results from our long-run economic simulations – for example, 
changes in employment and wages) – to identify potential effects on the distribution of 
household incomes and measures of poverty. See Box 1 for a discussion of what we mean by 
‘long-term’. 
Throughout we test for a number of different factors, such as changes in migration, skill 
levels and consumption patterns, that might impact upon any results.   
Note that what we are not doing is providing a forecast for what the impact of a CBI ‘will’ be.  
Rather our analytical approach is designed to shed light on the key avenues through which 
introducing a CBI could impact upon the Scottish economy; the underlying costs of different 
schemes; the likely scale of different effects; the potential positive and negative implications 
of different scenarios for how people/firms might respond; and most importantly, the types 
of behaviours that could drive particular outcomes.  
This does of course mean that instead of providing a single point-estimate or a definitive 
positive or negative conclusion, we provide a range of outcomes each highlighting the 
possible scale and direction of travel under various assumptions and scenarios. In our view, 
this is a much more effective and transparent approach that avoids falling into a trap of 
believing that an exact outcome good or bad can be predicted for such a major and 
unprecedented policy.  
This is especially important in our case given i) the scale of the change we have been asked to 
model and ii) the limited experience there is anywhere in the world of such a major structural 




Box 1: Long-term results in our approach 
The CBI policy involves a substantial redistribution of resources between people in the 
Scottish population.  Because of varying propensities to purchase different types of goods 
and services, this redistribution changes the pattern of demand within the Scottish economy.  
Also, the new income tax regime changes incentives to work, which changes behaviour on 
the part of current or potential workers.   
Firms respond to the changing pattern of demand for goods and services, and the changing 
pattern of labour supply from workers with decisions about investment and how many 
workers to employ.  These decisions in turn create their own dynamic responses in the 
following period, creating a feedback loop.  Eventually the feedback loop irons itself out and 
the economy settles down in a new, altered, state. 
The macroeconomic model estimates these dynamic responses and traces the path through 
the first year’s response to the policy and the feedback loops that occur in subsequent years.  
The point at which the feedback loops iron out and the model converges to a new, altered 
state of the economy, will depend on the degree and type of change being modelled.   
Typically, within this project, the macroeconomic modelling refers to 15 to 20 years after the 
policy is introduced. In effect, this is when all the adjustments to the economy after the 
policy have settled down to its new ‘altered’ steady state.  
 
1.3 What we find 
What our results show is highly revealing, but also relatively intuitive.  
Introducing a CBI at scale would necessarily imply a fundamental change in society that seeks 
to remove inequality and poverty. 
For example, even the ‘low’ CBI policy option we have modelled costs around £27bn, rising to 
over double that in the case of a ‘high’ option3. This implies a substantial change to how 
much tax people pay, but also an unprecedented reduction in inequality and poverty.   
 
 
                                                          
3 To put this in context, the Scottish Government’s annual resource budget – to fund the NHS, police & fire, local 
government, environmental services, enterprise & skills, universities etc. – was £28.6bn in 2019-20.  
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Table 1.1 Citizens Basic Income Values in 2019/204 
Age band Low-level 
CBI 
High-level CBI 
0 to 15 £84.54 £120.48 
16 to 19 £84.54 £213.59 
20 to 24 £57.90 £213.59 
25 to below State Pension Age £73.10 £213.59 
State Pension Age or over £163.00 £195.90 
 
How society responds to such a fundamental change drives our analytical results. 
We find a substantial reduction in poverty and inequality under all policy options. Although 
the reductions are ‘expensive’ in terms of gross fiscal cost. Other alternatives – just focussed 
upon poverty reduction and not any possible wider benefits of a CBI – are much cheaper.  
  
Box 2: A note on terminology 
In the report, we refer to the different policy choices on CBI – high, low, universal credit 
comparator – as policy options (for ease, labelled 1, 2 and 3 respectively).  
In the modelling that follows to trace the impact upon the economy, we look at different 
scenarios for how the results might change according to different assumptions about key 











                                                          
4 These figures are taken from Table 2.1  
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Table 1.2 Effects on Poverty5  














Change in poverty (Base = 
1,140,000) -280,000 -280,000 -910,000 -170,000 
Change in child poverty (Base = 
270,000) -90,000 -80,000 -250,000 -100,000 
Change in poverty rate (Base = 
21.6%) -5.4 pp -3.3 pp -17.3 pp -3.2 pp 
Change in child poverty rate 
(Base = 28%) -9 pp -6 pp -25 pp -10 pp 
Gross cost per person lifted out 
of poverty £139,000 n/a £87,000 £15,000 
Gross cost per child lifted out of 
poverty £293,000 n/a £235,000 £10,000 
 
We also find that the impacts on the economy whilst uncertain, have the potential to be 
hugely significant and would require careful management and implementation.  
In short, to finance a CBI at scale requires a significant change to the tax system7. To illustrate 
this, we focus upon income tax. A CBI of the scale we have been asked to model, would 
require a change in the personal tax system across all parts of the income distribution. For 
example, a starting tax rate of over 30% rising to a top rate of tax of over 80% in the ‘high’ 
CBI policy option8.  
  
                                                          
5 These figures (unless otherwise noted) are taken from Table 2.4 
6 These figures are taken from Table 5.4: Bargaining 2 scenario (Wage bargaining adjusted for workers’ CBI) 
7 For example, to put £27bn in context, total VAT revenues in Scotland are estimated at £11.1bn, corporation 
tax at £4.0bn and council tax at £2.4bn.  
8 It is possible to use another combination of tax changes – e.g. VAT, National Insurance, Corporation Tax etc. 
Whilst the exact effects would be different, the changes in incentives either within firms, households or 
individuals would be similar. Although it should be noted that a substantial increase in VAT is likely to be 




Table 1.3: Costs and new income taxes rates required to achieve fiscal neutrality9 
Option 1 2 3 
  Low-level CBI High-level CBI 
Universal Credit 
comparator 
Gross cost -£26.7 bn -£57.8 bn -£1.0 bn 
Savings from benefit reductions £4.0 bn £4.0 bn £0.0 bn 
Savings from state pension reduction £6.3 bn £6.6bn £0.0 bn 
Savings from PA abolition £9.1 bn £9.0 bn £0.0 bn 
Savings from tax rate rises £7.2 bn £38.3 bn £0.9 bn 
Net cost -£0.2 bn £0.1 bn £0.0 bn 
Income tax rate rises needed to 
achieve fiscal neutrality 
+8 points on every 
band 
+49 pts on band 3 
+44 pts on band 4 
+39 pts on 1,2,5 
+6 points on top 
two bands 
New Scottish income tax schedule10 27:28:29:49:54 58:59:70:85:85 19:20:21:47:52 
 
One might expect that the response from individuals paying such higher tax rates, and who 
would see a significant shift in their absolute and relative income, would be such that the 
economy would be negatively impacted (even if there is a re-distribution within society).    
Why? Some economists and policymakers will have concerns that tax increases on such a 
scale may drive up wage costs, weaken some incentives to work by reducing in-work income 
for the vast majority of people11, increase some costs for firms, erode international 
competitiveness and have a negative impact upon traditional measures of economic 
performance such as GDP.  
In our modelling, and under a number of key assumptions about how our economy operates, 
the combination of such pressures would see employment fall and unemployment rise12 - see 
Table 1.4. In short, if these behaviours turned out to be the response to a CBI, then we can 
expect our economy to be smaller – in the long-run – as a result, and potentially significantly 
so.  
                                                          
9 These figures are taken from Table 2.3 
10 Scottish Income Tax bands: Band 1: £1 to £2,049; Band 2: £2050 to £12,444; Band 3: £12,445 to £30,930; 
Band 4: £30,931 to £150,000: Band 5: £150,001 plus 
11 Note that the tax rate required for a CBI of this scale is such that the difference between in-work and out-of-
work income (including all benefits) is smaller for the vast majority than at present.  
12 These ‘standard assumptions’ are based upon long-term evidence upon how individuals have reacted to 
changes in take-home income in the past. See Sections 3 and 4 for a discussion.  
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Of course, some will argue that any ‘trade-off’ between the size of the economy – as 
measured in terms of ‘traditional’ measures such as GDP or employment – and a reduction in 
inequality is worth it. A smaller economy relative to what it could have been but with greater 
equality might still be viewed as preferable by some if it better supports national wellbeing. It 
may also bring other ‘benefits’ such as a decline in emissions (at least those linked to 
growth).  
But others will argue that a smaller economy may be bad for the country as a whole in the 
long-run13. 
Is it however, guaranteed that a CBI would lead to a smaller economy?  Not necessarily. The 
risks to the economy in our modelling stem from those individuals now paying higher taxes 
responding negatively to a change in their total take-home income (even accounting for the 
fact that they too benefit from the CBI).  
 






GDP (£m)  -4.4% -15.2% 
Real take home wage  -11.5% -7.7% 
Employment  -5.0% -16.4% 
Income Tax  87.3% 125.1% 
Transfers to household from government  117.4% 117.4% 
Consumption of lowest quintile  28.7% 23.7% 
 
Some will argue that this mechanism may not hold. Firstly, it could be argued that people will 
not respond – or have the opportunity to respond – to a substantial increase in their tax take 
in the manner suggested above. But the evidence on such a view is limited, particularly over 
the long-run.  
                                                          
13 This may be particularly important in an economy, like Scotland, with an ageing population with growth one 
avenue through which the care and support of an elderly population can be supported.  
14 Figures taken from Table 4.6 and 4.7 both which assume that workers take the impact of the CBI on their own 
incomes fully into account. The migration scenario imposes a tight constraint, which implies that out-migration 
continues until the real personal disposable incomes of workers and unemployment rates return to their 
original levels, restoring differentials with the rest-of-the UK. 
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Secondly, it could be the case that the introduction of a CBI may have positive impacts upon 
labour supply efficiencies. For example, by removing the ‘cliff-edge’ in returns to work that 
some people, particularly on relatively low incomes, often face15.  
Thirdly, and most importantly, if society’s preferences are such that people are willing to pay 
higher taxes in exchange for a significant reduction in inequality across society, or to put in 
another way if people support the idea of a ‘social contract’, then the response may not be as 
stark.   
How much might this offset (and might it be sufficient to fully offset any behavioural 
change)? This is clearly another uncertainty, not in terms of economic modelling but in terms 
of societal attitudes and socio-economic preferences.  
Our analysis does not take a view on which argument is correct, instead it simply highlights 
the possibility for a trade-off to exist. 
What we can say is that, given the scale of the tax increases required, it would require a high 
level of support for a CBI right across all sections of society (and a commitment to pay for it). 
The stronger the support for a CBI, then the stronger these effects will be.  
Finally, it is possible to argue that a CBI might not just impact upon labour market incentives, 
but may also have implications for productivity.  
A CBI may boost productivity if it led to improved health and social outcomes for workers, 
which in turn contributes to worker productivity and reduces absenteeism. At the same time, 
it may also free up government resources to invest in skills, education and infrastructure 
which will have their own positive impacts upon productivity and employability in the long-
run.  
But should costs rise and competitiveness fall, then any change to productivity may be in the 
opposite direction if it limits investment and human capital development. If the economy is 
smaller, this may limit the amount of government resources that can be raised to support 
investment.   
Unfortunately, at this point in time there is limited empirical evidence that we are aware of 
that has been able to systemically test for any links between productivity and the 
introduction of a CBI, at least at the scale being modelled here.  
 
                                                          
15 Whilst this is an impact for a large number of people in the economy, from a macroeconomic perspective the 
cumulative impact – whilst important – is unlikely to be the most important factor driving the results. Instead it 




These results reveal a crucially important conclusion from our analysis.  
Introducing a substantial, permanent and unconditional CBI will require a massive fiscal effort 
by Scottish taxpayers, in exchange for a significant reduction in inequality. If a future 
government wished to consider introducing a CBI at scale, then to avoid any negative 
economic impact, it will need to ensure that society as a whole is ready for such an initiative, 
is fully supportive for what it is trying to achieve, and has people ready and willing to pay to 
see it happen. 
The sections that follow describe our methods and the key results.   
12 
 
Section 2: Microsimulation modelling of a Citizens Basic 
Income for Scotland 
2.1 Methodology 
Estimation of the first-order effects of two Citizens Basic Income (CBI) policies, and a 
comparator policy, were carried out using the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) Tax-
Benefit Model.   
This is a tax-benefit microsimulation model used by five organisations for short-term 
forecasting of the distribution of income and for estimating the effects of tax and benefit 
policy change.  The users of the model are the Institute of Public Policy Research, the 
Resolution Foundation, the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, the New Economics Foundation 
and the Legatum Institute.  For an example of a recent publication using the model, see 
Resolution Foundation’s Living Standards Outlook 2019.16  
The model takes a recent population sample from a survey of household incomes and 
uprates financial values in the data from the survey date of interview to April in the chosen 
policy year so that the sample represents a forecast of the sample for that year.  
Typically, values are uprated in line with a relevant Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) 
forecast series.  In some cases, a specific OBR series was not available so another was chosen 
as a suitable proxy.     
 
2.2 Tax-benefit simulation 
The model then simulates taxes and benefits for each member of the sample in the policy 
year, going through each tax and benefit one-by-one.   
First non-means-tested benefits are estimated, then income tax, national insurance and 
council tax and, finally, means-tested benefits.  Whilst the simulation of non-means-tested 
benefits and income taxes takes place mostly at the level of the individual, means-tested 
                                                          
16 For example, see Corlett (2019), The Living Standards Outlook 2019, Resolution Foundation 
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benefits are simulated at the level of the benefit unit – single adults or adults in a couple plus 
their dependent children17 – which is the unit used by the state to assess benefits.18   
 
2.2.1 Benefit take-up 
Each means-tested benefit is also subject to a take-up simulation, based on an econometric 
equation of take-up and a monte carlo simulation, aligned to aggregate take-up statistics.   
Built into the model is a probit equation of take-up of each benefit conditional on 
entitlement.  
Once entitlement is established during each run of the model, the equation is used to 
estimate a probability of take-up.  Uniform random numbers are drawn for each benefit unit, 
who are then ranked in order of the difference between their random number and take-up 
probability.  
Aggregate alignment totals of the proportion of the entitled population who take up each 
benefit are then used to select the required number of benefit units as taking up the benefit.  
Those who are not selected are recorded as receiving no income for that benefit.  
 
2.2.2 Calculation of results 
The model is run for a base case consisting of unchanged policy and chosen policy reform 
options. 
Net income is calculated in each case and the difference between a given reform option and 
the base case represents the effect of that reform on each sample member’s net income.  
Because net change is available for each household and benefit unit, it is possible to estimate 
the number of gainers and losers, and to look at average gains at different points in the 
income distribution, or for sub-groups of the population.   
Given that the model produces an estimate of net income for every member of the sample, it 
is also possible to estimate the number of people or children in poverty in each policy option, 
including the base case, thereby allowing an estimate of the effect of each reform on poverty 
and child poverty.  However, poverty estimates are calibrated to ensure they are consistent 
with the latest official poverty statistics.   
                                                          
17 Dependent children are those aged up to 16 or those aged up to 19 and in full-time education 
18 Thus, households can contain more than one benefit unit. For example, a household containing a couple plus 
two school-age children, one 20-year-old child, and a grandparent, contains three benefit units: one containing 
the couple and school-age children, one containing the grandparent and one containing the 20-year-old. 
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Finally, by aggregating across all members of the sample, the aggregate net costs of the 
reform can be estimated.  The Department for Work and Pensions runs a similar model – the 
Policy Simulation Model – and it uses exactly this method for estimating the likely fiscal costs 
and savings from all proposed changes to benefit rates.  
 
2.3  Data and modelling approach 
2.3.1 Model data  
The model uses data from the Family Resources Survey (FRS) – a UK-wide household survey 
of family incomes with a sample size of 19,105 households in the latest 2017/18 wave.  
There is a boosted sample for Scotland, so there are 2,766 Scottish households with an 
average grossing factor of 890 compared to 16,339 households in the rest of the UK with an 
average grossing factor of 1,540. 
In order to enlarge the sample further for Scotland-specific analysis, the modelling for this 
project was carried out using a pooled dataset of the last three years of the FRS: 2015/16, 
2016/17 and 2017/18.   
The total sample of Scottish households across these years was 8,259.   
 
2.3.2 Policy year 
The modelling was carried out using a policy year of 2023/24: i.e. all results are presented as 
if the chosen policies were implemented in that year.   
No demographic adjustment was made to weighting variables to take into account 
population change, so the results are presented as if the population is unchanged between 
2017/18.   
This means that fiscal costs and estimates of changes in poverty are directly attributable to 
policy change, rather than because the size of the population might have changed. 
 
2.3.3 Uprating 
The FRS is a continuous survey – households are surveyed throughout the year.  So financial 
values in our starting sample were uprated from the month of interview to a target date of 
April 2023 – the start of our chosen policy year.   
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Earnings, private pension income, other unearned income and pension contributions were 
uprated in line with the OBR quarterly average earnings growth forecast;19 childcare, home 
insurance and water & sewerage costs in line with the OBR Consumer Prices Index forecast; 
and local authority, housing association and private rented sector rents in line with the 
relevant OBR eligible rent growth assumptions. 
 
2.4  Tax and benefit assumptions 
In the modelling, the two CBI policies and the comparator policy were compared against a 
base case which consisted of all currently-announced policies at the time that the modelling 
commenced.  Due to the timing of this work, the Scottish Child Payment was not included in 
the base case. 
In the base case, tax thresholds and benefit amounts were set to their expected 2023/24 
levels.  These are constructed from currently announced government policy and a default 
assumption for uprating each threshold/amount.  
For example, beyond currently announced values for the Income Tax Personal Allowance, its 
value was assumed to rise in line with the OBR forecast of the Consumer Price Index.  
Similarly, beyond the four-year length of the benefit freeze, benefit amounts were assumed 
to rise in line with the previous September’s Consumer Price Index.  The ‘triple lock’ was used 
for state pensions. 
For Income Tax and Council Tax, Scotland-specific bands, thresholds and rates were used for 
Scottish households in line with current policy.  
We also assumed that Universal Credit had fully replaced legacy benefits by the time of our 
chosen policy year, 2023-24.  This was to enable the modelling results to show the pure 
effects of the CBI compared to Universal Credit rather than some aspects of the results 
actually showing the effects of the transition from legacy benefits to Universal Credit. 
 
2.4.1 Citizens Basic Income options 
We tested two version of the Citizens Basic Income: a low-level version based on benefit 
levels20 and a high-level version based on the level of the Joseph Rowntree Foundation 
                                                          
19 OBR (2019), Economic and Fiscal Outlook Supplementary Economic Tables, March 2019 
20 Note that the pensioner rate of £163 per week is slightly less than the rate of the Pension Credit Guarantee 
Credit (£167.25) and the rate of the New State Pension (£168.60). 
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Minimum Income Standard.21  The 2019/20 values of the two versions are shown in the 
table.  These values were uprated in line with the OBR Consumer Price Index forecast to 
2023/24. 
 
Table 2.1: Citizens Basic Income values in 2019/20 
Age band Low-level CBI High-level CBI 
0 to 15 84.54 120.48 
16 to 19 84.54 213.59 
20 to 24 57.90 213.59 
25 to below State Pension Age 73.10 213.59 
State Pension Age or over 163.00 195.90 
 
 
2.4.2 Tax and benefit changes 
With both CBI policy options, we assumed that the following tax and benefit changes would 
be made as part of the introduction of the policy: 
 
Table 1.2: Tax and benefits changes when CBI applies 
Benefit Approach for benefit units subject to the CBI 
Carers Allowance Set to zero 
Child Benefit Set to zero 
State Pension Reduced by the value of the person’s CBI 
(Set to zero if their CBI is greater than their 
State Pension) 
Pension Credit Set to zero 
Universal Credit Adult Element Element set to zero 
Universal Credit Child Element Element set to zero 
Income Tax Personal Allowance Set to zero 
 
Note that in our modelling, the CBI was not replacing those elements of Universal Credit 
designed to help with housing and childcare costs or the elements that provide additional 
support for families containing disabled adults or children.   
                                                          




So, under the CBI reform options, Universal Credit still existed, but could only go to those 
paying rent or childcare costs, or with disabled people in the family, whose incomes were 
sufficiently low to be eligible.  In technical terms, the standard adult and child elements were 
set to zero but the rest of the benefit was left unchanged. 
A core assumption was that each reform option should be fiscally neutral: that the net costs 
of the policy should be close to zero.  In the case of the Citizens Basic Income options, after 
the policies themselves were introduced, and the above benefit and tax changes were made, 
there remained a fiscal cost.  To remove this, we then increased income tax rates (by whole 
percentage points) until we reached fiscal neutrality.   
We imposed a limit on income tax rates for each band of 85 per cent.  We also tried as far as 
possible to increase income tax rates by no more in lower tax bands than in higher tax bands.  
However, in the case of the high-level CBI, these two restrictions meant that we could not 
achieve fiscal neutrality and so were forced to increase bands 3 and 4 by more than band 5. 
Also, for ease of presentation and discussion, we kept all income tax rate rises to whole 
percentage points.  To accommodate this restriction, we treated any final net cost of within 
£300 million per annum of zero as being effectively cost neutral. 
 
2.4.3 Universal Credit comparator policy 
We also tested a comparator policy which involved not introducing a CBI but instead making 
changes to current benefits and was designed to maximise the impact on child poverty. 
In this comparator policy, we abolished the two-child limit for Universal Credit, abolished the 
Benefit Cap, and increased the second and subsequent child element of Universal Credit by 
£40 per week in 2019/20.  The first child element was then set to the new, higher, second 
and subsequent child element.  These amounts were then uprated in line with the OBR 
Consumer Prices Index forecast to 2023/24. 
With this policy option, because the gross costs were lower, there was no need to make 
wide-ranging changes to taxes and benefits to achieve fiscal neutrality: the only changes that 
were needed were to increase income tax rates for the top two bands of the Scottish Income 
Tax system. 
 
2.4.4 Geographical scope 
The modelling was carried out using the whole UK-wide dataset (57,807 households), with 
any policy changes (whether for the CBI or the comparator policy) applied only to the 8,259 
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households in Scotland.  Sample households from the rest of the UK were assumed to face 
the base case policy option. 
 
2.5  Key results 
In the results below, the policy options are labelled as follows: 
 
Table 2.2: Policy Option codes 
1 Low-level CBI 
2 High-level CBI 
3 Universal Credit comparator policy 
 
2.5.1 Costs and income tax rate rises 
The table below shows the gross cost of introducing each policy, how much is saved from the 
benefit changes listed in Table 1 (apart from reducing the state pension), from reducing the 
state pension, from abolishing the Income Tax Personal Allowance, and finally from raising 
income tax rates by enough to achieve fiscal neutrality.22  






















                                                          
22 As noted above, due to the timing of this work, the Scottish Child Payment is not included in any of the three 
reform scenarios, or in the baseline scenario to which they are compared. 
19 
 
Table 2.3: Costs and new income tax rates required to achieve fiscal neutrality 
Option 1 2 3 
  Low-level CBI High-level CBI 
Universal Credit 
comparator 
Gross cost -£26.7 bn -£57.8 bn -£1.0 bn 
Savings from benefit reductions £4.0 bn £4.0 bn £0.0 bn 
Savings from state pension reduction £6.3 bn £6.6 bn £0.0 bn 
Savings from PA abolition £9.1 bn £9.0 bn £0.0 bn 
Savings from tax rate rises £7.2 bn £38.3 bn £0.9 bn 
Net cost -£0.2 bn £0.1 bn £0.0 bn 
Income tax rate rises needed to 
achieve fiscal neutrality 
+8 points on every 
band 
+49 pts on band 3 
+44 pts on band 4 
+39 pts on 1,2,5 
+6 points on top 
two bands 
New Scottish income tax schedule23 27:28:29:49:54 58:59:70:85:85 19:20:21:47:52 
 
2.5.2 Poverty 
Table 2.5 shows the effect of each policy on poverty.   
Note that these results show the effects on poverty assuming a fixed UK-wide poverty line 
using the After-Housing Costs measure and a poverty threshold of 60% of median equivalised 
weekly household income.   
The UK-wide poverty line is used because that is the basis for the Scottish Government’s 
poverty targets and poverty statistics.   
When modelling the effects of a policy reform on poverty, it is possible for the reform itself 
to move the poverty line if median incomes change as a result of the reform.  One can either 
report the post-reform level of poverty against the new poverty line or against a fixed, 
unchanged poverty line.   
In this case, the introduction of a CBI in Scotland would have some effect on UK-wide median 
income, and therefore on the UK-wide poverty line.  However, the effect would not be great 
because the population of Scotland is less than 10% of that of the whole of the UK.  So there 
is not too much difference between the poverty results using a fixed UK-wide poverty line 
and a floating UK-wide poverty line. 
Figures are shown separately for the change in people in poverty, and in children in poverty.   
                                                          
23 Scottish Income Tax bands: Band 1: £1 to £2,049; Band 2: £2050 to £12,444; Band 3: £12,445 to £30,930; 
Band 4: £30,931 to £150,000: Band 5: £150,001 plus 
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Finally, the table shows the gross cost per person and per child lifted out of poverty.  This is a 
standard metric for assessing the efficiency with which a policy reduces poverty (or child 
poverty): the lower the cost per person (or child) lifted out of poverty, the more efficient the 
policy. 
 
Table 2.4: Effects on poverty 
Option 1 2 3 
  Low-level CBI High-level CBI 
Universal Credit 
comparator 
Change in poverty (Base = 1,140,000) -280,000 -910,000 -170,000 
Change in child poverty (Base = 270,000) -90,000 -250,000 -100,000 
Change in poverty rate (Base = 21.6%) -5.4 pp -17.3 pp -3.2 pp 
Change in child poverty rate (Base = 28%) -9 pp -25 pp -10 pp 
Gross cost per person lifted out of poverty £139,000 £87,000 £15,000 
Gross cost per child lifted out of poverty £293,000 £235,000 £10,000 
 
2.5.3 Distributional effects 
The table below shows the average change in weekly benefit unit income24 for people in each 
quintile of the income distribution in the base case.   
Note that this shows the average amongst all people (not amongst all benefit units). 
 
Table 2.5: Change in weekly benefit unit income (rounded to nearest £) 
Option 1 2 3 
 Low-level CBI High-level CBI 
Universal Credit 
comparator 
  Average change in weekly benefit unit income 
All people £13 pw £7 pw £6 pw 
People in bottom quintile £71 pw £269 pw £31 pw 
People in 2nd quintile £56 pw £199 pw £31 pw 
People in middle quintile £36 pw £99 pw £7 pw 
People in 4th quintile £3 pw -£47 pw -£2 pw 
People in top quintile -£102 pw -£499 pw -£40 pw 
                                                          




2.5.4 Gainers and losers 
The table shows how many people in each quintile of the base case income distribution see 
an increase or a decrease in their benefit unit income. 
 
Table 2.7: Number of gainers and losers (rounded to nearest 10,000) 
Option 1 2 3 
 Low-level CBI High-level CBI 
Universal Credit 
comparator 
  Gainers 
All people 2,900,000 3,180,000 830,000 
People in bottom quintile 940,000 1,040,000 280,000 
People in 2nd quintile 780,000 990,000 390,000 
People in middle quintile 650,000 830,000 130,000 
People in 4th quintile 420,000 310,000 30,000 
People in top quintile 100,000 10,000 0,000 
  Losers 
All people 2,360,000 2,080,000 970,000 
People in bottom quintile 100,000 0,000 0,000 
People in 2nd quintile 270,000 60,000 10,000 
People in middle quintile 400,000 230,000 70,000 
People in 4th quintile 680,000 780,000 210,000 
People in top quintile 920,000 1,010,000 680,000 
 












Figure 2.1: Change in annual benefit unit income 
 
Source: MMU  
 
2.6 Discussion 
2.6.1 Costs and tax rate rises 
The gross costs for the low-level and high-level Citizens Basic Income are £26.7 billion per 
annum and £57.8 billion per annum respectively.  By way of comparison, total Scottish 
Government expenditure in 2018/19 was £42.9 billion.  So, this is a policy where the volume 
of expenditure would be larger than any previous item of activity by the Scottish 
Government. 
The removal of all of the benefits identified in Table 1, except for the State Pension 
reductions, would save £4 billion per annum.  The savings from the State Pension reductions 
are very slightly higher in the case of the high-level CBI because the approach taken was to 
reduce each person’s State Pension by the amount of their CBI.  With a higher CBI, this 
means that some people have a higher reduction. 
There is an interaction between reducing the State Pension and abolishing the Personal 
Allowance for Income tax because the State Pension is taxable.  Abolishing the State Pension 
creates savings from reduced outgoings but also a reduction in Income Tax receipts.  The 
effects shown in each stage of Table 2.3 show the net effects taking into account offsetting 
changes in other parts of the system. 
The net annual costs of introducing the CBI, reducing the specified benefits, reducing the 
State Pension and abolishing the Income Tax Personal Allowance are £7.3 billion in the case 
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of the low-level CBI and £38.2 billion for the high-level version.  In order to deliver fiscal 
neutrality, these are the amounts that it is necessary to raise through increases in income tax 
rates. 
In the case of the low-level CBI, an 8 point across-the-board increase in income tax rates is 
sufficient to make up almost all of the outstanding cost.  For the high-level CBI, it was not 
possible to deliver fiscal neutrality with an across-the-board increase in tax rates without 
pushing the highest rates above 85 per cent.  Thus, we settled on an Income Tax structure 
whereby bands 3 and 4 increase by slightly more than band 5. 
It is important to note that these Income Tax rates apply to all income – there is no Personal 
Allowance.  So, under the low-level CBI, the very first pound of earnings will be taxed at 27 
per cent, and earnings from £30,930 upwards25 would be taxed at 49 per cent. 
Comparing the two CBI options with the Universal Credit comparator, it is clear that this 
policy comes at a substantially lower cost.  The gross cost of £1.0 billion per annum can be 




The low-level CBI reduces the number of people in poverty by about a quarter and the 
number of children in poverty by about a third.  Unsurprisingly, the high-level CBI has a much 
greater impact on poverty, reducing the number of people by around 80% and the number of 
children by nearly 90%. 
Because the comparator Universal Credit policy was designed to be most effective at 
reducing the number of children in poverty, it is more effective at doing that than in reducing 
overall poverty numbers.   
In fact, it takes more children out of poverty than the low-level CBI, and at a substantially 
lower cost.  Its cost-per-child lifted out of poverty is only £10,000 compared to nearly 
£300,000 for the low-level CBI, which makes the low-level CBI a very inefficient way of 
reducing child poverty.   
The implication is that, if reducing poverty directly is the principal objective, there are more 
effective ways of doing so than a Citizens Basic Income. 
 
                                                          
25 £30,930 is the figure for 2019/20.  By 2023/24, this threshold would be expected to rise to just over £33,000. 
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2.6.3 Distributional effects 
In all three policies, the shape of the distributional effects is similar: the largest gains go to 
people at the bottom of the income distribution and the bill is paid by people at the top.  The 
main difference between the options is the scale of change. 
In the high-level CBI, the average gains to people in the bottom quintile are substantial: at 
£269 per week, or around £14,000 per year.  On the other hand, people in the top quintile 
stand to lose on average around £26,000 per year. 
With the low-level CBI, the average gains in the bottom quintile are around £3,700 per year 
whilst average losses in the top quintile are around £5,300 per year. 
As a more targeted policy, the Universal Credit comparator affects fewer people and so the 
average effects are smaller: +£1,600 in the bottom two quintiles and -£2,000 in the top 
quintile. 
 
2.6.4 Gainers and losers 
Figure 2.1 shows the results for gains and losses in a slightly different way, bringing out how 
many people are gaining and losing by different amounts.   
What is striking from this chart is that both CBI options are policies in which virtually no-one 
is unaffected.  Almost everyone either gains or loses from the policy.   
There are also quite large numbers of people who gain or lose by substantial amounts.  In the 
low-level CBI, 1.7 million people will see their benefit unit income go up by at least £2,500 
per annum, and nearly a million will see a fall of at least that much. 
This is in quite clear contrast the Universal Credit comparator policy, where two-thirds of 
people are unaffected by the policy.  Amongst the remainder, the numbers affected 
substantially are quite small. 
 
2.7 Conclusions 
The high-level CBI involves costs that are so substantial that it is very difficult to recover them 
through the income tax system.   
Fiscal neutrality requires income tax rates of 70 per cent on income above £12,444, and 85 
per cent on all income above £30,930. 
Concentrating on the low-level CBI, very few people will be neutral about the policy – most 
people will see their incomes go up or down, some quite substantially.   
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The policy will certainly be redistributive, shifting money from the better off to the least well 
off.  However, it does so in quite an untargeted manner.  If the objective is specifically to 
directly reduce poverty, these results suggest that there are more efficient ways of doing so. 
In Sections 3 and 4, we turn our attention to the knock-on impacts of such changes to the 
economy.  
In Section 3, we focus solely on a labour supply effect – a so-called micro-to-micro approach 
– using various labour supply elasticities.  
In Section 4, we look at the macroeconomy as a whole, including capturing the strength of 









Section 3: Modelling labour supply responses to changes in 
financial work incentives 
 
3.1 Introduction: concepts and definitions 
The previous section examined the financial implication of various CBI policies for households 
in different parts of the income distribution. 
The analysis was ‘static’ in the sense that it assumed that people would not change their 
behaviour at all in the face of changes to their financial circumstances. 
Whilst it is important to capture the scale of any ‘immediate’ impact through this channel, 
over the medium to longer-term this is likely to be an unreasonable assumption, particularly 
for those households who would see large changes in their financial circumstances following 
the introduction of a CBI. Indeed, the previous section showed that, whilst a CBI would 
directly (and unconditionally) increase household incomes, the funding of the CBI policy 
options would require increases in rates of income taxation that are likely to be significant for 
some individuals. 
The aim of this section is to consider how the changes in financial work incentives induced by 
different CBI policies might lead to changes in the labour market behaviour of individuals. For 
example, to what extent might people be encouraged to work more as a result of the 
changes in their financial status following the CBI’s introduction, and to what extent might 
they choose to work less to undertake more non-work activity – whether that related to 
leisure, caring or anything else? 
In broad terms, our approach involves two key stages: 
• First, we calculate the change in various measures of the financial incentive to work as 
a result of each proposed CBI policy, for each individual in our microsimulation model; 
• Second, we make assumptions – based on evidence from existing research – about 
how individuals’ labour market participation decisions might respond to a given 
change in financial incentive, based on the particular characteristics of those 
individuals. 
We set out the methodology in further detail in subsequent sections.  
The estimation of potential labour supply responses is of course subject to various 
uncertainties. We undertake sensitivity analysis by modelling a range of different 
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assumptions about the degree of responsiveness to financial work incentives, and we discuss 
the limitations and uncertainties of the results in the concluding section. 
Before proceeding, it is useful to set out a few concepts that are critical to the understanding 
of the discussion. 
First, there are two ways in which an individual’s labour supply decision might change 
following a change in financial work incentive: 
• Changes in financial incentive can influence the decision over whether to work at all 
or not. This is the so-called extensive margin of response. 
• Financial incentives can also influence the decision over how much to work, i.e. how 
many hours to work. This is the so-called intensive margin of response. 
Note that there are other ways that individuals might respond to changes in taxation or 
benefits policy. In particular, some individuals may be able to vary their taxable income 
without necessarily varying their labour supply decision (for example, an increase in income 
taxation might induce some people to make greater use of tax reliefs, or incentivise the self-
employed to incorporate in order to take income in the form of dividends that are taxed at a 
lower rate). In this analysis, we focus on labour supply responses rather than the 
responsiveness of taxable income. 
Second, a change in labour supply following a change in the financial incentive to work 
encompasses two sorts of effects: substitution effects and income effects. 
• Substitution effects relate to the financial reward of working relative to not working. If 
somebody’s marginal tax rate increases, the reward to them of working an extra hour 
relative to taking an hour of ‘leisure’ diminishes. Similarly, a tax or benefit change 
which reduces the reward of working relative to not-working may influence some 
people’s decision over whether or not to work at all. 
• But as well as caring about the rewards of working relative to not-working, people 
also care about income in its own right. This is the income effect. 
Thus, while substitution effects measure the reward from work, income effects measure the 
need to work. 
Income effects and substitution effects tend to work in opposite directions in influencing 
labour supply responses to a tax or benefit change.  
Economic theory cannot say anything about whether the income or substitution effects are 
larger, nor indeed how the income and substitution effects might differ across individuals. 




Our methodology builds on an approach developed by the Institute for Fiscal Studies (Adam 
and Phillips, 2013) to estimate, ex ante, the potential labour supply response to a change in 
tax/benefit policy. 
The Adam and Phillips (2013) paper assesses the possible labour supply effects of the 
introduction of Universal Credit in Wales. It is the only paper we are aware of that uses a 
microsimulation model to simulate labour supply effects across different types of individual 
and household.  
The Adam and Phillips methodology involves two broad stages. First, they estimate the 
change in financial work incentive faced by each individual in a microsimulation model. 
Second, they make a set of assumptions about how responsive each individual is likely to be 
to the change in financial incentive that they face. By aggregating up, the methodology can 
be used to estimate the response across the entire population. 
Adam and Phillips estimate both the intensive and extensive margins. But they only consider 
the substitution effect. The justification for ignoring income effects is twofold: it is justified 
partly on the grounds that empirical evidence suggests that income effects are small; and 
partly on the grounds that the policy change examined is one that is revenue neutral, and 
thus at an aggregate level income changes must net to zero. 
In considering the potential labour supply responses to a CBI the case for assuming income 
effects away completely is less justifiable, not least because of the large changes to 
household income that are seen under some of proposed CBI policies. 
We start by outlining the Adam and Phillips approach to estimating the substitution effect, 
before describing how we have broadened this approach to encompass income effects. 
 
3.2.1 Estimating substitution effects: the Adam and Phillips approach 
For both the extensive margin (the decision whether or not to work at all) and the intensive 
margin (how much to work), there are two stages. First, measure how much the financial 
incentive to be in work (or to work a bit more) changes. Second, based on an assumed 
estimate of how responsive individuals (of given characteristics) are, calculate the likely 
change in labour supply for all individuals who are in employment in the base case. 
The financial incentive on the extensive margin (whether to work or not) is measured by the 
Participation Tax Rate (PTR). The PTR measures the ‘gain-to-work’, the proportion of total 
earnings taken in tax and withdrawn benefits, and is given by: 
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𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 1 −  𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 − 𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁 𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑁𝑁 𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
𝐺𝐺𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝐺𝐺  
The higher the number, the weaker the financial incentive to be in work. A PTR of 0.9 would 
imply that 90% of an individual’s gross earnings are taken in tax and withdrawn earnings. 
The approach adopted by Adam and Phillips is to model changes in employment decisions by 
adjusting the weights of all working individuals in their model by a factor pi given by: 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 =  �1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖11 − 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖0�𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 
Where 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
0 and 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
1 are the PTRs faced by individual i under the baseline and post-reform 
options respectively, and 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 is the elasticity of employment with respect to (1-PTRi). The 
elasticity is a measure of how responsive an individual is to changes in their financial 
incentives, with a higher elasticity implying higher responsiveness. We discuss the choice of 
elasticities subsequently. 
To illustrate, consider the practical example in Table 3.1. A worker faces a pre-reform PTR of 
0.4. The reform has the effect of reducing the worker’s in-work net income, to the extent 
that the PTR increases to 0.5 (the incentive to be in-work relative to not in work has 
worsened). 
With an assumed employment elasticity of 0.15, the weighting factor is calculated to be 0.97. 
In other words, the weight attached to individual i declines by 3%. The weight attached to 
non-working individuals with the same characteristics is increased to ensure that the total 
population remains unchanged, albeit with a lower employment rate. 
 












(𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖) Re-weight factor (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖) 
Pre-
reform 80 20 100 0.4 0.15 .97 
Post-
reform 70 20 100 0.5   
 
The financial incentive on the intensive margin (how much to work) is measured by the 
marginal effective tax rate (METR), the proportion of a small increase in earnings taken in tax 
and/or withdrawn benefits. Again, a larger number implies weaker work incentives: a METR 
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of 0.6 implies that, if an individual worked an extra hour, 60% of their additional pay would 
be taken in tax or withdrawn earnings. 
Adam and Phillips model changes in labour supply decisions on the intensive margin by 
adjusting the income of individuals in the sample as follows: 
𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖
1 =  𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖0 . �1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖11 − 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖0�𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖  
Where 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖
0 and 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖
1 is income under the pre- and post-reform policy, 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖
0 and 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖
1 are the METR 
faced by individual i under the pre and post reform policies, and 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 is the elasticity (i.e. 
sensitivity) of hours of work with respect to 1-τ. 
Again, a practical example may help illustrate. 
Imagine an employee works 20 hours a week under a baseline policy, and faces a METR of 
30%. Following a policy change, the employee’s METR increases to 35%. If the individual’s 
elasticity of hours with respect to the METR is 0.16, then after the policy reform their 
assumed hours are 20 x ((1-0.35/1-.03))^0.16 = 19.8. On an individual basis it clearly does not 
make sense to say that an employee would reduce their hours worked by 0.2 hours, but 
aggregated over all individuals with similar characteristics the calculation provides an 
estimate of the total change on the intensive margin. 
We adopt the same approach as Adam and Phillips to modelling labour supply decisions on 
the extensive margin. We adopt largely the same approach to modelling labour supply 
decisions on the intensive margin, with one difference: rather than measure the 
responsiveness of income, we measure the responsiveness of hours worked. This difference 
does imply some differences in the choice of elasticity, discussed below. 
 
3.2.2 Incorporating income effects into the analysis 
We have adopted a simple, pragmatic approach to extend Adam and Phillips’ methodology to 
incorporate income effects. 
To measure the labour supply response on the extensive margin, we adjust the weight 
attached to employed individuals by a factor 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 given by: 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 =  �1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖11 − 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖0�𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 ∙  �𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖1𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖0�𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖  
The first part of the expression measures the substitution effect as defined by Adam and 
Phillips and discussed above. The second part of the expression measures the income effect, 
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by applying an assumed elasticity (i.e. measure of responsiveness) 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 to the change in benefit 
unit net disposable income between the base case 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖
0 and policy option, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖1. 
The labour supply response on the intensive margin for an individual working hours  𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖
0 > 0 
under the baseline is given by: 
𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖
1 =  𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖0 .�1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖11 − 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖0�𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖  ∙  �𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖1𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖0�𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖   
Where hours worked under the pre-reform policy (𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖
0) are multiplied by a term designed to 
capture substitution effects and a second term designed to capture income effects. The 
expression for the substitution effect is taken from Adam and Phillips as discussed above. The 
expression for income effects applies an assumed elasticity 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 to the change in benefit unit 
net disposable income between the base 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖
0 and policy, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖1. 
 
3.2.3 What does the evidence say about how responsive people are to changes in financial work 
incentives? 
The previous section set out an overall approach to simulating the potential labour supply 
response to the introduction of a CBI. But to operationalise the approach we need to make 
assumptions about the likely size of the elasticities. 
Of course, the degree of responsiveness is likely to vary significantly from individual to 
individual based on their preferences and circumstances. We cannot hope to incorporate a 
specific elasticity for each individual. But we can draw on empirical evidence to make broad 
assumptions about the likely size of these elasticities across groups – where groups are 
defined based on income, age and family circumstances.  
There is a large literature on empirical estimates of labour supply elasticities. It is beyond the 
scope of this report to undertake a comprehensive and systematic review. But we can make a 
number of points and draw some general conclusions from this literature. 
First, some caveats and limitations.  
It is important to note that there are few if any studies which provide empirical estimates of 
labour supply responses to a large-scale policy change comparable to those modelled in this 
report, anywhere in the world – most empirical estimates are derived from relatively small 
changes to policy which affect a relatively narrow range of groups.  
Furthermore, there are also relatively few studies which provide empirical estimates of 
labour supply responses in a directly comparable labour market setting, whether in terms of 
the geographical coverage, the time period of study, or the institutional framework. Thus 
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whilst there exist many empirical estimates of labour supply elasticities of one form or 
another, the transferability to the analysis of a specific CBI policy in Scotland is less strong.  
As a result, there is a degree of uncertainty of how responsive people in Scotland would be to 
changes in induced by a Scotland-specific CBI policy. 
That said, a degree of consensus does exist around the relative magnitude of response to 
changes in financial work incentives across workers with different characteristics (Adam and 
Phillips, 2013; Meghir and Phillips, 2009). For example, in terms of substitution effects, the 
following conclusions can be drawn: 
• Among men, the decision of whether or not to work is more responsive among those 
with low education than those with high levels of education.  
• For highly educated and wealthy men, taxes have little effect on the decision whether 
to work or not, nor how many hours are worked per week or per year. But taxes do 
affect these men’s total as well as taxable income through less quantifiable ‘work 
effort’ and tax avoidance.  
• For low education men, it has typically been assumed that tax and benefit incentives 
affect the participation decision, but not hours of work. However, there is increasing 
evidence that this view of male hours being relatively unresponsive to tax changes is 
becoming outdated – the proportion of men working part-time has increased 
significantly during the past 20 years (a trend that long predated the financial crisis – 
see Clarke and Bangham 2018; Belfield et al. 2017; Blundell et al. 2018). 
• Second earners in a household tend to be much more responsive to financial work 
incentives than the main earner 
• Participation (extensive) elasticities and intensive elasticities are particularly high 
among women who have young children.   
• Lone mothers in particular are very responsive to changes in work incentives, a 
finding observed across a number of studies looking at the impact of the introduction 
of Working Families Tax Credit (Brewer and Browne, undated). 
• Elasticities on both the intensive and extensive margins tend to be higher amongst 
the young and the old, for whom the trade-off between work and education or 
retirement respectively can be more finely balanced compared to the trade-off 
between work and ‘leisure’ that one might face during ‘prime’ working age. 
• Intensive elasticities tend to be higher over the course of a year or longer than over a 
shorter period, given the challenges in changing working practices in the short run. 
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The observation that men are somewhat less responsive than women, (or at least, primary 
earners are less responsive than second earners) to changes in earnings taxation is borne out 
in a recent review of the labour market effects of ten pilot CBI schemes (Gibson et al. 2018). 
Across five ‘negative income tax’ pilots introduced in the US in the 1970s, small negative 
employment effects at the intensive margin (hours) were observed for males who were 
household heads, and somewhat larger hours effects were observed for second earners and 
female household heads.  
On the basis of a detailed review of the literature and its applicability in a UK context, Adam 
and Phillips specify assumed elasticities to measure the substitution effect on the extensive 
margin for 85 distinct groups, defined in terms of income, age and family characteristics. On 
the basis that the intervening period has not produced any directly relevant studies that 
create a strong case for varying these assumed elasticities, we adopt these same elasticities 
in this study.  
The elasticities used to estimate substitution effects on the extensive margin in this study 
(taken directly from Adam and Phillips) are shown in Appendix B Tables B1, B2, B3, and B4. 
Given the uncertainty around the likely magnitude of labour supply responsiveness, three 
scenarios are identified – a low responsiveness scenario, central scenario, and high 
responsiveness scenario.  
These are elasticities of employment probability with respect to one minus the PTR. The 
interpretation of these elasticities is that they are a measure of the change in probability of 
employment from a 1 per cent change in the ‘gain-to-work’ (where the gain to work is 1-
PTR). Note that this is not quite the same as the more frequently reported elasticity of 
employment with respect to in-work income, but it is the more appropriate elasticity to use 
in the case of a policy change which affects out-of-work income as well as in-work income 
(see Adam and Phillips 2013 for a discussion). 
Adam and Phillips also specify assumed elasticities to measure the substitution effect on the 
intensive margin for 10 groups. The interpretation of these elasticities is that they measure 
the percentage change in hours worked for a given change in the marginal rate of effective 
taxation faced. We use slightly lower elasticities than Adam and Phillips to measure the 
responsiveness of hours worked amongst the highest paid 5% of workers. This is because we 
are interested in changes in labour supply whereas Adam and Phillips were interested in 
changes in taxable income; and as discussed above, taxable income at the top of the 
distribution tends to be more elastic with respect to tax changes than do hours worked. The 
elasticities used in this study are shown in Table B5. 
What about evidence in relation to income effects? 
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As with the literature on labour supply responses generally, it is difficult if not impossible to 
come to definitive conclusions on what the precise size of elasticities should be, but some 
generalisations are possible. 
The literature is unambiguous in a conclusion that income effects tend to be smaller than 
substitution effects. Indeed, it is for this reason that many studies – both theoretical and 
empirical – choose to ignore income effects entirely. Bargain et al. (2014) for example, in an 
analysis of labour supply responses across EU studies, conclude that ‘income elasticities are 
extremely small’. 
Beyond this, there is some evidence that, as with labour supply responses more generally, 
women with children tend to be more responsive (on both intensive and extensive margins) 
than men or single women. 
Putting some more specific numbers on things, Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), reviewing 
findings from a range of cross-country studies, report income elasticities for men typically 
around -0.1 but up to -0.3, whilst for married women they are around -0.2 with a range 
between -0.1 and -0.3. Note that income elasticities tend to be negative: an increase in net 
income leads to a fall in hours worked (intensive margin) or the probability of working 
(extensive margin). 
In a review of previous studies, Keane (2011) largely finds evidence for similarly-sized 
elasticities in relation to income effects – despite the fact that these studies took place in a 
range of countries using alternative methodologies during the previous three decades. 
Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998) find an income elasticity for women without children of 
0, whilst the elasticity is higher for those with children aged 0-2 (-0.185), declining as the age 
of youngest child increases to 3-4, 5-10 and 11+ to -0.173, -0.102 and -0.06 respectively. 
On the basis of these findings we propose to use the set of elasticity assumptions in Table A6 
to capture income effects. As with substitution effects, we propose a range of potential 
elasticities, captured through low, central and high responsiveness scenarios. 
Unfortunately, there is relatively less information on the size of income effects than there is 
on substitution effects, particularly in relation to recent UK studies. We have therefore 
decided not to identify separate income effect elasticities for individuals in different points of 







3.3.1 Aggregate results 
The headline results are summarised in Table 3.2.  
For each of the three policy options modelled, Table 3.2 shows the simulated labour supply 
response under three scenarios for the degree of labour supply responsiveness to a change in 
financial work incentives: a ‘central’ responsiveness scenario with low and high 
responsiveness scenarios either side of this. 
Column 1 shows the percentage change in total employment (the change on the extensive 
margin) resulting from the introduction to each of the three options, and where only 
substitution effects are considered. Under the central scenario, employment is projected to 
fall by 2%, 11% and 0.6% under policy options 1-3 respectively. 
Why is employment projected to fall? Under policy option 1 (the low-level CBI), the increase 
in income tax rates required to pay for the CBI shifts the balance of the trade-off between 
work and leisure slightly in favour of leisure on average, which is enough to induce some 
people to choose ‘leisure’ over work (where the term ‘leisure’ is defined in economists’ 
arguably paradoxical way to include childcare or other caring responsibilities).  
Under policy option 2 (the high-level CBI), both the higher level of out-of-work income and 
higher taxation of in-work income serve to accentuate the scale of these substitution effects. 
Under policy option 3, the scale of tax and benefit changes is much less substantial, resulting 
in only a small projected employment rate change. 
Column 2 also considers the change in employment from each of the three policy options 
modelled, but includes income effects as well as substitution effects. Incorporation of income 
effects does not change the aggregate results materially – the negative employment effect is 
only slightly different after inclusion of income effects. However, as we will see below, whilst 
the income effects have relatively little impact on the aggregate results, this hides the fact 
that they have quite significant positive and negative impacts in different parts of the income 
distribution, and these countervailing impacts offset each other in aggregate.  
Columns 3 and 4 show equivalent information but where the parameter of interest is the 
employment rate, rather than the employment level. 
Column 5 then looks at the change in aggregate hours worked under each policy option, 
looking initially at substitution effects only, but incorporating both the anticipated changes 
on the extensive and intensive margins (i.e. these results show the effect on hours worked of 
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the reduction in employment, and the changes in hours worked of those who remain in 
employment). 
The scale of the changes in percentage terms is clearly more significant than when we 
considered the extensive margin only – with this difference in relative scale of impact 
indicative of the extent to which the three policy options are projected to reduce hours 
worked as well as employment in total. But the relative scale of impact across the three 
policy options is similar as when the extensive margin only was considered. Again, 
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Low -1.1% -1.5% -0.70% -0.90% -1.9% -1.9% 
Central -1.8% -2.3% -1.10% -1.30% -4.2% -4.3% 




Low -5.2% -5.8% -3.10% -3.40% -9.4% -9.6% 
Central -9.6% -10.4% -5.70% -6.20% -24.9% -25.3% 




Low -0.4% -0.7% -0.20% -0.40% -1.0% -1.0% 
Central -0.6% -0.9% -0.40% -0.50% -1.9% -1.9% 





3.3.2 Results across the distribution 
The previous sub-section showed that the CBI policy options are projected to have quite 
negative labour supply effects, on both the extensive (employment) and intensive (hours) 
margins. But what explains these effects? One way of answering this question is to look in 
more detail at the projected labour supply effects in different parts of the income 
distribution. 
Chart 3.1 shows the projected labour supply impact of the CBI policy options on the extensive 
(employment rate) margin. For each of the three options, the chart shows the labour supply 
impact of the substitution effect, the income effect, and the combined effect respectively, for 
five quintiles of the distribution of net benefit unit income. 
Consider first the substitution effect. For each CBI policy option, the size of the negative 
employment impact increases as we move through the income distribution from the lowest 
to highest quintiles of net income. This partly reflects the fact that the employment rate 
increases across the income distribution (so a projected fall in the employment rate of say 2 
percentage points represents a larger proportionate fall in employment in the lowest income 
quintile compared to the highest income quintile). But more significantly, it reflects the fact 
that, whilst the Participation Tax Rate increases across the distribution, it increases more 
substantially at the top of the distribution than at the bottom. This is shown explicitly in Chart 
3.2. 
Recall that a higher PTR reflects worsened financial incentives to choose work over leisure. 
The CBI policy options result in increased PTRs because they tend to reduce the difference 
between net in-work income and out-of-work income (the CBI increases out-of-work income 
relative to the status quo, and whilst the CBI is not tapered away from those who are in-work 
and thus may result in higher incomes for some of those in work relative to the status quo, 
the scale of the income tax increases required to fund the CBI mean that the difference 
between in-work and out-of-work income deteriorates for virtually everyone).  
But it is at the top of the income distribution where PTRs increase most relative to the status 
quo (i.e. work incentives deteriorate the most) given that the scale of the income tax 
increases at this end of the distribution results in a particularly large eroding of the difference 
between in-work and out-of-work income. The high-level CBI scheme results in much larger 
increases in PTR than the low level CBI scheme, both because of the relative scale of the 
increase in out-of-work income, and because of the larger increases in income taxation to 





Chart 3.1: Changes in employment rate (extensive margin) across the income distribution 
  
Source: Fraser of Allander 
Chart 3.2: PTRs across the income distribution under status quo and modelled policies 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander 
What about income effects?  
Chart 3.1 shows that income effects have quite different impacts across the distribution. In 
the lower part of the income distribution, income effects have negative impacts on labour 
supply, accentuating the negative impact of the substitution effect. But at the top of the 
distribution, income effects have a positive impact on labour supply, mitigating some of the 
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This pattern can be explained relatively simply by considering a chart showing the change in 
benefit unit net income following the introduction of each CBI policy (Chart 3.3). Benefit units 
in the lower part of the distribution tend to see increases in their net income as a result of 
the CBI policies (with the CBI itself offsetting the higher tax rate paid on gross income), and 
so the income effect in itself reduces work incentives for these benefit units. But higher up 
the income distribution, the cash value of the CBI is more than offset by increased tax rates, 
so that benefit unit net income is lower than under the status quo. 
 
Chart 3.3: Benefit unit net equivalised income across the income distribution under status quo 
and modelled policies 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander 
 
What about the intensive margin? Chart 3.4 shows results in the same format as Chart 3.1 – 
where results are broken down into substitution and income effects and by income quintile – 
incorporating impacts on the intensive as well as extensive margins. 
The overall pattern here is similar to the picture for extensive effects only. The substitution 
effect results in a larger proportionate decline in hours worked as we move through the 
income distribution, but this effect is offset by the income effect. 
What determines the size of the substitution effect on the intensive margin is the change in 
marginal effective tax rate (METR) following the introduction of a CBI. And again, it is in the 
upper half of the income distribution where the largest increases in the marginal tax rate are 
seen, particularly in the cases of the high-level CBIs.  
Chart 3.5 plots the average METRs faced in each vigintile of the income distribution. Under 
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quite high METRs as various means-tested benefits are withdrawn with each additional 
pound of income. In the middle of the income distribution, the typical METR is just over 0.3 
(the basic rate of income tax is 20% whilst the employee NICs contribution is 12%). Families 
at the top of the distribution face higher marginal tax rates. 
The low-level CBI does result in a fall in average METRs in the lower third of the income 
distribution, and hence some increase in average hours worked (although individuals in this 
part of the distribution are typically assumed to be not very responsive to changes in work 
incentives on the intensive margin). But in general, the CBI policies result in increased METRs, 
for most of the distribution in the case of the low level CBI, and for all of the distribution in 
the case of the high level CBIs. 
The high-level CBI result in METRs of around 70% in the lower part of the distribution. This 
reflects the basic rate of tax of 59%, on top of which there remains employee NICs and the 
withdrawal of housing benefits and disabled elements of Universal Credit. The METRs 
increase to over 80% in the top part of the distribution, reflecting the income tax rates 
required to fund the CBI. 
So, the scale of the substitution effect – and its pattern across the income distribution – is 
determined by the pattern of changes to METRs. The income effect on the intensive margin is 
again influenced by the pattern of change in net benefit unit income, and has broadly the 



























Chart 3.4: Change in hours worked (intensive and extensive margins combined) under three 
modelled policies, across the distribution of net income 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander 
 
Chart 3.5: Benefit unit net marginal effective tax rate across the income distribution under 
status quo and modelled policies 
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The results indicate a large negative labour supply response to the introduction of the 
proposed CBI policies. The size of this labour supply response is lowest under the low-level 
CBI, but is larger under the high-level CBI. 
The ‘substitution effect’ of the CBI policies induces a reduction in labour supply across the 
distribution. This is because, although a CBI scheme leads to an increase in net income for 
some households, it reduces work incentives on the extensive margin by reducing the 
difference between in-work and out-of-work income, and it reduces work incentives on the 
intensive margin by levying a higher rate of marginal taxation. 
Income effects accentuate this negative labour supply impact in the lower part of the income 
distribution (as the scheme increases net income relative to the status quo) but mitigate it 
towards the top of the distribution (where reductions in net income relative to the status quo 
offset some of the impact of reduced work incentives arising from the substitution effect). 
The fact that the modelling suggests that labour supply would likely fall following the 
introduction of a CBI, even in the lower part of the income distribution, might run counter to 
some people’s expectations. After all, an argument often put forward for CBI policies is that 
they may improve work incentives because they do not withdraw out-of-work and low-
income benefits as people move into employment.  
However, the CBI policies modelled here do retain some means tested elements of the 
existing benefit system (including housing benefit and child disability elements of Universal 
Credit). And because the policy has been designed to be wholly or largely funded through the 
income tax schedule, those in work face higher marginal and average rates of income 
taxation than they do currently. Hence the policies modelled here tend not to reduce 
marginal effective tax rates, or participation tax rates, compared to the status quo. It is 
conceivable that a CBI funded through increased taxation on wealth, land or pollution might 
not induce such unambiguously negative labour supply effects, but it has been beyond the 
scope of this report to consider the economic impacts of funding a CBI through these 
alternative channels.  
It is worth pointing out that, whilst the labour supply effects are quite significant, the impact 
on taxable income could be even larger, given that taxable income tends to be more 
responsive to tax increases than hours worked in themselves. 
There is of course a degree of uncertainty around the size of the potential behavioural 
response, and hence the scale of the labour supply impact. The extent to which people might 
respond to a change in their financial work incentives – measured by the various elasticities – 
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has been informed by existing empirical evidence, but is subject to uncertainty for a range of 
reasons. 
Uncertainty is inherent in the existing estimates of the behavioural response to specific policy 
changes. In particular, it is difficult to estimate the behavioural response to a given tax or 
benefit change because no ‘counterfactual’ policy option can ever be observed. Various 
statistical techniques exist to try to estimate what the counterfactual might be, but there is 
rarely one definitive way to do this. For example, estimates of the elasticity of income with 
respect to changes in the Additional Rate of income tax in the UK range from 0.05 to 0.95 
(Phillips and Browne, 2017). 
But even where there is a reasonable degree of uncertainty about the degree of 
responsiveness of a particular group to a particular policy change in the past, there is a 
question about the transferability of that estimate to the specific case of a CBI in Scotland. 
The question of the ‘transferability’ of a given elasticity estimate to the case of a CBI in 
Scotland will depend on factors like the comparability of labour-market institutional factors 
and broader social policy context, the magnitude and salience of policy change, and the type 
of policy change assessed. 
Nonetheless, whilst there is significant uncertainty around the exact scale of the behavioural 
response, we feel confident that the direction and broad range of changes indicated here are 





Section 4: Modelling the Macroeconomic Impact of a Scottish 
Citizen’s Basic Income 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous section looked at the potential labour supply response to the introduction of a 
Citizen’s Basic Income (CBI). But the wider macroeconomic impacts of a CBI have rarely been 
analysed.  
The proposed Scottish CBI here is substantial, permanent and unconditional. This means that 
such a change in policy will undoubtedly have structural impacts upon the economy.26  
This section therefore looks at the macroeconomic impacts of introducing such a CBI27.  
Why is this important? 
The balance of economic activity is ultimately crucial to wider government objectives, including 
inclusive growth. Levels of economic activity are also important for raising general taxation 
that funds public services. In addition, it is likely that there will be possible policy trade-offs or, 
opportunities for ‘double-dividends’, from such a policy.  Of course, the existence of trade-offs 
would not in itself militate against the introduction of the CBI; it simply clarifies any 
macroeconomic costs of doing so.28  
Accordingly, we employ a well-respected economic model to explore the possible 
macroeconomic consequences of a CBI. The model that we use is a Computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE) model of the Scottish economy, developed by the Fraser of Allander 
Institute. Such models are useful tools to help analyse and understand the possible impacts of 
policy. But as with any model it is important to be clear about the data and assumptions used, 
and how these drive the results.  
                                                          
26 There are very few existing studies of macroeconomic impacts of a CBI, with apparently no theoretical 
analyses and no papers in refereed journals. However, Nikiforos et al. (2017) and the Penn Wharton Budget 
Model  (PWBM, 2018) provide recent empirical analyses of the introduction of a hypothetical, substantial CBI in 
the US economy, although they come to radically different conclusions about its likely impact, reflecting their 
conflicting views on supply-side impacts. So the macroeconomic evidence is as yet very thin and contradictory. 
27 There are of course all manner of potential costs and benefits with such a major policy shift, including impacts 
upon wellbeing, health outcomes and social cohesion. This section is limited to the macroeconomic impacts.  
28 Some of the benefits of the CBI may have a positive impact on well-being, but may not affect economic 
activity or do so adversely.  
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Moreover, modelling of this nature has to be employed with particular caution, particularly 
give the scale of the proposal.  
Our results should therefore be interpreted as indicative with the key objective being to show 
the scale of possible impacts and – crucially – the channels through which different factors will 
have an impact. In doing so, they also highlight where complementary policies may be best 
targeted.  
It should be noted that the proposed CBI we model could not be implemented by a Scottish 
Government under the current fiscal arrangements, which further highlights the hypothetical 
nature of the modelling work. In our modelling work, the net cost of the CBI is met by a rise in 
the average income tax rate. In what follows, we focus upon the low-level CBI29.  
From a macroeconomic perspective, there are two channels through which a CBI will have an 
impact:  
• Demand side  
• Supply side  
In fact, the planned implementation of a CBI in the Scottish context introduces a rather 
complex combination of demand and supply impacts. However, to simplify and clarify the 
analysis, it is helpful initially to consider these in isolation. 
In Section 4.2, we summarise our modelling framework. (A full account is in Annex D) 
In Section 4.3, we focus on the demand side. In fact, “the” demand side impact is itself a 
combination of different disturbances, so again we decompose these for clarity. Results, not 
surprisingly, depend on assumptions about the financing of the CBI.  
On the supply side, the crux is how households react to changes in tax and the CBI, and the 
knock-on implications of these behavioural responses for the wider economy.  
We adopt two main approaches on the supply side.  
In the first approach, explored in Sections 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6, we assume that the supply side is 
characterised by imperfect competition and wage bargaining. In Section 4.4 we analyse the 
basic labour market models in the macro-to-macro approach. At one end of the spectrum 
workers may not fully value even their own CBI payments when bargaining over wages, since 
these are paid irrespective of employment status. At the other end, they may fully value all CBI 
payments, irrespective of who the recipients are. In this latter case, workers regard the 
                                                          
29 The scale of the net cost of the high-level CBI is such that it exceeds the current level of total Scottish 
Government expenditure, and a change of this order of magnitude proves challenging for the solution of any 
macroeconomic model. Accordingly, we focus exclusively on the low-level CBI proposal. 
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reduction in inequality and poverty as part of their “social wage”. In Section 4.5 we provide a 
summary of the macroeconomic impacts of the various bargaining models and compare them 
with an alternative policy of modifying universal credit. In Section 4.6 we explore a range of 
additional supply-side impacts that have been associated with the introduction of a CBI, and 
assess the sensitivity of the modelling results to skill and sectoral disaggregation. 
In the second major approach, developed in Section 4.7, we assume that individuals’/groups 
of individuals’ labour supply decisions are governed by the changes in incentives implied by 
the microsimulation analysis and analysed in detail in Chapter 3. We use aggregate measures 
of these estimates to generate a shock to the supply side of the macroeconomy.  
Of course, there may be other links between a CBI and the economy, most notably through 
improvements in productivity, should it lead to better health and education outcomes. Whilst 
the evidence on such links is slight (and typically qualitative), we consider the principle behind 
such an argument and explore its potential impact.  
In Section 4.8 we present a summary and conclusions. 
 
4.2 The modelling framework 
We first provide an overview of our modelling framework and a brief summary of the structure 
of our CGE model.  
 
4.2.1 Overview of the modelling framework 
Recall that our modelling framework is summarised by Figure 4.1.  








For the purposes of the macroeconomic modelling we take the microsimulation analysis, - 
which identifies the “immediate” impact of the introduction of the CBI on the distribution of 
income across individuals and households – together with the fiscal assumption (typically fiscal 
neutrality) to inform the scale of the demand side disturbance.  
Table 4.1 summarises the substantial immediate impacts of the CBI on household income (in 
2019 prices) across 5 quintiles within the income distribution. As intended, the policy heralds 
a significant societal shift. 
 
Table 4.1 Income impacts by household (2019 basic prices). 
Household 
Group 
Total quintile income 
(£ million) Average income 
Average change 
per year Change (percentage) 
HG1 10,166 £9,967 £3,640 36.52% 
HG2 14,438 £13,621 £2,860 21.00% 
HG3 23,812 £22,465 £1,924 8.56% 
HG4 34,129 £31,311 £156 0.50% 
HG5 54,860 £54,317 -£5,304 -9.76% 
 
In what follows next, we take two approaches.  
Firstly, there is the ‘macro-to-macro approach’, which is reflected in the red loop in Figure 4.1 
and explored in Sections 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 below. Here we respond to evidence that there are 
imperfections in labour markets. We therefore implement a range of alternative bargaining 
models.  
Secondly, there is the ‘micro-to macro’ approach, which is reflected in the blue loop in Figure 
4.1. and implemented in Section 4.7 below. Here we take the estimate of each individual’s/ 
group’s change in labour supply in response to the introduction of the CBI – as set out in Section 
3 - and explore the subsequent macroeconomic impact. This approach is predicated upon the 
assumption that labour market institutions (firms and unions) are effectively a veil: individuals’ 
decisions ultimately determine aggregate labour supply.  
Finally, and as highlighted above, it should be noted that we focus primarily on the low-level 
CBI as the option in our modelling – Policy Option 1 (although we briefly explore the 






4.2.2 Introduction to the general equilibrium model 
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models provide a detailed description of the economy 
which captures the key interlinkages between the private sector, households, government, 
international trade and the labour market.  
They combine economic data with a complex system of equations to give an accurate picture 
of the structure and operation of the economy.  
These models are ideal for simulating the impact of policy. They are used extensively by 
governments to assess the merits of alternative policy choices.  
The model used here (and summarised in Annex D) is one of Scotland.  
Scotland’s integration with the rest-of-the-UK (RUK) and the rest-of-the-world (ROW) is 
captured through detailed trade and migration flows.  
Broadly defined, it is a multi-sectoral, forward looking, imperfectly competitive CGE model.  
The outputs generated include:  
• GDP, employment, unemployment, capital stock, population, real wages, and CPI  
• For each sector: gross output, intermediate inputs, value-added, employment and 
capital stocks, and prices 
• Public expenditure and tax revenues 
• Households disaggregated by income 
• Labour market disaggregated by skill (skilled/unskilled). 
Model parameters come from several sources. A large number are calibrated using a Social 
Accounting Matrix (SAM). The SAM is constructed based on the analytical Input-Output (IO) 
tables produced by the Scottish Government30.  
Others come from “external” sources, including the econometric estimation of key behavioural 
equations (such as the wage curve and the migration function), and from the literature.  
All simulations isolate the macroeconomic effects that are attributable solely to the 
introduction of the CBI.  
So all the effects should be understood as indicating what is likely to happen to the 
macroeconomy relative to what would happen in the absence of the CBI. 
                                                          
3030 A full specification of the methodology underlying the creation of the Scottish SAM is available (see Emonts-
Holley et al, 2014). 
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Importantly, this also indicates the likely impact relative to the rest of the UK (and other 
countries more broadly) in response to a Scottish-specific CBI. 
 
4.3 The demand-side impacts of the CBI 
The impacts of the CBI on demand are identical for both our micro-to-macro and our macro-
to-macro simulations. 
For now, we abstract from all potential supply-side responses to the CBI31.  
The results are not simply of interest in providing a “decomposition” of the overall impacts of 
the CBI. In particular, if nominal wages are genuinely inflexible - motivated, for example, by the 
prevalence of national bargaining or commitment to a “social wage”, both of which are 
discussed more fully in Section 4.4 – then the results reflect the likely macroeconomic 
response.  
The demand side impacts of a CBI depend, as we would expect, on the method of financing. 
Here we consider two alternatives, one of which is hypothetical, but serves to aid the 
interpretation of our results: 
• Externally-funded or deficit-financed CBI (hypothetical) 
• Balanced budget CBI: fiscally neutral, involving a combination of income tax rises and a 
reduction in other social security payments 
We consider each of these cases (and a number of related sub-cases) in turn. 
 
4.3.1 Externally-funded or deficit-financed CBI 
Consider first, the case of a Scottish deficit-financed (or externally financed, for example from 
a Sovereign Wealth Fund) CBI.  
Note this scenario is unrealistic, it provides a useful benchmark to assist with interpretation. 
External funding implies an injection of new spending through the substantial increase in (net) 
transfers. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.2 summarise the short- and long-run impacts of an 
externally funded CBI32. In the short-run capital stocks are fixed, but over the long-run they 
adjust fully.  The entire adjustment paths for GDP and employment are presented in Figure 2. 
                                                          
31 We achieve this in our macroeconomic modelling by imposing a fixed nominal wage in the labour market and, 
initially, assuming no migration. 
32 It should be noted that all results are presented relative to a baseline. For example, a long-run value of -1% 
simply says that relative to the baseline, the economy will be 1% smaller.  
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Table 4.2 Short and long run impact of an externally funded, Policy Option 1 (low-level CBI)33 
 Short-Run Long-Run 
GDP (£m) 1.05% 3.46% 
Consumption 6.78% 8.61% 
Investment 5.62% 4.00% 
Total Exports -2.69% 0.00% 
Total Imports 4.87% 4.85% 
Nominal Gross Wage 0.00% 0.00% 
Real take home wage -1.38% 0.00% 
CPI 1.40% 0.00% 
Real cost of capital 0.95% 0.00% 
Unemployment Rate (pp difference) -1.39% -2.84% 
Employment 1.48% 3.03% 
Total HH Tax 1.99% 3.34% 
Income Tax 1.48% 3.03% 
Transfers to HH from Gov 117.37% 117.37% 
Real Scottish Government Consumption 0.00% 0.00% 
HG1 Lowest income group’s consumption  29.78% 31.46% 
HG2 Second quintile’s consumption 17.26% 19.17% 
HG3 Third quintile’s consumption 7.49% 9.31% 
HG4 Fourth quintile’s consumption 0.42% 2.37% 









                                                          
33 While it matters for only one or two results, for consistency we report results to the second decimal point 
throughout this section of the report and in the associated annexes. 
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Figure 4.2 Adjustment paths of GDP and employment with an externally funded, Policy Option 
1 (low-level CBI) 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander  
In the short-run both GDP and employment rise, and the positive impacts grow over time. 
In the long-run, there is a substantial rise in consumption of 8.6%, which ultimately generates 
a 3.5% stimulus to GDP – primarily in response to a substantial 117% increase in government 
transfers to households. The import intensity of consumption is reflected in the 4.9% rise in 
imports.  
The changes are strongly progressive. In the long-run, the lower-income household groups 
benefit through a large increase in consumption of 31.5% (household group 1), 19.2% 
(household group 2) and 9.31% (household group 3).  
However, the distinctive impacts among income groups is an important result and of all 
subsequent simulations: the expenditure of higher income households is more labour-
intensive and less value-added intensive than lower income households. So although all 
household groups’ incomes and expenditure rise, this is concentrated on lower income 
households, and so on capital and value-added-intensive goods.  
Clearly, if this case was feasible, it would be a rather attractive one: economic activity and 
employment expand significantly and all households benefit. Both the distributional and 























4.3.2 Balanced-budget implementation of the CBI 
Not surprisingly, the imposition of a balanced-budget constraint modifies the estimated 
macroeconomic impacts significantly.  
In particular, the net transfers to households now have ultimately to be funded by a reduction 
in the incomes of other households. 
Accordingly, in the present context the macroeconomic impacts reflect the net effect of two 
countervailing forces: the increase in the incomes and consumption of low-income groups and 
the corresponding reductions amongst higher income households.  
In the context of a highly aggregated macroeconomic model there would be a presumption of 
a net stimulus to consumption, reflecting the greater marginal propensity to consume of lower 
income groups.  
However, in the context of multi-sectoral models such as ours even the direction of the net 
effect is unclear, since, as already noted, changes in the composition of consumption – 
reflecting the redistribution of income by household – can have macroeconomic impacts, since 
it involves an increase in the capital- and value-added intensity of consumption. 
 
Income-tax-(and partial benefits)-financed CBI 
Here the CBI is funded – after eliminating some other benefits and personal allowances – solely 
by rises in income tax rates.34  
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.3 report the short and long run results  














                                                          
34 The macroeconomic analysis focuses on the impacts of the required changes in income tax rates. The other 
changes are assumed to have no behavioural effects. 
35 The average tax rate in the base year is 14.1%; in this simulation it rises to 24.5%. 
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Table 4.3. Short and long run impacts of an income tax-financed, Policy Option 1 (low-level CBI) 
 Base CBI HG1 change to HG2 
 SR LR SR LR 
GDP (£m) -0.15% 0.10% -0.08% 0.44% 
Consumption -0.13% 0.00% -0.22% 0.20% 
Investment 0.19% 0.46% 0.75% 0.89% 
Total Exports -0.30% 0.00% -0.52% 0.00% 
Total Imports -0.08% -0.01% -0.24% -0.14% 
Nominal Gross Wage 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Real take home wage -13.10% -13.06% -13.28% -12.94% 
CPI 0.06% 0.00% 0.26% 0.00% 
Real cost of capital 0.09% 0.00% 0.18% 0.00% 
Unemployment Rate (pp 
difference) 
0.29% 0.13% 0.22% -0.11% 
Employment -0.31% -0.14% -0.23% 0.12% 
Total HH Tax 36.60% 36.82% 36.71% 36.80% 
Income Tax 73.29% 73.62% 73.47% 73.39% 
Transfers to HH from Gov 117.37% 117.37% 117.37% 117.37% 
Real Scottish Government 
Consumption 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
HG1 Lowest income group’s 
consumption  
30.67% 30.76% 31.20% 31.55% 
HG2 Second quintile’s 
consumption 
15.10% 15.22% 14.94% 15.34% 
HG3 Third quintile’s consumption 3.53% 3.65% 3.42% 3.81% 
HG4 Fourth quintile’s 
consumption 
-6.46% -6.32% -6.53% -6.09% 
HG5 Highest income group’s 
consumption 
-12.62% -12.48% -12.64% -12.18% 
 
Note that transfers to households increase by the same amount as in the externally funded 
case (117.4% - a 1.2 fold increase).  
However, in this case the transfers are funded by the average income tax rate (and revenues) 
increasing sharply with a corresponding fall in the real take home wage (of 13.0% in the long-
run), given the assumed inflexibility of the nominal wage. 
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Ultimately, the impact of the increases in the consumption of low-income groups is balanced 
by reduced consumption for higher income groups - GDP increases by only 0.10%, although 
employment falls by 0.14%. The overall macroeconomic impact is negative initially.  
The impacts on the consumption of household quintiles are, of course, very marked, as 
indicated in Figure 4.3, reflecting a major redistribution across income groups.  
 
Figure 4.3 Household consumption changes with an income tax-financed, Policy Option 1 (low-
level CBI) 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander  
 
The consumption of the lowest income group, HG1 increases by 30.8%, whereas that of the 
highest income group falls by 12.5% - reflecting the substantial net income tax rises on higher 
income households’ disposable income necessary to finance the CBI.  
 
The importance of the composition of consumption 
Not surprisingly, the outcomes reported above are sensitive to the precise composition of 
changes in the consumption of low- and high-income groups.  
The results reported in the first two columns of Table 4.2 reflect the consumption patterns of 
our base year data. However, in the face of any substantial redistribution of income, the 
assumption of unchanging household quintiles becomes questionable. In effect, some 






















As purely illustrative of the importance of the assumptions about expenditure, columns 3 and 
4 of Table 4.2 show the difference in results if the lowest income group (HG1) were to adopt 
the expenditure pattern of the second lowest (HG2).  
The impact on GDP becomes bigger, and the net employment effect is now positive36.  
Overall, it seems likely that the net effect of the substantial redistribution of income will have 
fairly modest effects on demand. 
 
Comparison with an income-tax–financed increase in government expenditure 
Here we increase Scottish Government-controlled expenditure exogenously by 21.8%, an 
amount equivalent to the CBI transfers to lower income households, and adjust the income tax 
rate to close the budget constraint.  






























                                                          
36 Of course, this does not capture the switch among quintiles in the face of any substantial redistribution of 
income, but it illustrates the significance of the pattern of consumption. 
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Table 4.4 Income-tax-financed increase in government expenditure, Policy Option 1 (low-level 
CBI) 
 SR LR 
GDP (£m) 2.29% 2.82% 
Consumption -5.31% -3.43% 
Investment 4.73% 1.17% 
Total Exports 0.30% 0.00% 
Total Imports -0.03% 0.27% 
Nominal Gross Wage 0.00% 0.00% 
Real take home wage -15.67% -11.20% 
CPI 0.19% 0.00% 
Real cost of capital 0.51% 0.00% 
Unemployment Rate (pp difference) -3.98% -3.79% 
Employment 4.24% 4.04% 
Total HH Tax 48.10% 35.41% 
Income Tax 95.75% 69.98% 
Transfers to HH from Gov 0.00% 0.00% 
Real Scottish Government Consumption 21.83% 21.83% 
HG1 Lowest income group’s consumption  -0.23% 0.00% 
HG2 Second quintile’s consumption -1.72% -0.99% 
HG3 Third quintile’s consumption -3.27% -1.95% 
HG4 Fourth quintile’s consumption -5.12% -3.12% 
HG5 Highest income group’s consumption -11.05% -7.57% 
 
The impact of this general fiscal expansion is quite different from those of the CBI.  
First, the impact on the economy is much greater (GDP rises by 2.8% as compared to 0.1% in 
the long run, with employment up 4.0%). 
Of course, consumption falls (by 3.4% in the long run) as the increase in government 
expenditure is funded through an increase in the average income tax rate, which reduces 
households’ disposable income and consumption.  
But by funding current government expenditure, which has a lower propensity to import than 
current consumption, this provides a bigger stimulus than the CBI.  




4.3.3 Summary of demand-side impacts 
There are a number of conclusions that follow from simulating the impact of the balanced-
budget CBI under the assumptions of a fixed nominal wage and no migration. 
First, and most important, any balanced-budget CBI ensures that the gains of lower income 
households must ultimately be funded by higher income households. 
Second, while higher income households have higher marginal propensities to save, their 
consumption is typically less value-added and more labour intensive than lower income 
households. The net impact on economic activity is therefore positive, but modest. In short, 
gains from increased consumption amongst lower income households, are largely offset by the 
reduction in consumption of higher income households.  
Third, the scale and direction (of the modest) net macroeconomic impact of an income tax 
financed CBI on demand is governed by the scale of the changes in disposable incomes of each 
household group and their precise pattern of expenditure. If these were to alter in a manner 
consistent with the changes in median disposable income for each quintile the net 
macroeconomic impact would likely be even more negligible. 
Fourth, the impact of a comparable balanced budget expansion in which income tax revenues 
fund government spending (instead of a CBI) would be unambiguously positive given the lower 
propensity to import of government spending.   
Overall, then, the presence of a “fiscal neutrality” constraint makes it likely that the overall 
impact of the CBI on aggregate demand is modest.  
We now turn to explore the consequences of relaxing these restrictions, and fully 
accommodating possible supply side responses to the CBI.  
 
4.4 Supply side changes: the “macro-to-macro” simulations 
Our primary focus in this section is on supply side impacts.  
We consider the impact of the CBI on individuals’ (and groups of individuals’) supply of labour 
on the macro-economy in our micro-to-macro simulations in Section 4.7 below. Here we focus 
on the macro-to-macro analysis (Figure 4.1).37  
                                                          
37 However, as we have already noted, the macro-to-macro simulations are not independent of the 
microsimulation analysis, which identifies the scale of the redistribution across household quintiles resulting 
from the rises in income tax rates (and the scale of any associated fiscal stimulus) and informs our assumptions 
about the likely responses of those bargaining over wages. 
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Our earlier discussion identifies a range of potential supply-side impacts. We briefly consider 
each of these, starting with the potential adverse impacts of a CBI. 
First, there is the possible response of wage bargaining to any rise in income tax to fund a CBI.  
As we have seen, a CBI would result in a substantial cut in real take home wages. How likely is 
it that workers would be willing to accept this and not seek to bid up their wages? 
The conventional bargaining view in economics assumes that workers would not accept this.  
Instead they would seek to restore their real take home wage to its original level, with adverse 
consequences for competitiveness.  
But contrary to this conventional view, it may also seem unreasonable to assume that workers 
do not value their CBI at least to some extent. 
We therefore explore the impact of workers fully valuing their own CBI payments, which 
represents a reasonable intermediate position. Here the personal CBI exactly compensates for 
the reduction in their take home pay in this case.  
We also explore the case where workers take into account the full impact of the CBI on their 
total family income; in this case they only seek compensating wage rises to make up for any 
loss of family income. 
Second, there may be adverse migration responses to higher taxes and benefits.  
The conventional migration model in economics links net migration to real take home wages 
and unemployment rates. Major falls in real take home pay may lead to outmigration. 
However, it would seem irrational for migrants, in particular, not to value a CBI since it would 
form part of the financial gain to migration. There is a fairly compelling case that migration 
should be linked to the real wage adjusted for personal, and indeed family, CBI payments. 
Third, non-work is now more attractive than work at the margin. The conventional bargaining 
model argues that an increase in benefits increases worker bargaining power. This would be 
expected to lead to upward pressure on wages, and a deterioration in competitiveness. (We 
address this issue in Section 4.6 below.) 
What about the potential beneficial supply-side impacts of a CBI.  
First, the notion of a “social wage” may result in workers accepting lower take-home pay if they 
value an improvement in income distribution and reduction in poverty. In fact, this case can be 
regarded as the opposite case of the bargaining model discussed above, one in which workers 
fully value all CBI payments, irrespective of to whom they are paid.  
Second, social wage considerations may also apply to migrants either helping to offset any 
negative push effect out of Scotland (or indeed encourage more people to locate here).  The 
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notion that migrants would be likely to take a more holistic view of the introduction of the CBI 
seems compelling, since they are directly comparing (by presumption) a location in which 
neither CBI payments nor the associated tax rises are present. 
Third, it has been argued that benefits act as a subsidy to search activity. A CBI may improve 
the efficiency of labour market search activity and stimulate the supply side. (We explore this 
issue in Section 4.6 below.) 
Finally, a number of commentators have suggested that a CBI could generate a benefit in the 
form of higher productivity arising from e.g.: improved health, education and training, which 
we address in Section 4.6 below. 
We next explore the macroeconomic effects each of the alternative characterisations of wage 
bargaining. We begin by considering potential wage and migration effects.   
We take the most reasonable assumption to be that employees bargain so as to maintain their 
personal disposable incomes (so that their personal CBI payments are fully taken into account). 
There is, as far as we are aware, little empirical evidence either way. However, it is easiest to 
consider this case after analysing the limiting case of the conventional bargaining (and 
migration) model, which focuses exclusively on the real take home wage. 
 
4.4.1 The adverse impact of the rise in income tax rates in the conventional bargaining and 
migration models 
In the conventional bargaining model workers focus on their net of tax take home wage38.  
This assumes that whilst workers do receive the CBI, this (and other non-wage income) has no 
direct impact on their bargaining behaviour. In effect, workers do not take into full account the 
financial value of the CBI to themselves and families; it is given zero weight in the bargaining 
process. What matters to them is their relative position.  
In the present case, the shock to the supply side is the change in the average income tax rate 
required to fund the CBI. This is exactly the same as for our analysis of demand side effects 
above.  
Under this approach, there is now an adverse supply effect associated with the rise in the 
average income tax rate since workers now bargain for higher wages in an attempt to restore 
their net of tax real consumption wage.  
                                                          
38 The formal model is briefly summarised in Annex D.  
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This has adverse competitiveness effects on trade and therefore would, in isolation, induce a 
contraction in economic activity and employment.  
We know from column 2 of Table 4.3 that the demand effect of the CBI is ultimately only 
moderately expansionary (0.1% increase in GDP). However, we also know that the real take 
home wage falls substantially (by 13%), so we would anticipate that the supply impact would 
strongly dominate. This does indeed prove to be the case. 
The first two columns of Table 4.5 report the economic impacts of the CBI when workers 
bargain over their net of tax real wage. Figure 4.4 illustrates the time path of GDP and 
employment.  
The result is a contraction in economic activity with GDP falling by 8.8% and employment by 
9.7%, with investment falling by less (8.9%), reflecting some substitution away from the now 
more expensive labour in favour of capital.  
Workers are only partially successful in restoring their real net of tax wage, which ultimately 
falls by 9.9% (compare to column 2 of Table 4.3).  




































Table 4.5 Short and long run impacts of an income tax-financed, low-level CBI with bargaining 
(and no migration), Policy Option 1 (low-level CBI) 
 SR LR 
GDP (£m) -2.61% -8.79% 
Consumption 0.40% -4.65% 
Investment -7.57% -7.86% 
Total Exports -3.43% -10.52% 
Total Imports -0.18% -1.77% 
Nominal Gross Wage 10.17% 13.22% 
Real take home wage -6.01% -9.93% 
CPI 1.62% 4.00% 
Real cost of capital 1.19% 3.16% 
Unemployment Rate (pp difference) 4.38% 9.14% 
Employment -4.66% -9.73% 
Total HH Tax 43.22% 50.89% 
Income Tax 84.08% 102.01% 
Transfers to HH from Gov 117.37% 117.37% 
Real Scottish Government Consumption 0.00% 0.00% 
HG1 Lowest income group’s consumption  29.76% 26.68% 
HG2 Second quintile’s consumption 14.79% 10.72% 
HG3 Third quintile’s consumption 4.02% -0.27% 
HG4 Fourth quintile’s consumption -5.10% -10.22% 
HG5 Highest income group’s consumption -11.95% -18.38% 
 
There is a substantial fall in economic activity even in the short run, and this grows through 
time, as is apparent in Figure 4.4. 
The impacts of the CBI on the distribution of consumption across households is less positive 
for lower income groups, and more negative for higher income groups than before.  
In large part this reflects the fall in aggregate consumption of -4.7%. Of course, higher income 
groups are impacted disproportionately so there is still some redistribution, with the 
consumption of the lowest income group growing by 26.7%, while the highest income group’s 
consumption falls by 18.4%. 
The scale of the effects reflects the fact that the CBI is not linked in any way to employment 
status: it is paid entirely unconditionally to workers (and non-workers). With a CBI, workers 
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continue to put in the same effort, but the return from working is now reduced (in relative 
terms).  
` 
Figure 4.4. Adjustment paths of GDP and employment of income tax-financed, Policy Option 1 
(low-level CBI) with bargaining over the net of tax real wage 
 




The scale of economic impact is a reflection of the size of the rise in tax required to fund the 
implementation of the CBI.  
If migrants are motivated solely by the take home real wage (and unemployment rate), the 
impact would be greater than indicated in Table 4.5.39 The rise in unemployment and fall in 
the real net of tax wage, would lead to net out-migration.  
Note, as economic activity declines, so do other taxes – including devolved taxes - and this 
would result in a further contraction. 
Overall, if workers’ and migrants’ focus is the real net-of-tax wage rate then the introduction 
of a CBI of this scale would have negative – and substantial – effects on macroeconomic 
outcomes.40  
                                                          
39 The formal migration model is outlined in Appendix D. 






















The main lesson to be drawn is that policymakers need to be aware of the possibility of such 
“wage push” effects and respond accordingly.   
We now turn to possible alternative motivations for workers and migrants that may partially 
counteract wage push effects.  
 
4.4.2 The impact of the rise in income tax rates and migration models with workers and migrants 
fully valuing their own CBI payments 
A key issue is how likely workers (we consider migrants below) choose to value a CBI in their 
wage bargaining.  
It is possible, at least to some extent, to argue that they may account for the value of their 
personal CBI (in excess of foregone other benefits and the personal allowance) when pressing 
for “compensating” wage rises.41   
The difficulty, as noted above, is the unconditional nature of the CBI, which is paid even if the 
worker withdraws from the labour force altogether; it is not part of their net wage.  
But what if policymakers successfully tie any tax rises to workers’ own personal CBI so that they 
modify their wage claims? Clearly, this would moderate the scale of the “wage push” response: 
workers in this case “only” seek compensation for the reduction in their net personal income 
arising from the introduction of the CBI (i.e. the excess of the value of their own CBI over the 
value of the loss of benefits and the personal allowance.)  
The adverse competitiveness effects on trade are substantially reduced – see Table 4.6. Figure 
4.5 illustrates the time path of GDP and employment. 
The result is still a significant contraction in economic activity with GDP ultimately being 4.4% 
and employment 5.0% below where they would have been in the absence of the CBI.  
However, while the adverse impacts on economic activity are moderated it does imply a 
greater fall in the take home wage – workers give up some of their wages for the CBI (11.5% 
reduction as compared to 9.9%).  




                                                          
41 Recall that we simulate the taxes and transfers required to fund the CBI net of the reduction in other benefits 
and personal allowances. The assumption is that individuals feel fully “compensated” for these losses by the 
payment of the CBI. Only the tax rate changes required to fund the net transfers induce behavioural change and 
it is only that part of CBI in excess of the value of reduced other benefits and the absence of personal 
allowances that is responsible for the rise in income tax rates in the model.  
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Table 4.6. Short and long run impacts of an income tax-financed, Policy Option 1 (low-level CBI), 
with workers fully valuing their own CBI payments (and no migration) 
 SR LR 
GDP (£m) -1.63% -4.35% 
Consumption 0.21% -2.31% 
Investment -4.51% -3.71% 
Total Exports -2.20% -5.28% 
Total Imports -0.14% -0.88% 
Nominal Gross Wage 6.08% 6.29% 
Real take home wage -8.82% -11.50% 
CPI 1.00% 1.95% 
Real cost of capital 0.75% 1.54% 
Unemployment Rate (pp difference) 2.79% 4.68% 
Employment -2.97% -4.98% 
Total HH Tax 40.55% 43.61% 
Income Tax 79.70% 87.32% 
Transfers to HH from Gov 117.37% 117.37% 
Real Scottish Government Consumption 0.00% 0.00% 
HG1 Lowest income group’s consumption  30.12% 28.73% 
HG2 Second quintile’s consumption 14.92% 12.99% 
HG3 Third quintile’s consumption 3.84% 1.70% 
HG4 Fourth quintile’s consumption -5.61% -8.25% 






















Figure 4.5. Adjustment paths of GDP and employment of income tax-financed, Policy Option 1 
(low-level CBI), with workers fully valuing their own CBI payments (and no migration) 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander 
 
Other factors 
As before, there remain incentives for net out-migration, ultimately resulting in a loss in 
population – see Table 4.7. The important message is not the numerical results, but simply the 














































Table 4.7 Short and long run impacts of an income tax-financed, Policy Option 1 (low-level CBI), 
with workers fully valuing their own CBI payments (with migration) 
 SR LR 
GDP (£m) -1.63% -15.16% 
GDP (£m) per capita  -1.63% -5.0% 
Consumption 0.21% -8.11% 
Investment -4.51% -13.79% 
Total Exports -2.20% -17.98% 
Total Imports -0.14% -3.10% 
Nominal Gross Wage 6.08% 24.50% 
Real take home wage -8.82% -7.69% 
CPI 1.00% 7.16% 
Real cost of capital 0.75% 5.62% 
Unemployment Rate (pp difference) 2.79% 0.00% 
Employment -2.97% -16.39% 
Population  0.00% -10.65% 
Total HH Tax 40.55% 62.37% 
Income Tax 79.70% 125.07% 
Transfers to HH from Gov 117.37% 117.37% 
Real Scottish Government Consumption 0.00% 0.00% 
HG1 Lowest income group’s consumption  30.12% 23.69% 
HG2 Second quintile’s consumption 14.92% 7.40% 
HG3 Third quintile’s consumption 3.84% -3.17% 
HG4 Fourth quintile’s consumption -5.61% -13.11% 
HG5 Highest income group’s consumption -12.19% -22.78% 
 
If workers’ take full account of all UBI payments to their families the adverse impacts on GDP 
and employment are further mitigated because the pressure on wages is reduced. We do not 
discuss the results in detail here since this case was regarded as less compelling than that in 
which workers only fully take into account their own CBI receipts. However, for completeness 
the summary results for this case are included in Section 4.5 below. 
 
4.4.3 What if all CBI payments are fully valued by workers and migrants? The social wage model 
The “social wage” concept is based on an assumption that workers may feel as well off after 
the introduction of the CBI as before it.  
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The basic idea here is that workers would value the CBI that they (and their families) receive 
and also the reduction in poverty and inequality in society more generally, just as much as the 
reduction in their real net wage42. 
In this case, workers do not seek to restore the real value of their take home wage. There is no 
pressure to restore the net of tax real wage, since workers feel as well off after the change as 
they did before. 
The results are summarised in Table 4.8. It is clear that the presence of a ‘social wage’ has a 
major beneficial impact on the macroeconomic effects. Here, GDP falls, but only slightly, in the 
short-run (by 0.1%) and rises slightly in the long run (0.2%).  
 
Table 4.8. Short and long run impacts of an income tax-financed, Policy Option 1 (low-level CBI), 
with social wage and no migration 
 SR LR 
GDP (£m) -0.07% 0.19% 
Consumption -0.15% 0.04% 
Investment 0.41% 0.54% 
Total Exports -0.21% 0.11% 
Total Imports -0.08% 0.01% 
Nominal Gross Wage -0.29% -0.12% 
Real take home wage -13.31% -13.09% 
CPI 0.02% -0.04% 
Real cost of capital 0.05% -0.03% 
Unemployment Rate (pp difference) 0.17% 0.04% 
Employment -0.18% -0.05% 
Total HH Tax 36.41% 36.69% 
Income Tax 72.99% 73.35% 
Transfers to HH from Gov 117.37% 117.37% 
Real Scottish Government Consumption 0.00% 0.00% 
HG1 Lowest income group’s consumption  30.69% 30.80% 
HG2 Second quintile’s consumption 15.11% 15.27% 
HG3 Third quintile’s consumption 3.51% 3.69% 
HG4 Fourth quintile’s consumption -6.50% -6.28% 
HG5 Highest income group’s consumption -12.65% -12.42% 
                                                          




Figure 4.6 illustrates the change in the net of tax real wage under the conventional 
bargaining and social wage cases.  
 
Figure 4.6 Adjustment path of net of tax real wage under conventional bargaining and a social 
wage, Policy Option 1 (low-level CBI) 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander 
 
The overall results are similar to those of the income-tax-financed CBI in the presence of a fixed 
nominal wage – Table 4.243. 
The overall macroeconomic impact proves to be broadly neutral under the social wage 
assumption.  
However, this is only so because workers are willing to accept a permanent reduction in their 
take home wage of more than 13.1%! 
 
The impact of migration 
The idea that transactors may look beyond their real net take home wage can also be extended 
to migrants.  
Indeed it would seem certain that rational migrants would wish to include all of the effects of 
movement on their income levels, including the CBI payments to themselves and their families, 
                                                          
43 The results are not identical, however, because the social wage case does not have the effect of fixing the 
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and wider public services. If they also value the reduction in inequality and poverty sufficiently 
to motivate the social wage assumption, they would feel no worse off after the introduction of 
the CBI. 
When we allow for migration motivated in this way, the macroeconomic impacts of the tax-
financed CBI become slightly less favourable than reported in Table 4.8 – due to the small fall 
in wages and rise in unemployment. Accordingly, there is an incentive for outmigration.  
Allowing outmigration continues until (in this case) the real gross wage and unemployment 
rates are restored to their original levels, we obtain the results reported in Table 4.9.  
Notice that ultimately population falls by 0.09%.  
 
Table 4.9 Short and long run impacts of an income tax-financed, Policy Option 1 (low-level CBI), 
with social wage and migration 
 SR LR 
GDP (£m) -0.07% 0.10% 
GDP per capita -0.07% 0.20% 
Consumption -0.15% 0.00% 
Investment 0.41% 0.46% 
Total Exports -0.21% 0.00% 
Total Imports -0.08% -0.01% 
Nominal Gross Wage -0.29% 0.00% 
Real take home wage -13.31% -13.06% 
CPI 0.02% 0.00% 
Real cost of capital 0.05% 0.00% 
Unemployment Rate (pp difference) 0.17% 0.00% 
Employment -0.18% -0.14% 
Population  0.00% -0.09% 
Total HH Tax 36.41% 36.82% 
Income Tax 72.99% 73.62% 
Transfers to HH from Gov 117.37% 117.37% 
Real Scottish Government Consumption 0.00% 0.00% 
HG1 Lowest income group’s consumption  30.69% 30.76% 
HG2 Second quintile’s consumption 15.11% 15.22% 
HG3 Third quintile’s consumption 3.51% 3.65% 
HG4 Fourth quintile’s consumption -6.50% -6.32% 




Note that a key distinguishing feature of the social wage simulations is the very substantial fall 
in the real take home wage (as in the fixed nominal wage case). Workers and migrants are 
willing to absorb this cut in real take home pay – both because they value the benefit to 
themselves of the CBI and the benefit they feel from being part of a more equal society 
characterised by a substantial reduction in poverty. 
Whether or not this would bear out in reality is an open question.  
The contrast between the different outcomes according to bargaining models is a major issue 
for policy in the context of a CBI. Furthermore, this raises the issue of what policy makers could 
do to influence that response, including, for example, seeking to influence the wage bargaining 
process. These are issues we return to in Section 6 below. 
 
4.5 Summary of various adjustments to wage bargaining and the 
macroeconomic impacts of an alternative policy 
Table 4.10 provides a summary of how key macroeconomic results are impacted by various 
adjustments (Bargaining scenarios 1 through 4).  
For comparative purposes we also include the macroeconomic impacts of microsimulation 
results in Policy Option 3, which involves improving child benefits until the impact on child 
poverty is comparable to that of the CBI implementation. 
 
The effects of various adjustments to wage bargaining 
Bargaining scenario 1 summarises the changes implied by the conventional bargaining model. 
These correspond to the results reported in Table 4.5 above.  
Bargaining scenario 2 shows the impact of workers’ fully valuing their personal CBI receipts 
when bargaining over wages 
Bargaining scenario 3 shows the impact of workers valuing their own and their families’ CBI 
payments. 
Bargaining scenario 4 summarises the results of the Social Wage model (Table 4.8).  
The final column of Table 4.10 identifies the macroeconomic impact of Policy Option 3, which 
relates to adjustments in child benefits. (Here the conventional bargaining model is assumed 
to be applicable.) 
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The central point is that the conventional bargaining and social wage models reflect either end 
of a spectrum of results, with the adverse supply side effects associated with the CBI 
diminishing as the models move in the direction of the Social Wage model.  
It should be noted, however, that under all assumptions about wage bargaining the CBI 
succeeds in its primary objective of effecting a substantial redistribution of income in favour of 
the lower income households. 
 
Table 4.10 The macroeconomic impacts of implementing Policy Option 1(low-level CBI), across 
various bargaining models and Policy Option 3 (modified child benefit): Summary with NO 
migration 
Results (percentage 
change from base)  












Policy Option 3 
(Modified child 
benefit) 
GDP  -8.8 -4.4 -1.7 0.2 -0.7 
Employment  -9.7 -5.0 -2.1 -0.1 -0.8 
Consumption of 
lowest quintile  26.7 28.7 30.0 30.8 3.7 
 
If the pure flow model of migration holds, the macroeconomic impacts would be worse in all 
cases (i.e. more negative/less positive) – Table 4.11.  
 
Table 4.11 The macroeconomic impacts of implementing Policy Option 1 (low-level CBI), across 
various bargaining models and Policy Option 3 (modified child benefit): Summary with migration 
Results (percentage 











 Policy Option 
3 (Modified 
child benefit) 
GDP * -15.2 --5.8 0.1 -1.8 
Employment * -16.4 --6.5 -0.1 -2.0 
Consumption of 
lowest quintile 
* 23.7 28.1 30.8 3.4 
*The scale of the impacts was such that the model failed to solve in this case. 
 
The macroeconomic impacts of increasing child benefits 
The final column in Tables 4.10 and 4.11 compares the macroeconomic impact of an 
adjustment to child benefits that is income tax financed (Policy Option 3 in Chapter 2) and has 
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a very similar impact on child poverty as the introduction of the CBI – see discussion in Chapter 
2.  
For simplicity we have assumed that the only supply side impacts associated with this policy 
are those associated with the rise in income tax required to fund it (and so the conventional 
bargaining model is employed here) 
In the absence of migration this policy is associated with a small loss of GDP and, of course, a 
much less marked impact on the consumption of the lowest income group, although the 
impact is positive.  
Only in the social wage case is the GDP outcome more favourable for the CBI. 
While the overall distributional impact of the child benefit policy is far smaller, the effect on 
child poverty is, by construction, the same and the adverse impact on economic activity is 
typically much less than under the CBI (except where the social wage case holds). 
 
4.6 Other supply side impacts of a Scottish CBI 
4.6.1 Direct impact of benefits on bargaining/ labour supply 
There are potentially countervailing forces operating on labour market behaviour when 
benefits are increased.  
The view of the conventional bargaining model discussed above was that an increase in 
benefits (especially unemployment benefits) reduced the costs of being unemployed, and so 
increased workers’ bargaining power. Other things being equal this would lead to an increase 
in real wages and decline in employment (increase in unemployment).  
However, by acting as a subsidy to search, increased benefits could improve the search process 
and lead to lower unemployment. While this may also be accompanied by increased real 
wages, here this would reflect higher productivity. 
On the basis of the existing (in some cases rather dated) empirical evidence we do not find any 
substantial macroeconomic effects. (We report the results in Annex E.) 
 
4.6.2 Skills disaggregation 
Up to this point we have treated the labour market as an integrated whole. We have, however, 
also treated skilled and unskilled labour as having distinct labour markets.  
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The demand for each skill group is obtained by separately aggregating their demands across 
all sectors. This results in separate demands for skilled and unskilled labour (although there is 
a degree of substitutability between skill groups).  
The supply side of the labour markets is characterised by distinct skilled and unskilled wage 
functions.  
However, overall, we find that the disaggregation of skills makes little difference to the 
estimated macroeconomic impact of an income-tax-funded CBI irrespective of the whether 
wages are determined in real net of tax terms or through a fixed nominal wage. (See Annex F)   
However, the behaviour of wages continues to have a critical impact on the overall outcome.  
Under conventional bargaining, with skills disaggregated or aggregated, the key is the resultant 
substantial reduction in take home pay of workers, which stimulates a major wage-push effect 
with adverse impacts on economic activity. 
 
4.6.3 Sectoral disaggregation 
We also explore the impact of allowing for separate labour markets across sectors (in Annex 
F).  
The public sector is distinctive in typically having a more centralised bargaining system than 
the private sector (with average unionisation rates of 60.8% compared to 14% in the private 
sector)44 and bargaining is “as if” with a single employer.  
Accordingly, we explore the impact of distinctive labour markets for the public and private 
sectors.  
Overall, the disaggregation by sectors appears to make little difference to the estimated 
macroeconomic impact of a CBI. However, if wages are modelled in a non-symmetrical way, 
with private sector wages being determined in accordance with the bargaining model and 
wages in the public sector being characterised by a social wage, results are significantly 
impacted. In this case we obtain results that are intermediate to those for the conventional 
bargaining model and the social wage model. 
 
4.6.4 The potential stimulus to productivity 
A number of potential routes by which the introduction of a CBI may stimulate productivity 
have been identified, often by case studies of CBI-like interventions.  
                                                          




For example, as we have already seen, the CBI may stimulate more efficient matching in the 
labour market, through lowering the effective costs of searching (and allowing individuals to 
hold off for higher wage, higher productivity job offers).  
Furthermore, the provision of a basic income allows individuals to choose to invest more in 
their human capital through education and training, rather than feeling compelled to take low 
paid, possibly insecure jobs. Some case studies have also identified mental health benefits, 
which are likely to improve productivity. 
However, there is a dearth of empirical estimates of the likely scale of the various possible 
sources of productivity enhancement arising from the implementation of a CBI. Accordingly, 
we return to this issue at the end of the study, where we shall explore the extent to which 
productivity would need to increase to achieve certain economic targets (e.g. no contraction, 
or a target expansion, in GDP).  
However, it is useful to assess the macroeconomic impacts of an improvement in productivity 
per se, to allow us to isolate and identify the nature and scale of system-wide responses that 
are directly attributable to that alone. Accordingly, we report the results of an illustrative 3% 


















Table 4.12. Short and long run impacts of 3% increase in labour productivity 
 SR LR 
GDP (£m) 1.18% 2.73% 
Consumption -0.57% 0.58% 
Investment 3.73% 2.50% 
Total Exports 1.67% 3.73% 
Total Imports -0.14% 0.03% 
Nominal Gross Wage -2.06% -1.19% 
Real take home wage -1.25% 0.12% 
CPI -0.82% -1.31% 
Real cost of capital -0.57% -1.04% 
Unemployment Rate (pp difference) 0.71% -0.06% 
Employment -0.75% 0.07% 
Total HH Tax -2.07% -0.72% 
Income Tax -2.79% -1.13% 
Transfers to HH from Gov 0.00% 0.00% 
Real Scottish Government Consumption 0.00% 0.00% 
HG1 Lowest income group’s consumption  0.21% 0.84% 
HG2 Second quintile’s consumption -0.07% 0.88% 
HG3 Third quintile’s consumption -0.47% 0.61% 
HG4 Fourth quintile’s consumption -0.94% 0.41% 
HG5 Highest income group’s consumption -0.76% 0.50% 
 
The improvement in labour efficiency is a beneficial supply-side stimulus that improves 
competitiveness and stimulates economic activity.  
GDP rises over the entire adjustment period, by 1.2% in the short run and by 2.7% in the long 
run.  
In the long run employment rises slightly (by 0.1%), reflecting the greater responsiveness of 
labour demand to changes in the effective cost of labour when firms can expand capacity in 
response to the rise in profits in the short-run. The real wage falls initially, but rises in the long 
run. Consumption increases across all household quintiles, broadly benefiting the lower 
income households by more. Overall, the impact on the distribution of income and expenditure 
is progressive. 
The change in GDP in response is significant but much smaller than the negative hit seen in 
some of the bargaining models above.  
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In order to offset the GDP contraction in the bargaining model in which workers fully value 
their personal CBI, the various potential sources of productivity gain would have to generate 
an increase in productivity of 4.26%.  
If workers (and migrants) can be persuaded of the wider private and social benefits so as to 
induce a social wage type response and ensure that the potential productivity-enhancing 
aspects of the CBI are fully exploited, there is the prospect of a policy dividend in the form of 
simultaneous improvements in both distribution and economic activity. 
This would seem to us to be an important area for future research.  
 
4.7 Micro-to macro simulations 
The demand side simulations reported in Section 4.3 apply equally in the present context.  
As for the macro-to-macro analysis of the preceding sections, there is some external evidence 
on the microeconomic labour supply impact of CBI-type interventions from existing case 
studies, although very few provide quantitative evidence, and most report no such effect.45 
However, here we focus on the micro-to-macro simulations based upon the microeconomic 
analysis of Chapter 3. 
In this approach the assumption is that individuals are effectively in control of their own labour 
supply. The change in labour supply at the macroeconomic level is then a weighted average of 
groups’ responses, where the weights reflect the importance of each group of individuals in 
overall labour supply.  
Recall that the microsimulations identify the changes in effective marginal tax rates relevant 
to participation and hours decisions for a wide range of household groups. These are matched 
to estimated elasticities of participation and hours decisions with respect to changes in 
effective marginal tax rates. These combine to provide the likely labour supply responses to 
the marginal tax rates and finally, these are aggregated to produce an overall estimated change 
in FTE employment.  
The base case from Chapter 3 (Table 4.2 low level CBI central case) implies an overall 
contraction in labour supply of 4.27%. 
Table 4.13 summarises the impact of the implied contraction in labour supply. This constitutes 
an adverse supply shock, which pushes up real wages, and so reduces competitiveness, exports 
and investment. In the long run GDP falls by 3.8% and employment by 4.3%.  
                                                          




Table 4.13 The macroeconomic impact of a labour supply shock derived from the 
microsimulations: a wage inelastic aggregate labour supply curve, Policy Option 1 (low-level CBI) 
 SR LR 
GDP (£m) -2.40% -3.84% 
Consumption 1.08% -0.81% 
Investment -7.42% -3.52% 
Total Exports -3.34% -5.23% 
Total Imports 0.29% -0.01% 
Nominal Gross Wage 10.27% 6.22% 
Real take home wage 8.45% 4.21% 
CPI 1.67% 1.93% 
Real cost of capital 1.18% 1.52% 
Unemployment Rate (pp difference) 0.00% 0.00% 
Employment -4.27% -4.27% 
Total HH Tax 4.12% 1.09% 
Income Tax 5.56% 1.69% 
Transfers to HH from Gov 0.00% 0.00% 
Real Scottish Government Consumption 0.00% 0.00% 
HG1 Lowest income group’s consumption  -0.43% -1.19% 
HG2 Second quintile’s consumption 0.11% -1.24% 
HG3 Third quintile’s consumption 0.89% -0.86% 
HG4 Fourth quintile’s consumption 1.81% -0.57% 
HG5 Highest income group’s consumption 1.46% -0.69% 
 
Table 4.14 summarises the results of the same shock, but assuming that labour supply is 
responsive to the real wage.  
Again there is a negative impact on economic activity, but here it is reduced: the impacts on 
employment and the real wage are smaller than under the perfectly wage-inelastic case, as we 
would expect. As the real wage increases this induces an extension in labour supply, which 
moderates the scale of the increase in the real wage and the adverse impact on 
competitiveness, and so limits the fall in employment. Note that the results only incorporate 
the supply side impact of the CBI, hence the reduction in all households’ consumption. 
 
 
Table 4.14 The macroeconomic impact of a labour supply shock derived from the 
microsimulations: a wage elastic aggregate labour supply curve, Policy Option 1 (low-level CBI) 
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 SR LR 
GDP (£m) -1.41% -2.91% 
Consumption -0.34% -1.30% 
Investment -4.45% -2.64% 
Total Exports -1.37% -3.43% 
Total Imports -0.49% -0.44% 
Nominal Gross Wage 5.09% 4.02% 
Real take home wage 4.40% 2.73% 
CPI 0.66% 1.25% 
Real cost of capital 0.48% 0.99% 
Unemployment Rate (pp difference) -2.10% -1.41% 
Employment -2.41% -3.10% 
Total HH Tax 5.51% 3.27% 
Income Tax 2.56% 0.79% 
Transfers to HH from Gov 0.00% 0.00% 
Real Scottish Government Consumption 0.00% 0.00% 
HG1 Lowest income group’s consumption  -0.23% -0.78% 
HG2 Second quintile’s consumption -0.24% -0.97% 
HG3 Third quintile’s consumption -0.13% -1.10% 
HG4 Fourth quintile’s consumption 0.03% -1.23% 
HG5 Highest income group’s consumption -0.88% -1.92% 
 
Table 4.15 summarises the impact of adding the demand side impact of the CBI to the 
simulation reported in Table 4.14.  
The small stimulus to demand moderates the scale of the adverse supply effect, but is 
insufficient to offset it. GDP falls by 2.5% and employment by 3.0%.   
The scale of the macroeconomic impact from the micro-to-macro simulation corresponds to 
the more optimistic results of the macro-to-macro model. The competitive vision of the labour 




Table 4.15 The macroeconomic impact of the demand and labour supply shock (derived from 




 SR LR 
GDP (£m) -1.30% -2.53% 
Consumption 0.14% -1.36% 
Investment -3.48% -2.01% 
Total Exports -1.78% -3.13% 
Total Imports -0.12% -0.52% 
Nominal Gross Wage 4.74% 3.65% 
Real take home wage -9.75% -12.14% 
CPI 0.80% 1.14% 
Real cost of capital 0.60% 0.90% 
Unemployment Rate (pp difference) -1.91% -1.30% 
Employment -2.39% -3.02% 
Total HH Tax 39.68% 40.78% 
Income Tax 78.28% 81.61% 
Transfers to HH from Gov 117.37% 117.37% 
Real Scottish Government Consumption 0.00% 0.00% 
HG1 (Lowest) Consumption  30.24% 29.57% 
HG2 Consumption  14.96% 13.90% 
HG3 Consumption  3.78% 2.50% 
HG4 Consumption  -5.79% -7.46% 




This introduction of a CBI at scale would represent a significant policy innovation.  
However, the macroeconomic impacts of a CBI have rarely been analysed; certainly they are 
never emphasised as key objectives of the policy. 
It is important for overall policy efficacy, to identify the potential impact of the CBI on the 
macro-economy. If these effects are adverse, the prospect of potential trade-offs between 
equity and poverty-reduction objectives on the one hand and economic activity/ growth 
objectives on the other is raised. If the macroeconomic impacts of the CBI are beneficial, the 
policy offers a “double dividend” – a simultaneous improvement in both distributional and 
economic growth objectives. 
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The first finding of our analysis is that the introduction of a CBI has a major progressive 
redistributive impact, with the incomes and consumption of high-income households falling 
and those of low-income households rising. In this sense, achievement of the major objectives 
of the introduction of the CBI seems assured.  
This implied redistribution does drive substantial macroeconomic effects, however. 
Our analysis of the demand side impacts revealed a number of important features of the CBI.  
• A CBI generates a substantial, progressive redistribution of income among households.  
• We find that the income-tax financed CBI has a negligible overall impact on demand: 
the stimulus from the increase in the consumption of lower income households is 
matched by a contraction in the expenditure of higher income households.  
• The impact of the redistribution is governed by the precise spending patterns of 
household quintiles.  
• While the negative effects of the contraction in income and consumption of the higher 
income groups could be offset by external funding (e.g. through a sovereign wealth 
fund), the practicalities of this option are clearly limited.   
• If the funds increased current government expenditure instead of a CBI, there would 
be an expansion in economic activity: private consumption here is replaced by 
government expenditure, which has a lower propensity to import.  
A key feature of our results are that they are all associated with a substantial (of over 13%) cut 
in the real take home wage, reflecting the major rise in income tax rates required to fund the 
CBI.  
Crucial to the final impact of a CBI therefore is the nature and extent of both workers’ and 
migrants’ responses to this fall in the net real wage.  
In the conventional bargaining model workers’ focus on the net of tax real wage so that they 
respond to the CBI by attempting to restore the initial value of this wage. The resultant “wage 
push” effect generates a substantial contraction in GDP and employment. The negative effects 
would be further reinforced by potentially net outflows of migrants, which would reduce 
labour supply and lead to a further contraction in economic activity.46 
If, alternatively, workers (and migrants) fully valued their own CBI payments the wage push 
effect is moderated: workers “only” seek to restore their personal disposable income. The 
                                                          
46 Matters may be made worse still by the progressivity of the income tax system; the incentives for higher wage 
earners to outmigration may be significantly greater than for lower wage earners. 
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effect would be further limited if workers were to fully value their families’ receipts of CBI in 
the bargaining process. 
In the limiting “social wage” case it is as if workers (and migrants) value CBI payments 
irrespective of who they are paid to. In this case workers value the reduction in poverty and 
inequality and are prepared to help pay for that through higher taxes. Workers (and migrants) 
are content to accept the substantial reduction in their real take home wage in return for 









Section 5: Long-term impacts upon households and 
families 
5.1  Methodology 
5.1.1  Summary of approach 
Stage 1 of the modelling – microsimulation discussed in Section 2 – showed the first-order 
effects of the Citizens Basic Income Policy (CBI) policy before any behavioural or dynamic 
responses to the policy from households and firms.   
Stage 2 – the economic modelling in Sections 3 and 4 – estimated the aggregate effects of 
these dynamic responses to the policy change.   
The intention of Stage 3 of the modelling – a second round of microsimulation – was to show 
the effects of the aggregate changes identified in Stage 2 on households and families.  Of 
particular interest was whether the long-term macroeconomic effects would change 
significantly the picture identified in the Stage 1 microsimulation. 
The approach taken was to run the microsimulation modelling in a similar way to Stage 1, but 
with the model dataset adjusted in line with the aggregate estimates produced in the Stage 2 
macroeconomic modelling.   
The intention was to estimate whether and to what degree these long-term dynamic effects 
changed the results obtained in Stage 1 for the net costs of the policy, and the effects of the 
policy on poverty. 
 
5.1.2 Time period 
The Stage 2 macroeconomic modelling shows the long-run – at least 20 years into the future 
– aggregate effects of dynamic response to the introduction of the CBI.  However, it was 
decided not to run the microsimulation model forward for another 20 years after 2023/24 for 
the Stage 3 modelling.  This is because the further forward we run the microsimulation 
model, the greater are the uncertainties as to what will happen to the distribution of income.  
Essentially, the further forward we take the uprating process described above, the more 
uncertainty is involved. 
Instead, we have taken the long-run aggregate effects estimated in the Stage 2 
macroeconomic modelling and applied them in 2023/24.  We have taken this approach to 
show the extent to which the changes estimated in the Stage 1 first order microsimulation 
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modelling will be ameliorated or exacerbated by the macroeconomic responses estimated in 
Stages 3 and 4.   
This makes this set of results an illustration of the effects of macroeconomic change on 
households and families rather than a forecast.   
 
5.1.3 Amended Family Resources Survey for 2023/24 
As discussed above, the microsimulation modelling takes the most recent three years of 
Family Resources Survey (FRS) data and uprates it to our chosen policy year by uprating 
financial values in the data in line with various Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) 
forecasts, thereby producing a forecast of an FRS sample for our policy year. 
Our approach for the Stage 3 modelling was to produce an altered version of our predicted 
FRS sample which reflected the long-run macroeconomic outputs of the Stage 2 
macroeconomic modelling.   
The Stage 2 macroeconomic modelling generates estimates of the likely long-run impact of 
the CBI policy on: 
• Price inflation (Consumer Price Index) 
• Wage growth 
• Size of the population 
• Size of the labour force 
• Unemployment rate  
• Full-time equivalent employment 
 
For Scottish households, instead of uprating financial values in line with OBR forecasts, 
amended uprating series were created that produced, by 2023/24, a difference to the OBR 
forecasts consistent with the estimates from the Stage 2 macroeconomic modelling of the 
effects of the CBI on the Consumer Price Index and wage growth. 
To generate amended population totals, and amended numbers of people in employment, 
grossing values were altered using a raking algorithm so that weighted results produced from 
the amended dataset generated population, unemployment, and full and part-time 
employment totals consistent with the results from the Stage 2 macroeconomic modelling. 
This approach is similar to that used in Barnard, Heykoop and Kumar (2018)47 where 
estimates from a general equilibrium model of the macroeconomic effects of alternative 
                                                          
47 Barnard, Heykoop and Kumar (2018), How could Brexit affect poverty in the UK?, Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation, 2018, https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/how-could-brexit-affect-poverty-uk 
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Brexit trade scenarios were used to alter uprating series and grossing variables to allow a 
microsimulation-based estimate of the effects of these trade scenarios on poverty. 
 
5.2  Data and modelling approach 
5.2.1 Macroeconomic scenarios 
In the Stage 3 microsimulation, we modelled three macroeconomic scenarios, all based on 
the low-level Citizens Basic Income (Policy Option 1): 
Table 5.6: Macroeconomics scenarios modelled in Stage 3 Microsimulation 
Policy Option 1: with micro-to-
macro  
Labour supply scenario 
Policy Option 1: with 
Bargaining scenario 2 
Macro-to-macro scenario (with migration) with workers’ 
bargaining affected only by their own CBI 
Policy Option 1: with 
Bargaining scenario 3 
Macro-to-macro scenario (with migration) with workers’ 
bargaining affected by their family’s CBI 
 
The table below shows the long-run macroeconomic effects of the CBI for each of these 
scenarios: 
 
Table 5.7: Long-run macroeconomic effects of the CBI modelled in Stage 3 Microsimulation 
 Policy Option 1:  
Micro-to-macro  
Policy Option 1:  
Bargaining 2 
Policy Option 1:  
Bargaining 3 
Consumer Price Index +1.14% +7.16% +2.58% 
Average earnings +3.65% +24.50% +8.39% 
Population 0 -10.65% -4.21% 
Labour force -4.34% -16.39% -6.48% 
Unemployment -1.3pp 0 0 
FTE Employment -3.02% -16.39% -6.48% 
 
5.2.2 Re-grossing algorithm 





Table 5.8: Adult re-grossing algorithm 
Step Title Coverage 
(People whose grossing 
value was changed at this 
stage of the algorithm) 
Control totals used to adjust grossing 
values 
1 Population All adults Population change 
2 Labour force / 
inactive split 
All adults in the labour 
force 
All inactive adults 
Change in the size of the labour force 





Change in the unemployment to labour 
force ratio 
4 Full-time / part-
time split 
Adults working full-time 
Adults working part-time 
Change in the balance between part-time 
and full-time workers implied by the 
difference between the change in people 
in employment and the change in full-
time equivalent employment 
5 Re-adjust working 
age / pensioner 
split 
Working age adults 
Pensioners 
Ratio between working age adults and 
pensioners after Step 1 
6 Re-adjust work 
status groups 
amongst working 
age with kids 
Working age adults with 
children 
Ratio between full-time workers, part-
time workers, unemployed and inactive 





Working age adults with 
children 
Childless working age 
adults 
Number of children after Step 1 
 
Step 1 adjusts the population in line with any migration/population change outputs from the 
macroeconomic modelling.  Steps 2 to 4 adjust labour market status in line with the labour 
force, unemployment and full-time equivalent employment outputs discussed above.  
However, these changes produce alterations to the ratio of working age adults to pensioners 
and changes to the number of children in the weighted population. 
Steps 5 to 7 are intended to ensure that the number of working age adults, pensioners and 
children in final results are unaffected by the adjustments to employment totals.  This was 
considered to be important in the context of modelling a Citizens Basic Income because the 
effects of the policy, and its costs, are dependent on the number of people in each of these 
three age groups. 
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The final step in the re-grossing process was to produce benefit unit-level and household-
level grossing tables by taking the mean values of the new adult-level grossing variables 
within each benefit unit and household.  
 
5.3 Results 
The column labelled 1 in the results table below shows the first-order net costs and effects 
on poverty of the low-level CBI (Policy Option 1).  The subsequent columns show the net costs 
and effects on poverty when taking into account the macroeconomic changes estimated by 
the Stage 2 macroeconomic modelling. 
Table 5.9: Stage 3 microsimulation results (including taking into account macroeconomic 
effects) 




Policy Option 1 

















Effect of CBI on no of people in 
paid work (base = 2,560,000) 
 -90,000 -420,000 -170,000 
Effect of CBI on average wages  +3.65% +24.50% +8.39% 
Net cost of CBI -£0.2 bn -£0.6 bn -£0.2 bn -£0.2 bn 
Effect of CBI on poverty  
(base = 1,140,000) 
-280,000 -250,000 -280,000 -280,000 
Effect of CBI on child poverty 
(base = 270,000) -90,000 -80,000 -80,000 -90,000 
Effect of CBI on poverty  
(base = 21.6%) 
-5.4 pp -4.7 pp -3.3 pp -4.6 pp 
Effect of CBI on child poverty  
(base = 27.8%) 








5.4.1 Net costs 
In each of the three macroeconomic scenarios, the CBI causes a fall in employment but an 
increase in wage rates.   
Recall that means-tested benefits have not been abolished under the CBI – just restricted to 
providing support for housing and childcare costs, and for disabled people.  This means that 
the fall in employment will increase the net costs of the policy because more people will be 
relying on state support.  On the other hand, the increase in wages will increase income tax 
receipts, thereby reducing the costs of the policy.   
The results show that in the case of the micro-to-macro scenario, the former effect will be 
slightly larger and the long-term macroeconomic effects will have the effect of slightly 
increasing the costs of the policy.  In the two bargaining scenarios, the effects cancel out and 
the costs will be similar to that suggested in the Stage 1 first-order microsimulation. 
 
5.4.2 Effects on poverty 
In all three scenarios, the reduction in the poverty rate falls slightly as a result of the longer-
term macroeconomic effects of the policy.  In the second and third scenarios there is 
however some reduction in poverty numbers due to outward migration caused by the 
macroeconomic impacts of the policy. 
 
5.5 Summary 
The overall summary of this stage of the modelling is that, once long-term macroeconomic 
effects are taken into account, the CBI policy costs about the same or is slightly more 
expensive, and it is slightly less effective at reducing poverty than suggested by the Stage 1 









Section 6: Conclusions & Policy Implications 
This introduction of a CBI at scale would represent a significant policy innovation.  
However, the macroeconomic impacts of a CBI have rarely been analysed; certainly they are 
never emphasised as key objectives of the policy. 
Our microsimulation modelling confirms that a CBI would lead to a major re-distribution within 
Scottish society.  
However, it would also carry a price tag. Indeed a high-level CBI involves costs that are so 
substantial that it is difficult to recover them through the income tax system.   
Fiscal neutrality requires income tax rates of 70 per cent on income above £12,444, and 85 
per cent on all income above £30,930. 
Concentrating on the low-level CBI, very few people will be neutral about the policy – most 
people will see their incomes go up or down, some quite substantially.   
The policy will certainly be redistributive, shifting money from the better off to the least well 
off.  However, it does so in quite an untargeted manner.  If the objective is specifically to 
directly reduce poverty, these results suggest that there are more efficient ways of doing so. 
In assessing the impacts upon the economy, we find that what matters most is how workers 
respond, not just to the change in taxation used to fund the CBI, but the CBI itself.  
On balance, the demand side impacts of a CBI are small. All the impact will come through 
how it will impact upon the supply side of the Scottish economy.  
A key feature of our results is that they are all associated with a substantial (of over 13%) cut 
in the real take home wage, reflecting the major rise in income tax rates required to fund the 
CBI.  
In the conventional bargaining model, workers’ focus on the net of tax real wage so that they 
respond to the CBI by attempting to restore the initial value of this wage. The resultant “wage 
push” effect generates a substantial contraction in GDP and employment. The negative effects 
would be further reinforced by potentially net outflows of migrants. 
If, alternatively, workers (and migrants) valued their own CBI payments the wage push effect 
is moderated: workers “only” seek to restore their personal disposable income. An effect 
further strengthened if workers were to fully value their families’ receipts of CBI. 
In the limiting “social wage” case it is as if workers (and migrants) value CBI payments 
irrespective of who they are paid to. In this case workers value the reduction in poverty and 
inequality and are prepared to help pay for that through higher taxes. Workers (and migrants) 
91 
 
are content to accept the substantial reduction in their real take home wage in return for 
reduced inequality and poverty.  
In summary, a CBI of the scale and coverage proposed in this research would constitute a 
transformational shift in society. If society’s attitudes do not shift with it – i.e. people respond 
to a major move to tackle inequality by seeking to maintain their net take home wage – then 
it necessarily follows that it is likely to be a challenge for the macroeconomy. Of course, if 
society responds differently, then the outcome could be quite different.  
 
Policy implications 
Clearly, any government considering implementing a tax-financed CBI would wish to convince 
society of both the private and social value of the CBI. The objective would be to ensure an 
outcome much closer to that of the social wage than the conventional bargaining case, and so 
secure the distributional objectives of the policy while minimising any adverse 
impact/maximising any beneficial impact on the macro-economy.  
This is a major challenge for policy and one that is entirely novel since a genuine CBI has never 
yet been implemented.  
The CBI-like interventions that most closely approximate a substantial, permanent and 
unconditional CBI are much smaller scale and are effectively externally funded.  
We are unaware of any compelling evidence about the likely response of workers to CBI-type 
interventions. In particular, there is no evidence relating directly to wage responses to a tax-
financed CBI. There is some national and international survey evidence that suggests a 
willingness to pay higher taxes, but this is typically linked to the provision of improved public 
services rather than a substantial shift in the distribution of income. 
Societal change on the scale anticipated appears to necessitate the establishment of a kind of 
“social contract”. Ensuring that workers fully understand the value of CBI payments to 
themselves and their families appears more straightforward.  
Clearly, there may be a number of things that policymakers could attempt to do to encourage 
support for a CBI. First, set out all of the potential advantages of a CBI – to individuals, families 
and to society. The latter includes reductions in income inequality, poverty and precarity and 
a range of other potentially well-being-enhancing outcomes. Ultimately however, this is a 
political decision and people will take different views on the merits of all this.  
Second, while a substantial rise in income tax rates is also required to ensure that the CBI is 
fully funded efforts could be made to limit the scale of this. This could occur through adjusting 
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the scale of the CBI. Alternatively/additionally, using other sources of funding may limit the rise 
in income tax, although there is no costless alternative.  
Third, policymakers could seek directly to influence the response of the wage bargaining 
system. However, a high degree of centralisation in the bargaining system would seem to be 
required. A second way to influence the bargaining process would be through a direct wage 
(and price) restraint policy. Again, this would necessitate some kind of social contract. 
Fourth, the Government could endeavour to maximise the other supply side benefits that may 
be generated by the CBI. These could include, for example, the provision of training 
opportunities and general uplift in human capital to help boost productivity.   
In conclusion, the introduction of a CBI would represent a major societal innovation that would 
undoubtedly convey significant benefits in terms of its primary objectives of reducing 
inequality and poverty, and very probably also in terms of a range of other desirable outcomes 
(including improved mental health and productivity). However, our analysis shows that under 
certain circumstances it may have significant adverse macroeconomic impacts. Understanding 
these impacts, and their transmission mechanisms, will be a crucial part of the policy 






Annex A: Literature Review of Citizen’s Basic Income 
Introduction 
Since the financial crash of 2007/08, and the austerity agenda, welfare cuts and benefits 
reforms that followed, interest in the concept of a citizens’ basic income has increased. With 
significant economic challenges and transitions facing Scotland, the UK and the wider world - 
including automation, ageing and the urgent need to decarbonise our economy - radical new 
ideas that could reshape peoples’ relationship with the state and with work are gaining 
support across the political spectrum (Martinelli 2017a). 
In their most basic form, basic income schemes constitute a regular payment made to every 
individual in a society, regardless of their personal circumstances, at a rate designed to 
achieve at least a basic standard of living. The concept of a basic income as we understand it 
today was first articulated in the mid-20th century, but some of the earliest conceptions can 
be traced back to the time of the first industrial revolution.  
In Scotland, interest in a basic income has accelerated over recent years. In May 2018, the 
Scottish Government confirmed plans to fund a number of feasibility studies that would 
assess whether a basic income scheme could be piloted in Scotland (Barcley et al. 2019). The 
announcement was built on several years of research and work by organisations such as 
Citizen’s Basic Income Network Scotland (CBINS), the Fairer Fife Commission and The Scottish 
Basic Income Pilot Steering Group, the latter set up in November 2017 in order to assess 
coordinate feasibility studies of a basic income pilot in Scotland.  
This literature review seeks to understand the family of proposals that make up citizens’ basic 
incomes, to outline a brief history of thinking around basic income schemes, learning from 
basic income trials to date, and to identify key questions in relation to designing a citizens’ 









What are Basic Income Schemes? 
The principles of a basic income scheme are relatively straightforward and indeed, for many, 
this is one of its key attractions.  
 
Definitions of a basic income 
Philippe Van Parijs in his 1992 paper “Competing Justifications of Basic Income” cites the 
“beautifully, disarmingly simple idea” of “an income unconditionally paid to all on an 
individual basis, without means test or work requirement” (Van Parijs 1992). Van Parijs 
reinforces the distinction between basic income and other forms of income assistance by 
stressing that payment is made: 
1. “to individuals rather than households; 
2. irrespective of any income from other sources; and 
3. without requiring any present or past work performance, or the willingness to accept 
a job if offered.” (ibid) 
These tenets of basic income (individual, universal, unconditional) have more recently been 
developed further by the Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN) who define basic income as 
having the following five characteristics: 
1. “Periodic: it is paid at regular intervals (for example every month), not as a one-
off grant. 
2. Cash payment: it is paid in an appropriate medium of exchange, allowing those who 
receive it to decide what they spend it on. It is not, therefore, paid either in kind (such 
as food or services) or in vouchers dedicated to a specific use. 
3. Individual: it is paid on an individual basis—and not, for instance, to households. 
4. Universal: it is paid to all, without means test. 
5. Unconditional: it is paid without a requirement to work or to 
demonstrate willingness-to-work. (BIEN, 2019)” 
In referencing basic income schemes, multiple terms and acronyms have emerged including 
Basic Income (BI), Universal/Unconditional Basic Income (UBI), Citizens Basic Income (CBI) or 
simply Citizens’ Income (CI).  Although the addition of words such as “universal”, 
“unconditional” and “citizens’” would suggest divergence in terms of each of these systems, 




Motivations for introducing a basic income 
Where the principle of a basic income scheme appears fairly intuitive, the theories motivating 
advocates of such schemes are varied. Throughout the literature there are broadly three key 
(overlapping) motivations for introducing a basic income: as a tool to respond to the social 
challenges stemming from the changing nature of work (Srnicek and Williams 2016); as an 
empowering social security system (Murphy 2015); and as a means of reducing poverty and 
improving health and quality of life (Lowrey 2018; Bregman 2017).  
 
As a response to automation and a changing labour market 
For some, basic income schemes can address crucial labour market deficiencies such as 
increasing job insecurity and “the threat of mass job losses due to automation” (Gibson et al. 
2018; Ford, 2018; Walter, 1989). As technological developments enable a growing share of 
tasks previously performed by humans to be automated, some proponents argue that 
automation will lead to displacement on such a scale that requires a fundamental rethink of 
society’s relationship with work (J. Andrade et al. 2019; Van Parijs & Vanderborght 2017). 
Against this backdrop, some advocates see in basic income schemes the potential to 
reconstruct society in a manner that prioritises citizen’s well-being over increases in national 
economic productivity, allowing people to undertake fulfilling paid and unpaid work as they 
want, rather than as they need (Mays 2019).  
 
As a means of empowering people within the social security system 
A related but separate motivation for some that propose a basic income, is to ensure the 
social security system is reformed to provide a basic standard of living to all, without 
infringing on individual’s privacy or dignity. Furthermore, proponents of a basic income see it 
as a route to a more empowering and dignified form of social security, avoiding the perceived 
pernicious effects of means-testing, conditionality and sanctions, most notably characterised 
within the UK’s Universal Credit system. Indeed, the roll-out of Universal Credit across 
Scotland and the UK has coincided with increasing interest in the concept of a basic income, 
given a basic income avoids means-testing, conditionality and sanctions (Torry 2018). In these 
ways, basic income schemes could create a raft of benefits outwith the workplace, with 
greater numbers of people able to enjoy freedom to pursue personal and self-fulfilling aims 
and ambitions, and to make choices of their own rather than choices based on conditions set 





As a means of poverty reduction 
Equally, for others, basic income could have important distributional effects. For example, 
Emery et al. suggest basic income schemes could “prove to be a highly efficient anti-poverty 
strategy” (Emery et al. 2013). Poverty reducing effects are anticipated from the basic income 
itself, but the fiscal reforms required to pay for it are also identified as an opportunity to 
deliver far-reaching income redistribution, with many proponents seeing significant and 
progressive tax changes implemented hand in hand with a basic income (Murphy 2015).  
In-work poverty has become a defining characteristic of poverty in Scotland as across the UK 
in recent years. As of 2017/18, nearly 4 million workers in the UK were classed as being in 
poverty, with this representing 1 in 8 members of the workforce (Piercy 2019). In Scotland, 
more than half of people living in relative poverty in 2017/2018 lived in a household where at 
least one person was in employment (ScotPho 2019). Advocates for basic income suggest 
that it represents a modern solution to the modern experience of poverty. By promoting a 
basic income set at a level that will at least cover the costs of peoples’ basic needs, and by 
implementing redistributive tax policy to help to pay for it, proponents see a basic income as 
a potentially important tool in reducing if not eradicating poverty (see below for 
consideration of evidence in favour and against this view).  
The guiding principle behind this rationale is that work should always pay, with extra hours 
worked being fairly rewarded without compromising other sources of income (Horstmeyer 
2017). Under Universal Credit, additional earnings from work (above a given work allowance) 
are associated with steep rates of benefit withdrawal (Corlett 2019). Equally, income volatility 
can be exacerbated by income assessment mechanisms that are particularly sensitive to 
fluctuating earnings – seeing benefit entitlement potentially varying drastically month by 
month.   
Under basic income schemes, supporters argue that many of the disincentives to taking on 
greater numbers of hours or higher paid work would be reduced if not removed entirely 
(Torry 2018) (Horstmeyer 2017). With the reliability of basic income payments, recipients 
could be incentivised to take on more hours of work and may have greater income 
predictability. In other words, basic income would provide an avenue to increased labour 
market participation amongst previously neglected groups, and would provide greater 
financial stability for those unable to constantly reassess their place in a means-tested 
benefits system.  
Similarly, advocates of basic income view the reliability of the payment as a key means of 
better supporting those in precarious work, including agency workers and workers on zero-
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hours or temporary contracts (Evans 2019). It is likely, however, that the effectiveness of 
basic income would depend heavily on the design of a particular scheme. 
Furthermore, many see the potential for a basic income to improve social outcomes, 
including educational and health outcomes, alongside a reduction in criminal activity (Gibson 
et al. 2018). By freeing people from the need to work through covering their basic needs, 
proponents argue that basic income recipients will be able to focus on what they wish to 
spend their time doing, leading to  improvements in levels of overall wellbeing, quality of life, 
and with that a variety of other key outcomes (Walker 2016).  
    
Support for basic income 
Advocates and detractors of basic income schemes come from across the political spectrum. 
Although most heavily associated with left, liberal and green political parties, basic income 
policies are proving particularly popular with new political parties emerging across the globe 
(Standing 2017). Advocates also include, in smaller numbers, representatives of centrist and 
right-wing politics including utilitarians, libertarians and conservatives. Indeed, in the 
historical context Milton Friedman, widely recognised as one of the leading thinkers driving 
neoliberalism, was an early proponent of a basic income for all (albeit to drive more efficient 
distribution of public services than driving redistribution and a narrowing of inequalities).  
De Wispelaere and Stirton (2013), both long-term advocates of basic income schemes, note 
that one of the key distinctions between left-wing and right-wing models lies in the perceived 
benefits of reduced administration. For left-wing advocates, basic income models should be 
built from a “redistributive perspective”, prioritising a bureaucracy in a “minimal intrusion 
sense since the relevant forms of intrusion and inconvenience fall disproportionately on the 
most disadvantaged claimants” (ibid). For advocates on the right, savings in terms of overall 
bureaucracy are suggested as “benefiting the whole population”, with an “aggregate model” 
viewing the diminishing returns of investing in an administration that means-tests 








Other Types of Basic Payments  
There are a number of proposed schemes that sit within the family of basic income schemes, 
but that do not meet one or more of the aspects of a basic income outlined above.  
 
Conditional Cash Transfers 
First amongst these is Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs), a model of anti-poverty policy which 
requires recipients in receipt of payment to carry out certain activities aimed at reducing 
poverty amongst families and, in particular, children (Morais de Sá e Silva 2017). A notable 
example of this popular type of anti-poverty intervention is the Bolsa Família program 
operated by the Brazilian government since 2004. Representative of most CCTs, the Bolsa 
Família deviates from a basic income scheme in that it is targeted only at those living in 
poverty (non-universal) and requires recipients to make “investments in human capital, such 
as school attendance by children and adolescents, complying with children’s immunization 
schedules, prenatal care for pregnant women and health monitoring for children under five” 
(conditional) (Britto & Soares 2011). CCTs such as the Bolsa Família are often paid at the 
“family” or household level (non-individual) (ibid). 
 
Negative-Income Tax Schemes 
Negative-Income Tax schemes (NITs) in many ways share a close association with basic 
income schemes, with the terms often used interchangeably, notably in Canada where a NIT 
version under the name ‘basic income’ has been under discussion among policymakers 
(Widerquist 2018). In practice, NIT is a payment or rebate that replaces most other existing 
social security payments with a single payment that supplements the income of lower 
earners. The payment is withdrawn as earnings increase, through the tax system, reducing 
the risk of ‘benefits traps’ or ‘cliff-edges’ where people experience high effective marginal 
rates of tax as their earnings increase (Bowman 2014).  
Advocates of basic income schemes point to three key distinctions that restrict the 
comparable positive impacts of NIT schemes. Firstly, like CCTs, NIT schemes have historically 
taken household rather than individual income as the measure by which payments and 
taxation are assessed (non-individual) (Van Parijs & Vanderborght 2017). However, this may 
depend on the income tax system in operation in a given country. Secondly, under most 
schemes, NIT would be paid at the end of the tax year based on income earned during this 
period (non-periodic). Thirdly, while offering a universal minimum, NITs are only paid to the 




For supporters of a basic income, the implementation of such a scheme would negate a great 
deal of the positive symbolic effects of a basic income as a vehicle to achieve greater social 
justice.  
As Van Parijs & Vanderborght argue: 
“What our societies need for the sake of freeing everyone from poverty and unemployment, 
and what those committed to freedom for all should fight for, is a floor on which all can 
stand, not just another, more sophisticated policy targeted at the poor” (Van Parijs & 
Vanderborght 2017). 
Finally, the operation of an NIT scheme through existing income tax administration would 
require individuals to already be engaged with such an administration potentially risking the 
take-up of payments amongst the unemployed or undeclared workers may be significantly 




The final group of models associated with basic income is the ‘basic endowment’ or ‘basic 
capital grant’. Proposals for a basic endowment usually mirror the criteria of basic income 
schemes as outlined above except in terms of the frequency of payment. Instead of a regular 
payment to every citizen (weekly, monthly, quarterly, etc.), a basic endowment would be 
provided to every citizen on a one-off or irregular basis (non-periodic). As a working paper 
from the IMF suggests, such a payment “may be regarded as serving the purpose of 
improving equality of opportunity at an early stage of life” (Francese & Prady 2018).  
Two heavily cited policy proposals for basic endowments have come from Ackermann and 
Alstott (2004) and A.B. Atkinson (2014). In the former, Ackermann and Alstott’s (2004) 
proposal for a basic endowment or “stakeholding” payment includes a stake of $80,000 
(USD) being provided to every “liberal citizen” at the age of 21, on condition that individuals 
have achieved a high-school diploma and have no criminal record 
A.B Atkinson proposed that a similar model be translated into the UK context, whereby the 
payment of a ‘capital endowment’ would be provided to all “either at adulthood or at a later 
date” (2014). Building on Atkinson’s work, the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) has 
proposed the creation of a ‘Citizen’s Wealth Fund’ with one recommendation to pay a 




Key design choices and issues for a Scotland CBI 
While the definition of a basic income is clear, few of the pilots that have been implemented 
fully meet this definition (see annex for an outline of a number of basic income or related 
case studies). However, even if the definition of a basic income were to be fully met in any 
pilots in Scotland, there are a number of design choices, and potential trade-offs associated, 
in developing a basic income to be piloted, including in Scotland (Francese & Prady 2018).  
 
Full vs partial basic income systems 
A crucial aspect in designing a basic income model is in how far it replaces existing social 
security provision, with distinctions made between ‘full’ basic income schemes, that replace 
all or almost all cash benefits, and ‘partial’ schemes that retain some means-tested support 
or sit alongside the existing social security system (BIEN, 2019; Van Parijs & Vanderborght 
2017; Standing 2017). Within the context of Scotland’s social security powers, some of which 
are devolved to Holyrood and the majority of which are reserved to Westminster, there are 
additional considerations that might shape the design of a basic income administered in 
Scotland.  
Some critics of a ‘full’ basic income argue that replacing all current means-tested supports 
would lead to “unacceptable household losses”, leading some disadvantaged groups to fall – 
or fall deeper  – into poverty. Yet, the alternative option of providing an adequate universal 
payment whilst maintaining additional payments to disadvantaged groups would, even in the 
eyes of many supporters, “simply cost too much” (Martinelli 2017a). In response to this 
intrinsic challenge, a number of basic income proponents advocate for an initial period of 
‘partial’ basic income implementation, during which some means-tested support would be 
continued before being phased out over time, with the ultimate goal being that no one 
currently receiving benefits would be worse off than before (Standing 2017).  
Partial schemes are also often proposed as a way of at least retaining premiums related to 
disability, means-tested housing and childcare costs. However, the more partial the scheme 
(i.e. the more of the existing social security system that is maintained), the less impact it 
might have in delivering against the intentions for a basic income (Haagh and Rohreggar 
2019). In particular, for those advocates who see a basic income as a route to a simplified and 
dignified social security system, retaining much of the social security system defeats the 
purposes of the basic income. Some argue partial schemes would fail to realise the “drastic 
reductions in bureaucratic complexity” proposed in full schemes (Martinelli 2017a). Similarly, 
others argue the unconditional element of basic income is lost when a scheme operates in 
conjunction with welfare states predicated on “willingness to work” requirements (Walker 
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2016). This element is heightened by the fact that most partial basic income proposals are, by 
definition, based on amounts of payment that are insufficient to live on as a sole source of 
income. 
  
Public support in roll-out 
Some advocates of UBI argue that social security provision based on universal entitlement 
would boost social cohesion by eroding notions of who is ‘deserving’ or ‘undeserving’ of 
social support (Painter et al, 2019). Although advocates argue universal coverage may reduce 
bureaucracy and administration costs over the long run, there is a significant political 
challenge in the immediate term to convince politicians and the public that everyone is 
equally deserving of a basic income (De Wispelaere & Nouera 2012). Likewise, where a partial 
programme has been rolled out and the rationale underpinning eligibility has not been clearly 
understood, basic income schemes have been found to damage social cohesion. For example, 
the rushed roll-out of partial basic income schemes such as the Indonesian Bantuan Langsung 
Tunai (BLT) Direct Cash Transfer programme have resulted in a “lasting erosion of trust in all 
levels of government”, with non-recipients withdrawing from community projects and 
related engagement (Keating et al. 2015; Gibson et al. 2018). 
In order to overcome this challenge, it has been suggested that any UBI scheme could 
provide support to “one demographic group at a time” (Torry 2018). This would see a phased 
roll-out based on age groups, beginning with groups that the public might regard as being 
more ‘deserving’ of social support, so that each group’s roll-out can pass a “behavioural 
feasibility test”, building public and political support for a full roll-out. Typical age groups that 
could be considered for the initial phases of any rollout might include “young adults and pre-
retirement working-age adults” (ibid). Torry argues that a phased roll-out would further 
support workable transitions from tax allowances and means-tested benefits towards 
unconditional and nonwithdrawable benefits (ibid).  
 
Defining universality 
Despite its apparent simplicity, the concept of basic income as a payment made to each 
individual within a society also demands design choices. Firstly, there is a decision about how 
to define beneficiaries: what (if any) criteria identify the eligible population, and whether the 
basic income design incorporates any degree of targeting or additional or higher payments 
(for example, based on additional need or relative social position). In the Scotland context, 
we might expect these design choices to relate in the first instance to questions of residency, 
migration or citizenship status and – for the purposes of a pilot – internal migration within 
the UK.  
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If a definition of eligibility is based on residency, there remain questions as to how far that 
eligibility is extended or circumstances in which it could be rescinded. Does a recipient who 
moves out of the trial area continue to receive the payment, and likewise, does someone 
moving into the trial area begin to receive the payment?  
Alternatively, if based on citizenship, there is a design choice with regards to who is perceived 
to be an eligible citizen. For example, some basic income proposals and trials have placed 
further behavioural conditions on eligibility such as absence of a criminal record, or school 
attendance (Ackermann and Alstott 2004) (Silva and Lima 2019).   
 
Size of payment 
There are a number of design choices and trade-offs in determining the size of any basic 
income payment. 
 
• Impact vs. affordability  
Firstly, there is the question of the amount paid to recipients. Basic income concepts often 
described the sum of income paid as basic, modest, or enough to provide economic security 
sufficient to ensure survival (Bregman, 2017; Standing, 2017). There is, however, a clear 
trade-off between the affordability, or indeed feasibility, of basic income, and its impact in 
designing the level of payment. While a small basic income might be politically or 
economically more feasible, it may make little impact on an individual’s life – whereas a more 
generous payment may make a significant difference to the lives of recipients, but may not 
be affordable (Fitzpatrick, 1999; Van Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017).  
The case for a payment adequate to eliminate absolute poverty have been countered by the 
argument that too great a payment could create work disincentives that would 
fundamentally distort the labour market and, consequentially, the tax base that any basic 
income scheme is necessarily funded from (Francese & Prady 2018). Within the context of 
Scotland’s fiscal framework and the revenue-raising powers available, these considerations 
are likely to be even more pressing.  
Crucial to this affordability argument, and often crucial to any distributional effects of a basic 
income, is how a basic income is paid for. Those paid for through dividends from collective 
resources, such as fossil fuels, may be seen as more affordable but are less likely to have the 
strongest distributional effects. Alternatively, those basic incomes that are combined with 
significantly progressive income or wealth tax changes may have the advantage of 
strengthening the distributional effects of a basic income proposal, but may have the 




• Differentiation by age 
There is also the question of whether a payment should vary by age. While we might expect a 
basic income design to see the same payment made to every recipient, there are important 
challenges raised in relation to both children and people of retirement age, who under the 
current social security system would ordinarily be entitled to a state pension and not 
expected to supplement their income through paid work. Under a full basic income, an 
income would be expected to be sufficient to protect against destitution in retirement. Some 
basic income designs therefor advocate for a lower payment for children, paid to a parent or 
carer through childhood, and for a premium payment for people of retirement age (see 
Standing, 2017; Van Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017).  This logic raises further questions, too, 
with regards to people who are not able to supplement their income through the labour 
market – including some case of disability, injury or chronic ill health, or full-time carers.  
The mechanism through which payments are made can be expected to have consequences 
too. There are design choices to consider with regards to whether payments are definitively 
universal, as Standing and others have advocated for, including payment to all children. But 
there are questions of capacity and capability to consider, where how a payment is made 
may differ on the basis of dependency – for example where payments are made to a child’s 
parent. These could be considered within the design of the payment – with payments 
bundled and made to an assigned carer, or they could be made individually, with 
responsibility for accessing and spending money in cases of diminished capacity left to 
existing structures. Whether payments are bundled or made directly to individuals within a 
household could also be expected to make a significant difference to outcomes, as evidence 
heard on the decision to enable split payments for Universal Credit recipients in Scotland has 
found (Scottish Government, 2018). 
 
• Differentiation by geography  
Thirdly, there is the question of differentiation by geography. Recognising the variable cost of 
living across different areas and regions, some advocates have made the case for income 
varying on the basis of where people live – particularly by urban or rural location (Van Parijs 
& Vanderborght, 2017). Critics of a universal basic income’s power to reduce poverty in the 
UK have pointed to variable housing and childcare costs as clear cost barriers that would 
persist for families in receipt of the payment, while means-tested support may be withdrawn 





• Equalities Groups 
There are further design issues relating to how far a basic income can or should seek to 
redress existing structural inequalities between different groups. In this vein, a number of 
feminist arguments have been made for and against basic income. Some feminist advocates 
argue that basic income could provide a means of compensation for women’s unpaid work, 
recognising that women are disproportionately responsible for unpaid care work. Indeed, 
some scholars have pointed to feminist “wages for housework” campaigns of the 1970s as 
early articulations of demands for basic income (Huws 2017). Some feminist utopian visions 
of an unconditional basic income suggest its introduction could go some way to address the 
structural economic disadvantages women currently face within capitalist societies, arguing 
that a future in which going out to work was non-essential could lead to a re-evaluation of 
care work, potentially improving pay and conditions within formal care workforces which are 
both heavily feminised and characterised by low pay.  
Others, meanwhile, have argued that the individual payment design of basic income would 
offer women greater financial agency and greater bargaining power within the family. These 
arguments rest on a critique of contemporary social security provision in its structural 
reliance on the family unit, under which social assistance is offered to women in relation to 
their roles as carers for children, or second earners to the (most often male) primary 
breadwinner (McKay and Vanevery 2000; Webster 2019).  
Feminist critiques of basic income have also evolved over the last decade. These range from 
critiques of arguments for a basic income as blind to the gendered nature of capitalist market 
structures (McKay 2007) to concerns that a basic income might pressure some women with 
caring responsibilities to withdraw from paid labour – a concern that has been heightened by 
evidence of how the design of Universal Credit has disincentivised second earners to enter or 
take on more paid work (Lister 2017).  Some feminist scholars have argued basic income does 
not, by its unconditional nature, adequately value or remunerate women for unpaid care 
work, and that without other measures it fails to address the deeply gendered gap in care 
provision, or to associated pay gap. Feminist perspectives advocating for and against basic 
income are often heavily reliant on assumptions about how work incentives are affected by 
the introduction of a UBI, as so we might expect gender effects to play out differently under 
different basic income designs. 
As McLean and McKay (2015) argue, it is important for debates on the equalities impact of 
basic income to move beyond gendered division of labour to consider other forms of 
disadvantage and oppression encountered by women with intersecting identities (Reynolds 
2017). This is particularly pressing with regard to the design of a basic income when it comes 
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to disability and childcare – both of which may reduce an individual’s ability to enter and 
sustain paid work. If a basic income scheme proposed to take the place of other social 
security entitlement, a key test may be its ability to provide an adequate income for those 
furthest away from the labour market. Here, those who are unable to work due to illness or 
disability and lone parents with pre-school age children are two key groups to consider in the 
design of a basic income scheme.  
 
Modelling the effects of a CBI to date 
In exploring the feasibility of both full and partial schemes in the context of the UK, a small 
number of existing studies have simulated the revenue and distributional effects of various 
basic income designs.  
 
Institute for Policy Research 
Chief amongst these is the Institute for Policy Research (IPR) working paper by Martinelli 
(2017b), which considers over 30 basic income designs in the UK context, including full and 
partial designs. Amongst the full schemes modelled, variation is mainly concerned with the 
level of payment and includes design iterations based on matching existing benefit levels, 
providing premiums for certain groups or on predicted increases in tax revenue derived from 
scrapping the personal allowance (ibid). Within partial schemes, design largely varies by 
coverage, with different iterations targeting a range of groups including young adults, the 
working age population, and pensioners to different extents. Given historically high child 
poverty rates in the UK, generous payments targeting children were maintained across most 
designs. While the research acknowledges limitations in how the designs modelled addressed 
some vulnerable groups and incorporated potential behavioural changes, the paper’s core 
finding is that none of the basic income designs modelled were able to alleviate poverty 
whilst also retaining simplicity and work incentives in a cost effective manner (ibid).   
 
Compass 
In a publication produced for Compass, Lansley and Reed (2019) “examine two 
complementary steps to establish a basic income system” in the UK.  
Model 1 is based on a partial basic income scheme implemented in a single parliament. The 
model varies basic income payments by age, with weekly payments of £40 for children, £60 
for adults under the age of 65 and £175 for those 75 and over. Model 1 operates in 
conjunction with the abolition of child benefit and the state pension alongside a reduction in 
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means-tested state benefits. The gross cost associated with the model is £300.2bn per year.  
The scheme is presented as cost neutral on the grounds that it incorporates a number of 
parallel tax reforms that are revenue-raising, including the removal of the personal allowance 
and national insurance and income tax rises. The revenue raised through tax changes is 
£182bn per year, with the revenue raised through benefit changes totalling £118bn per year. 
Effects on relative poverty are detailed by age group. Child poverty drops by 10.6% (18.1% 
from a base of 28.7%). Working-age poverty falls by 4.5% (15.7% from a base of 20.2%). 
Pensioners poverty drops by 4.9% (11.3% from a base of 16.2%). Figures for effects on 
absolute poverty are not provided. Finally, effects on inequality are represented of drop of 
0.04 on the Gini coefficient  (0.337 from a base of 0.377) (where 0 is complete equality and 1 
complete inequality). 
Model 2 represents a more costly basic income design, with weekly payments set at £50, £80 
and £180 for children, the working-age population and pensioners respectively.  This is 
estimated to require an additional £26bn of spending on top of Model 1. To afford this, 
Lansley and Reed propose a citizen’s wealth fund, built up from a mixture of long-term bond 
issuing, transferring the public asset base and a consistent investment of revenue over the 
period. A fund equal to £650bn would be required to afford meet the additional annual cost, 
with an estimated 20-year accumulation period assumed prior to implementation (ibid). The 
effects in terms of relative poverty are once again detailed by age group. Child poverty drops 
by 13.1% (15.6% from a base of 28.7%). Working-age poverty falls by 5.7% (14.5% from a 
base of 20.2%). Pensioners poverty drops 5.4% (10.8% from a base of 16.2). Again, absolute 
poverty figures are not provided. The effect on the Gini co-efficient is a drop of 0.048 (0.329 
from a base of 0.377).  
 
Reform Scotland 
Mackenzie et al (2016) produced a paper for Reform Scotland which modelled the effects of 
the Scottish Greens’ proposal to provide a weekly basic income of £50 for children and £100 
for adults. The gross cost of implementing such a scheme in the Scotland was estimated at 
£20.4bn. The paper suggests that this could be partially afforded by raising an estimated 
£14.74bn in additional tax revenue and £3.6bn through benefits savings (albeit through tax 
and benefit powers currently not devolved to the Scottish Parliament). Proposed tax and 
benefit changes include  scrapping certain benefits, the removal of the personal allowance, 
an 8p flat rise across all income tax brackets, and plans to combine National Insurance and 
income tax schedules. This would see taxpayers pay a single rate of 40% tax on income 
between £0 - £41,786, 60% on income between £41,787 - £150,000 and 65% on anything 
above. No figures were provided referring to the effects of the basic income on absolute and 
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relative poverty, or in terms of inequality. However, the paper does detail the effects on 
individual incomes after implementing the scheme saw gains go to people earning below 
£26,000 and losses for anyone earning above this sum, with the biggest winners being those 
with the smallest incomes.  
 
Royal Society of Arts 
More recently, Painter et.al (2019) produced a paper for the RSA detailing two separate 
models for basic income, specifically addressing Scotland. The first simulated model is based 
on three separate age-related payments: £58 per week for children; £92 for the working age 
population; and £169 for pensioners. Unlike many other proposed basic income models, the 
personal allowance is retained, but reduced to £1,500. National Insurance is also retained, 
but with primary (£1,500) and upper (£43,430) thresholds reduced and rates applied above 
each of these limits at 12% (as is currently the case) and 4% (a rise of 2%) respectively.  
Income tax rates on gross income are adjusted as follows: 
 
Gross Income  Income Tax Rate 
£1,500 - £14,549 19% 
£14,549-£24,944 21% 
£24,944-£43,430 23% 
above £43,430 42% 
above £75,000 50% 
 
The second model operates on the same basis, but retains the current income tax schedule 
and a lower basic income payment of £46 per week for adults and £29 for children. Painter 
et.al (2019) argue this would see the existing tax savings made through Income Tax and 
National Insurance allowances paid out in a cash sum. 
Both models are suggested as being to the benefit of society as a whole, and to those most in 
need in particular. Details on the effect of each model on relative poverty rates at a 
household level are provided, alongside a breakdown in terms of age group. All relative 
poverty rates detailed in the paper are measured before housing costs are taken into 
account. Household poverty drops by 5.3% drop (13.5% from a base of 18.8%) under model 1 
and 1.6% drop (17.2% from a base of 18.8%) under model 2. Child poverty falls by 5.9% (12% 
from a base of 17.9%) under model 1 and by 1.7% (16.3% from a base of 17.9%) under model 
2. For adults, a drop of 5.7% (10.3% from a base of 16%) is registered for model 1 and a fall of 
1.8% (14.1% from a base of 16%) for model 2. Pensioner poverty falls by 5.4% (10.8% from 
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base of 16.2%) in model 1 and 1.4% (14.8 from base of 16.2) in model 2. Significantly for the 
authors, the rate of destitution48 in Scotland is halved under the second model and 
eliminated entirely under the first model” (ibid). Although no direct figure is referred to in 
terms of inequality, positive changes for those with the lowest incomes are acknowledged in 
both models.  
The funding gaps associated with both models, however, are considerable. The gross cost 
associated with both models are not detailed. Instead, net costs are provided. The second 
model would require an additional £1.9bn in spend per year, and the first model an 
additional £9.6bn per year. For the authors, the scale of the latter figure means that first 
model should be considered a “longer-term proposition” with reforms over “a number of 
five-year parliamentary sessions” required to make it a feasible prospect. To cover these 
gaps, the authors turn to a number of prospective revenue generators predicated on a series 
of ambitious assumptions. These include an average growth of 2% in GDP over the first 10 
years of the scheme, greater powers being devolved to Scotland in terms of tax and 
expenditure and a consistent Barnett formula being applied.  
 
Conclusion 
The simple idea of a basic income paid regularly to all has gained a great deal of interest in 
recent years. As we look back on the over a decade since the financial crash, the resultant 
public and benefit spending cuts, alongside benefit reforms and roll-out of Universal Credit 
and increases in insecure work and as we look ahead to automation and technological 
change, many see basic income as a proposal which has come of age.  
This literature review has considered some of the key definitions of a basic income, and other 
forms of basic payments, and has also outlined some of the pilots and practical applications 
of basic payments that have taken place in the past and are in existence to this day.  
Without question basic income has a simplicity that has helped it to gain support as a 
potential policy prescription to many of the challenges we face today. However, while simple 
in terms of definition, it seems clear a basic income is far from simple in terms of application. 
In designing any basic income scheme in Scotland there remains a number of key choices and 
                                                          
48 The paper cites the The Joseph Rowntree Foundation’s definition of destitution:  
““Destitution means going without the bare essentials we all need. That’s a home, food, heating, lighting, 
clothing, shoes and basic toiletries. We define destitution as when people have lacked two or more of these 
essentials over the past month because they couldn’t afford them; or if their income is extremely low – less 
than £70 a week for a single adult” (Goulden 2018). 
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potential trade-offs in turn, some intrinsic to any scheme others related to how any pilot or 
scheme is rolled out. These include whether a basic income operates alongside or instead of 
(parts of) the social security system, defining universality, how it is rolled-out to avoid 
resentment, and of course the size of any payment.  
Linked to many of these is the question of how a basic income could be paid for. Few if any of 
the basic payments piloted in practice have seen resultant changes to taxes (see annex). 
Where they have, such as in Alaska, the basic payment has been paid for through indirect 
taxation, rather than through the progressive income tax changes proposed by many 
advocates of a basic income. Any basic income pilot in Scotland designed to have 
distributional effects that narrow income inequalities would need to consider the potential 
effects of tax changes, as much as the effects of any payment itself – in essence how a basic 





Note: Existing Basic Income Schemes and Pilots 
Where have basic payments been implemented?  
Globally, basic income initiatives and the debate that surrounds them have taken place over 
two distinct periods. The first wave occurred between 1968-1980 and was marked by five NIT 
trials (loosely defined as Basic Income Guarantee experiments - see Widerquist 2018) in the 
United States and Canada. The second and current wave has taken place from 2008-the 
present day and is typified by a raft of new policy experiments and proposals seeking 
primarily to address inadequate welfare state provision in numerous countries (ibid). Pilots 
and proposals in this second wave are typified by a closer alignment to the basic income 
tenets as set out above, although none can be said to be based on a full basic income 
scheme. Instead, a number of compromises are shown to be necessary to at least enact 
partial basic schemes.  
 
The First Wave – NIT trials (1968-1980) 
• The Income Maintenance Experiments – 1970s 
The largest of the NIT trials conducted during the first wave were the Seattle/Denver Income 
Maintenance Experiments (SIME/DIME). For those families that received NIT benefits, 11 
different plans were applied with three levels of NIT annual payment ($3800, $4800 and 
$5600) and varying levels of “take-back rates” as income rose (ibid). Families selected for the 
trial included black, white, and Latino families with at least one dependent and household 
incomes below $11,000 for single parents [and] $13,000 for two-parent families (all figures as 
of 1971) (ibid). In total, 4800 low-income families took part in the trial, with just under 60% of 
families receiving financial payments, with the remainder acting as a control group 
(Spiegelman & Yaeger 1980). The trials began in 1970 and lasted until 1976, although a small 
number of families continued to receive NIT benefits up until 1980. Families were enrolled on 
a 3-, 5- or 20-year basis, although the latter group did not complete the full term as the trial 
was prematurely concluded.  
Much of the media and political coverage of these trials have focussed on negative labour 
market outcomes. Advocates of basic income initiatives have argued that this reading was 
fundamentally a problem of interpretations, making the case that the experimental group’s 
labour “reduction” was only a relative reduction in comparison to the control group, and 
many “substantial and encouraging” quality-of-life indicators were overlooked by lay 
commentators (ibid). Additionally, supporters argued that the 5-7.9% reduction in labour-
time between treatment and control groups would not necessarily be replicated on a 
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national scale, particularly given many participants were working less only in order to spend 
more time looking for other jobs. Nevertheless, this sizeable reduction (combined with a 
higher divorce rate amongst the treatment group) largely dictated the negative narrative that 
formed around the trials (Widerquist 2019).  
• Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend (1982-Present) 
The Alaskan Permanent Fund Dividend (APFD) has been cited as the longest standing ‘Basic 
Income-like’ intervention in the developed world (Painter et al. 2019). Since 1982, the 
scheme has entitled all Alaskan residents to a share of the state’s revenues from oil 
production. As of January 2018, the overall fund was worth approximately $66 billion, with 
around almost 630,000 people of all ages, who have resided in Alaska for at least a year, 
receiving a payment of around $2,000 per annum (Jones & Marinescu 2018) (Berain Garza 
2018).  
For many, the fund is not only the longest-standing example of a basic income scheme but 
also one of the most successful. Separate studies have noted that the dividend has had the 
effect of at least mitigating if not reducing poverty, especially amongst certain rural and 
Indigenous populations, while also maintaining labour market participation, with a small 
increase in part-time working amongst recipients (Berman 2016) (Berman 2018) (Jones & 
Marinescu 2018). However, overall poverty rates have continued to rise in recent years 
despite the existence of the payment (Berman 2016). As Gibson et al. highlight, such effects 
may be attributed to the fact that the APFD was not actually designed with the aim of 
reducing poverty or income inequality, but with the dividend originally implemented “in 
conjunction with the abolition of state level income taxes” (Gibson et al. 2018). The APFD 
may therefore be an example of a basic payment but it was not implemented alongside 
progressive tax reforms to pay for it (instead paid for through income from natural 
resources). Therefore the distributional effects of the APFD seem to be less substantial than 
models that combine a basic payment with significant income tax changes (ibid).  
Nevertheless, the initiative has maintained a high level of popularity amongst the Alaskan 
population since its inception, with a majority of Alaskans continuing to support the payment 
and almost 80 per cent of the population agreeing that the dividend is an important source of 
income for people in their local community (Knapp et al. 1984) (ESP 2017). The dividend 
amount is subject to change and is delivered annually meaning that it would not be 
considered a basic income scheme by the two core definitions discussed above. Yet, with 
payments being unconditional and universal, if not regular, the APFD represents one of the 
closest and most consistent real-world examples that can be drawn on for those interested in 
basic income design and implementation.  
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• First Nation payments 
The APFD is not the only example of a dividend-based community payment. Basic payments 
are also made as a proportion of casino profits to members of approximately 120 First Nation 
reservations, a trend that begun in the late 1980s following the introduction US Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) that allowed such nations to operate gambling businesses 
(Gibson et al. 2018). Although these per capita dividends are non-universal within the context 
of the wider state, they are paid universally to First Nations peoples, and are permanent and 
unconditional. In many cases, the level of dividend is enough to maintain a basic level of 
subsistence without other sources of income (ibid).  
 
The Second Wave (2008-Present) 
In the aftermath of the financial crash and increasing contraction in welfare state spending 
across the globe, and with the prospect of technological change across the economy, the 
case for basic income schemes has been raised anew. Completed pilots and related studies of 
forms of basic payment schemes have taken place in Namibia (2008-2009), Madhya Pradesh 
in India (2011-2013) and, most recently, Finland (2017-2018). Popular advocates in the 
modern context have championed the ability of basic income initiatives to address poverty 
(Lowrey 2018), create a fairer work-life balance (Bregman 2017), combat the increasing 
threat of automation (Srnicek and Williams 2016) and contribute to a more socially just tax 
system (Murphy 2015).  
• Namibian Basic Income Grant – 2008-2009 
The Namibian Basic Income Grant Pilot (2008-2009) was designed, at least in part, with the 
aim of redistribution agenda in mind given high rates of poverty, high unemployment, and 
high inequality within the country at the time (Haarmann, Haarmann & Nattrass, 2019). For 
Rigmar Osterkamp (2013), the need to address inequality through the initiative was particular 
warranted given Namibia’s status as a “middle-income economy” with some of the highest 
historical levels of income-inequality in the world. 
The pilot was funded by a combination of foundations and individual donations with the 
express intention of convincing the government to adopt the scheme at a national level 
(Standing 2017) (Osterkamp 2013). Selection was based largely on the mutual 
impoverishment of the 1005 residents of the town of Otjivero who had “no access to land 
and limited access to jobs” (Haarmann, Haarmann & Nattrass, 2019). Other notable factors in 
the selection of recipients included an exclusion of individuals over the age of 60 (receiving a 
state pension) and the fact that children received the basic income via their mothers, not 
fathers (Osterkamp 2013). Recipients, including all children, received “an unconditional 
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monthly basic income of 100 Namibian dollars (about $8, and about 2 percent of Namibia’s 
GDP per capita at the time)” (Van Parijs & Vanderborght 2017). The pilot was officially 
concluded after two years, although payments to participant continued at a reduced rate 
until 2014 (Haarmann, Haarmann & Nattrass, 2019). 
The impact of the Namibian Basic Income Grant was assessed during the pilot via three field 
surveys. These were conducted in November 2007 (the baseline survey), in July 2008 (a first 
assessment after half a year) and in November 2008 (covering 11 months of payments) 
(Osterkamp 2013). Those who designed the pilot pointed to several positive indicators 
recorded through the surveys. Child malnutrition fell significantly during the pilot, with a 
baseline rate of 42% at the start of the project dropping to 17% in July 2008 and 10% in 
November 2008 (Haarmann, Haarmann & Nattrass, 2019). Due to a noted increase in 
average household income, payment of school fees more than doubled (to 90%) and non-
attendance at school fell by 42% (ibid). Petty crime rates also dropped during the pilot and a 
small growth in business activity and labour market participation was also recorded.  
The causal relationship between the pilot and these outcomes has been called into question. 
Critics point to the fact that the baseline sample size was not sufficient, the surveyors were 
involved in the design of the project and where non-neutral and that data was not published 
on an open-access basis as is standard practice for such pilots (Osterkamp 2013). The primary 
criticism, however, was that other government interventions (including food aid provided at 
the start of the project) may have contributed to the outcomes to a greater degree than the 
BIG payments (ibid). The lack of a control group in terms of the project makes it difficult to 
isolate the effects of the BIG payments directly. The ultimate aim of the project was 
unsuccessful, with the Namibian government unwilling to adopt the policy on a national basis 
and there are currently no further plans to conduct further pilots in the country. 
• Madhya Pradesh in India – 2011-2013 
Like the Namibian pilot, the funding for the Madhya Pradesh pilots was sourced from non-
governmental bodies through the United Nations Development Programme and then, more 
substantially, from the United Nations children’s fund UNICEF (Standing 2017). In the case of 
the Madhya Pradesh pilots, such extra-governmental funding underlined the initiatives’ aim 
to provide a viable alternative to poorly implemented welfare schemes (Davala 2019).  
For some, the pilots’ design constitutes the most robust attempt to test as many 
characteristics of a full basic income as possible (Berain Garza 2018). All citizens included 
within the areas tested were beneficiaries on an unconditional basis, with around 6000 
people receiving basic income payments (Davala 2019) (Berain Garza 2018). For the first 12 
months of the pilots, adult residents received a basic income of “200 rupees per month 
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(slightly more than $4, or 6.5 percent of GDP per capita in Madhya Pradesh and 4 percent of 
GDP per capita in India at the time)”, with children receiving 50% of the entitlement (Van 
Parijs & Vanderborght 2017). For the remaining five months of the program, payments were 
increased to 300 and 150 rupees for adults and children respectively (Gibson et al. 2018). A 
separate study, specifically of tribal groups in the region, was also deemed appropriate, with 
individuals in these communities receiving the larger of the two payments for the entire 12-
month durations of the pilot (Davala 2019). 
The Madhya Pradesh pilots benefitted from the use of a modified Randomised Control Trial 
(RCT) methodology, with participants assigned on a communal rather than individual basis to 
correct for ethical concerns (Davala 2019). The main pilot was conducted in eight villages, 
with 12 villages in the region receiving no basic income support. In terms of the tribal villages, 
individuals in one received basic income payments whilst one other did not (ibid). 
This methodology allowed a more precise estimation of the impacts of the pilot than was the 
case in the Namibian example. Several positive outcomes were noted in the case of the 
general and tribal pilots. As was the case in the Namibian pilot, the most significant of these 
related to an improvement in nutrition amongst both adult and child beneficiaries (ibid). 
Other health benefits included an increased ability to afford regular medication and an 
increasing ability to access a range of health services. This also resulted in households 
becoming more financially resilient, with individuals experiencing less pressure to enter into 
destructive cycles of debt (ibid). Finally, “productive work” amongst beneficiaries was seen to 
increase, with many choosing to invest in their own private enterprises such as farm holdings 
and other small businesses (ibid) (Gibson et al. 2018). 
• Finland – 2017-18 
Finland’s pilot of a basic income was primarily concerned with addressing the country’s high 
historical rates of unemployment following an economic recession in the early 1990s (De 
Wispelaere, Halmetoja & Pulkka 2019). Specifically, the centre-right government’s intention 
when designing the program was to explore ways in which the social security system could be 
reshaped to “better adjust to changes in working life, to make social security more 
participatory, to diminish disincentives to working, to reduce bureaucracy and to simplify the 
overly complex tax-benefit system” (Kangas, Simanainen & Honkanen 2017). 
The Finish model narrowed the pool of recipients through their targeting of the unemployed, 
and made payments to 2000 individuals between 25 and 58 years of age who received a 
basic daily allowance or labour market support as of November 2016 (ibid). The Finnish trial 
was unique, however, in that it was the “first Basic Income experiment to adopt a nation-
wide RCT design” (De Wispelaere, Halmetoja & Pulkka 2019). Although targeted in terms of 
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the characteristics of recipients, the trial was strengthened by casting a wider net amongst 
the Finish population allowing greater analysis of, for example, differences between urban 
and rural groups. 
A flat payment of €560 per month was provided, tax free to 2000 people registered 
unemployed (Standing 2017). Despite the recommendations of a research group involved in 
the design of the pilot, the decision was made by the government to work on a single model 
of basic income corresponding to “the basic level received by those on labour market subsidy 
and basic unemployment benefit” (De Wispelaere, Halmetoja & Pulkka 2019). 
The preliminary results of the Finish basic income experiment did not produce any 
statistically significant improvements in employment outcomes and therefore did not achieve 
its overarching goal (Kangas et. al 2019). Recipients did, however, report clear improvements 
in their overall wellbeing. Additionally, it has been suggested that the data generated through 
the evaluation of the program can be used to redesign the current social security system, 
which may lead to impacts in terms of social security reforms if not basic income 
implementation (ibid). Proponents of basic income have been quick to defend the concept in 
light of the Finnish results. In particular, the poor design of the Finnish model has been cited 
as a potential cause of the weak results, with inadequate funding and a rushed process cited 




Annex B: Elasticities used in estimation of labour supply 
responses 
 
Table B1: Elasticities with respect to the gain-to-work used to estimate the substitution effect on the extensive 
margin, for those aged 19-54 (low scenario) 
 




20% Next 20% 
Middle-
earning 




Men (except lone fathers) 0.04 0.045 0.037 0.027 0.015 0.032 
Single women without children 0.053 0.059 0.048 0.035 0.019 0.049 
Women without children, non-
working partner 0.025 0.038 0.036 0.028 0.017 0.031 
Women without children, working 
partner 0.05 0.065 0.056 0.042 0.024 0.052 
Lone parents, youngest 
child aged: 
0–2 0.18 0.219 0.172 0.137 0.081 0.175 
3–5 0.228 0.265 0.239 0.242 0.242 0.242 
6–10 0.161 0.19 0.163 0.142 0.081 0.159 
11+ 0.122 0.126 0.116 0.091 0.058 0.112 
Women with non-
working partner, 
youngest child aged: 
0–2 0.034 0.035 0.036 0.035 0.035 0.035 
3–5 0.048 0.045 0.044 0.039 0.045 0.045 
6–10 0.035 0.039 0.035 0.031 0.023 0.034 
11+ 0.027 0.028 0.021 0.025 0.025 0.025 
Women with working 
partner, youngest child 
aged: 
0–2 0.06 0.087 0.081 0.064 0.038 0.069 
3–5 0.076 0.107 0.104 0.084 0.052 0.087 
6–10 0.058 0.081 0.078 0.063 0.038 0.064 
11+ 0.044 0.056 0.055 0.043 0.025 0.047 





Table B2: Elasticities with respect to the gain-to-work used to estimate the substitution effect on the extensive 
margin, for those aged 19-54 (high scenario) 
 




20% Next 20% 
Middle-
earning 




Men (except lone fathers) 0.112 0.127 0.102 0.075 0.043 0.091 
Single women without children 0.187 0.207 0.168 0.123 0.067 0.17 
Women without children, non-
working partner 0.069 0.106 0.101 0.078 0.047 0.086 
Women without children, working 
partner 0.14 0.183 0.157 0.119 0.066 0.145 
Lone parents, youngest 
child aged: 
0–2 0.63 0.768 0.604 0.48 0.285 0.611 
3–5 0.797 0.926 0.835 0.846 0.846 0.846 
6–10 0.563 0.664 0.569 0.499 0.284 0.558 
11+ 0.419 0.436 0.397 0.293 0.193 0.382 
Women with non-
working partner, 
youngest child aged: 
0–2 0.12 0.122 0.122 0.127 0.122 0.122 
3–5 0.169 0.156 0.155 0.137 0.156 0.156 
6–10 0.123 0.138 0.123 0.11 0.082 0.119 
11+ 0.086 0.094 0.098 0.072 0.087 0.087 
Women with working 
partner, youngest child 
aged: 
0–2 0.211 0.306 0.284 0.223 0.133 0.243 
3–5 0.267 0.376 0.362 0.293 0.181 0.305 
6–10 0.201 0.282 0.274 0.221 0.134 0.224 
11+ 0.152 0.198 0.192 0.151 0.088 0.165 





Table B3: Elasticities with respect to the gain-to-work used to estimate the substitution effect on the extensive 
margin, for those aged 19-54 (central scenario) 
 




20% Next 20% 
Middle-
earning 




Men (except lone fathers) 0.08 0.09 0.073 0.053 0.031 0.065 
Single women without children 0.107 0.118 0.096 0.071 0.038 0.097 
Women without children, non-
working partner 0.049 0.076 0.072 0.056 0.034 0.061 
Women without children, working 
partner 0.1 0.131 0.112 0.085 0.047 0.104 
Lone parents, youngest 
child aged: 
0–2 0.36 0.439 0.345 0.274 0.163 0.349 
3–5 0.455 0.529 0.477 0.483 0.483 0.483 
6–10 0.322 0.379 0.325 0.285 0.162 0.319 
11+ 0.244 0.253 0.231 0.182 0.117 0.225 
Women with non-
working partner, 
youngest child aged: 
0–2 0.069 0.07 0.07 0.073 0.07 0.07 
3–5 0.096 0.089 0.088 0.078 0.089 0.089 
6–10 0.07 0.079 0.07 0.063 0.047 0.068 
11+ 0.049 0.054 0.056 0.041 0.05 0.05 
Women with working 
partner, youngest child 
aged: 
0–2 0.121 0.175 0.162 0.128 0.076 0.139 
3–5 0.152 0.215 0.207 0.167 0.103 0.174 
6–10 0.115 0.161 0.157 0.126 0.077 0.128 
11+ 0.087 0.113 0.11 0.086 0.05 0.094 
Average 0.123 0.124 0.098 0.074 0.04 0.096 
 
Table B4: Elasticities with respect to the gain-to-work used to estimate the substitution effect on the extensive 















Central 0.177 0.165 0.141 0.118 0.094 0.146 
Low 0.353 0.33 0.283 0.235 0.188 0.292 





Table B5: Elasticities used to estimate the substitution effect on the intensive margin  
 Low Central High 
Those in top 1% of UK earnings distribution 0.1 0.3 0.4 
Those in next 4% of UK earnings distribution 0.07 0.2 0.3 
Otherwise:   
Men 0.012 0.12 0.24 
Single women without children 0.012 0.12 0.24 
Women in couples without children 0.057 0.17 0.34 
Women with a child aged 0–2 0.067 0.2 0.4 
Women whose youngest child is aged 3–5 0.133 0.4 0.8 
Women whose youngest child is aged 6–10 0.1 0.3 0.6 
Women whose youngest child is aged 11+ 0.067 0.2 0.4 
Average 0.038 0.16 0.32 
 
 
Table B6: Elasticities used to estimate income effects 
 Low Central High 
Men and women without children -0.037 -0.075 -0.15 
Women with youngest 
child aged: 
0-2 -0.075 -0.15 -0.3 
3-5 -0.06 -0.12 -0.24 
6-10 -0.05 -0.1 -0.2 















Annex C: Wage bargaining and migration behaviour 
under conventional bargaining and the social wage 
The idea that transactors may look beyond their real net take home wage can be applied to 
migrants. Rational migrants would certainly wish to include all of the effects of a move on their 
income levels, including the CBI payments to themselves and their families. We can capture 
this idea in the following equation. The migration model becomes: 




w wm u u
cpi cpi
ς β τ
    
 = − − + − − −     
    
 (1) 
In equation (2): m is net in-migration as a proportion of the Scottish population; u is the 
unemployment rate; the S and R superscripts stand for Scotland and the Rest of the UK, 
respectively; and ς is a parameter calibrated to generate zero net migration in the base period. 
β is the parameter indicating the extent to which households value public and CBI-linked 
private, as against general private, consumption. It represents the subjective net valuation by 
households of the benefits of the increased CBI weighed against the corresponding increase in 
their income tax. If β=1 migrants respond to the gross real wage; the rise in tax does not impact 
their migration decision since they feel as well off after the change as before. They value the 
benefits of the CBI as much as their loss of real take home pay. 
In the social wage case workers value the reduction in poverty and inequality (and the financial 
value of the CBI to them) as much as their loss of disposable income, and so do not seek to 
restore the real value of their take home pay, in contrast to the assumption of the conventional 
bargaining model that all that matters is the net real wage. In this case the real wage curve is 
augmented for the value attached to the CBI: 











Note that we can, in principle, vary the workers’ valuation of the benefits of the CBI, for 
example, to reflect only the private financial benefits of the CBI to workers. However, for 
simplicity we focus on the social wage case here, where the combined valuation of private and 
social benefits of the CBI mean that workers feel no worse off after its introduction, so that 
there is no wage push response. The parameter α represents the extent to which the amenity 
effect associated with redistribution (and the private valuation of the CBI) is reflected in the 
wage bargain and c is a calibrated parameter.49 In the conventional bargaining model 
                                                          
49 A wage curve elasticity of around -0.1 has been found over a large number of empirical 
studies across different countries and time periods (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2005).    
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employed in Section 4 above both α and β equal zero so that the last term on the RHS of (1) is 
zero. In this case bargaining is over the real net of tax consumption wage (which is the wage 
on the LHS above). However, in the Social Wage case β=α=1, so that (2) implies that workers 
bargain over the pre-tax real wage: the tax hike has no impact on the bargained wage; workers 





Annex D: A note on the specification of the CGE model 
Technical details of the specification of our models are available in the numerous papers 




The model typically has 18 sectors, but these are periodically aggregated to facilitate ease of 
presentation of results, for example, into Primary, Manufacturing and Services. No sectors are 
considered ‘sheltered’, since even health care services, traditionally regarded as a sheltered 
sector, is now inter-regionally traded.  
The model includes three domestic institutional sectors: Firms, Households and Government. 
External institutions are split into the Rest of UK (RUK) and Rest of the World (ROW).  
Consistent with other models, Scotland is assumed to be too small to affect prices in 
international and interregional markets and, as a consequence, the RUK and ROW prices are 
taken to be exogenous.  
The intertemporal behaviour of Households and Firms  is determined either under forward-
looking – based on intertemporal optimization with perfect foresight – or myopic assumptions. 
The model solution identifies the set of prices at which excess demand is zero in each market 
and market clearing prices equal marginal costs in each sector. However, imperfect 
competition in the labour market is accommodated and unemployment is involuntary. 
 
Production  
The SPF model has a multilevel, nested production structure, shown in Figure A2.1.  




In each sector gross output is produced by combining intermediate inputs, and value added. 
Labour and capital are combined in order to produce value added. Typically we use CES 
production functions which allow for a degree of substitution among factors of production. 
The demand for capital and labour is obtained from the first order condition for profit 
maximization. This implies that the demand for both factors of production is positively related 
to the volume of value added and is a decreasing function of their prices.  
Each industry in the region produces goods and services that can be exported or sold in the 
regional market. Intermediate goods that are produced locally (in Scotland) or imported are 
considered as imperfect substitutes. Scottish goods mix regional and imported goods under 
the Armington assumptions through a CES function (Figure 1). The demand function for 
regionally produced and imported intermediate inputs (from RUK and ROW) derives from the 
solution of a cost minimization problem. 
 
Investment  
Capital stock adjustment follows the standard law of motion including investment and 
depreciation. Investment follows Hayashy (1982), Go (1994) and Devarajan and Go (1998). 
There are adjustment costs which means that the economy does not adjust instantaneously to 
the desired level of capital stock. Firms respond to a shock by making continuous small 
investments over time.  
The dynamic path of investment can be determined either under the perfect foresight, 
forward-looking or myopic assumptions.  
Under the forward-looking assumption the dynamic path of investment is the result of an 
intertemporal programme that seeks to maximize the value of the firm, subject to the capital 
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accumulation equation. The value of firms is determined by the present value of the capital 
income less investment expenditure.. 
Under the myopic assumption investment demand in each sector is a proportion (speed of 
adjustment) of the difference between actual and desired capital stocks. Desired capital stock 
is derived from cost minimisation of output and is a function of value added and the price of 
value added relative to the user cost of capital. 
Investment goods can be produced domestically (in Scotland) and be imported (from RUK and 
ROW). Within each period the distribution between domestically produced and imported 
investment goods is determined by an Armington CES function in the same way as with 
intermediate inputs (Figure 1). The demand function for regionally produced and imported 




Consumption, like investment, is determined in accordance with either a forward-looking or 
myopic context.  
Under the forward-looking assumption individuals optimise their lifetime utility function of 
consumption, C, subject to a lifetime wealth constraint. According to the dynamic budget 
constraint, the discounted present value of consumption must not exceed total household 
wealth. The model distinguishes between financial wealth and non-financial wealth. Solving 
optimisation problem determines time path of aggregate consumption.  
In contrast, under myopic expectations, aggregate consumption is calculated as simple 
function of income (marginal propensity to consume). 
Once the dynamic consumption path is obtained, aggregate consumption is allocated within 
each period between different goods and services through a CES function. Household demand 
for regional and imported goods is derived from an intra-temporal cost minimization problem. 
As explained earlier, all international trade in the SPF model uses Armington assumptions, 
whereby imports, domestic production, RUK and ROW imports are considered imperfect 
substitutes. This means that household final demands follow the hierarchical structure of the 
intermediate inputs branch in Figure 1, and so governs how the SPF model treats all 
combinations of regional, national (UK), and ROW inputs. 
It is possible to disaggregate households into five income groups. In the default SPF model, 
each household group behaves identically (in a mathematical sense), but data-driven 
parameterisation results in heterogeneity. Each household group makes its own aggregate 
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consumption decision based on a specific budget constraint. Distributional effects in 
simulations can come from two sources: differences in the composition of income and in the 
sectoral composition of consumption.  
 
Government 
Following the Smith Commission and the devolution of income tax and assignment of part of 
Value-Add Tax (VAT) revenues, this iteration of the SPF model incorporates revenue from 
devolved (and assigned) tax changes and a distinct Scottish Government, which is subject to 
an appropriately formulated budget constraint.  (UK government expenditures in Scotland are 
also incorporated.).  
Government is split into two levels: UK Government in Scotland and “Scottish Government” 
(both local and sub-national).  
In this regard, the Scottish Budget is made up of a combination of block grant, block grant 
adjustment and devolved and assigned revenues from Scottish taxes. The model also includes 
UK Government taxes raised in Scotland (such as business taxes), but these, of course, do not 
form part of the Scottish Government’s budget constraint.  
The UK Government in Scotland is assumed to be exogenous, and so its behaviour does not 
respond to changes in Scottish prices, government revenues, or the behaviour of the Scottish 
Government. Its transfers (e.g., welfare payments) are indexed to UK prices. Since these are 
exogenous to Scotland the transfers are effectively fixed in nominal terms. It is assumed the 
UK government’s consumption is fixed in real-terms, i.e. total expenditure changes with 
changes in the UK price level. 
It is useful to be able to simulate the model under a range of alternative treatments of the 
Scottish Government’s budget constraint, so that it can be used to compare results under 
varying degrees of regional autonomy.  
• Fixed government expenditure – a useful benchmark case which treats Scottish 
Government expenditure symmetrically with the UK Government so that it is fixed in 
real terms. 
• “Barnett case” – fixes Scottish Government revenue in nominal terms (or, to UK prices) 
through a single block grant.  
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• “Smith case” – all of income tax and half of VAT revenues are recycled to augment 
Scottish Government public spending, subject to block grant adjustments. The block 
grant adjustments can be modified to reflect alternative adjustment mechanisms.50  
• “Full fiscal autonomy case” – all taxes raised in Scotland are devolved and recycled to 
augment current public spending by the Scottish Government.  
All taxes in the model can be separated into several categories depending on the tax base and 
application mechanism. There are four categories of taxes: 
• Taxes on income, including income tax (earnings and pensions), national insurance 
contributions (employer and employee), other household taxes – applied to different 
categories of income; 
• Consumption taxes, including value added tax (VAT) and other consumption taxes – 
applied to different components of final demand. VAT is levied directly on household 
and government consumption. VAT rates are sector- and final-demand-component-
specific. For those sectors where VAT is levied on intermediate consumption , an 
assumption is made that these costs are passed on to consumers; 
• Taxes on capital, including corporation tax – applied profits; 
• Taxes on production – indirect taxes applied on value of output. 
All potential government revenue sources identified in the Scottish Government Expenditure 
and Revenue Scotland (GERS) publication have been identified and compared to our modelling 
assumptions. 
Most other taxes, particularly those which are not devolved, are endogenous, but modelled 
generally through indexing to the appropriate metric. These include taxes such as income tax 
on dividends, specific purchase taxes, TV license fee, and council tax. 
 
Foreign and public assets 
Since Scotland is a region and not an independent country we do not impose strict constraints 
on accumulation of foreign and public debt, because interregional transfers can sustain 
perpetual capital flows. At the same time we can track implied foreign and public deficits and 
debts and impose sustainability constraints if required. 
 
 
                                                          
50 For detailed discussion of new Fiscal Framework and block grant adjustments see Eiser (2017) 
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Labour market regimes and labour supply  
The model incorporates three labour market closures reflecting the form of wage setting: 
regional wage bargaining (RB); national bargaining (NB); and fixed real wage (FRW).  
In the RB regime, the labour market is defined by the wage curve (Blanchflower and Oswald, 
1994) according to which wages and unemployment are negatively related. Thus regional 
wages are directly related to workers’ bargaining power and respond to excess demand for 
labour.  
NB is a typical Keynesian closure for regional labour markets. It assumes that the nominal wage 
is fixed at the base year level. This could be motivated by a system in which the nominal wage 
is fixed at the national level by the presence of a nation-wide bargaining system (Harrigan et 
al., 1991).  
FRW is used to obtain an alternative counterfactual analysis, reflecting a “real-wage-
resistance” hypothesis, where bargaining ensures that the purchasing power of wages remains 
stable over time.  
There are two ways to deal with population change in the model. The first is endogenous 
adjustment in the labour force through a migration function (Harrigan et al. ,1996; McGregor 
at al., 1996). The migration model assumes the form specified in Layard et al. (1991) and Treyz 
et al. (1993) where the net migration flow is taken to be positively related to the gap between 
the log of regional and national real wages, and negatively related to the difference between 
the log of regional and national unemployment rates. 
Alternatively we can introduce exogenous change in labour supply as a shock into the model 
and track the model’s response to this disturbance.  
It is possible to disaggregate the labour market into skilled and unskilled components. In this 
case there are two types of labour which are imperfect substitutes in the production process. 
Skill disaggregation is usually combined with the regional bargaining closure, and allows for 
separate wage curves and migration functions for both skilled and unskilled labour. Skilled and 
unskilled workers bargain for distinct wages, and the model allows firms to substitute skilled 
and unskilled workers in response.  
 
Verification process  
The development of a CGE model occurs in a number of steps: model specification; data base 
development (SAM); parameterisation; solution and counterfactual simulations. At each of 
these stages there are various means of verifying the model. 
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Once a balanced SAM is generated and the key parameters, including all elasticities of 
substitution and demand, have been determined, the remaining parameters are calibrated to 
the base year SAM. Once the calibration process is complete, it is checked by confirming that, 
when the model is solved with no changes in policy or other variables, it reproduces the base 
year data.  
Homogeneity tests which check that uniform external price changes have no real 
consequences, are also used in verification. However, there may well be genuine nominal 
rigidities in the system, which can, for example, emerge as a result of asymmetric revenue (e.g., 
the partial devolution of taxes) and expenditure devolution (e.g., the indexing of non-devolved 
versus devolved transfer payments). Necessarily, only versions of the model that have no 
nominal rigidities pass the homogeneity test.  
The solver(s) used are now standard for solving large sets of non-linear simultaneous equations 
systems. The solutions – and the efficiency of the solver – can be checked through extensive 
simulation.  
Once fully parameterised, the model can be used to simulate the impact of a huge range of 
demand- and supply-side disturbances, including government policies. There are a number of 
test simulations where the properties of the solution are known and can be checked. To reflect 
uncertainty around key parameter values, sensitivity analyses can be conducted. Where this is 
based on econometrically estimated parameters, statistical information can be used to inform 
the sensitivity analysis. Where there is genuine uncertainty concerning the appropriate 





Annex E: The direct impact of benefits on bargaining/ 
labour supply 
Benefits as a stimulus to labour bargaining power 
The traditional view is that welfare benefits enhance workers bargaining power and provide a 
disincentive to work.51 Nickell (1997) found a significant positive relationship between the generosity 
of benefits and the rate of unemployment across 20 OECD countries. Furthermore, the detrimental 
effect of benefits was one of the more consistent results in the literature (OECD, 1996; Layard et al., 
2005). The empirical evidence was therefore widely regarded as supporting the “adverse 
supply” impact of increased benefits, although the focus was predominantly – if not exclusively 
– on unemployment benefits. Eligibility for CBI, in contrast to unemployment benefits, is not 
conditional upon labour market status. Nevertheless, here we proceed on the assumption that 
evidence on the impact of unemployment benefits is applicable to the impact of benefits more 
generally,52 and illustrate the potential impact of the CBI based primarily on evidence relating 
to the impact of unemployment benefits. 
Here we use Nickell’s (1997) analysis as representative of those studies that find increased 
benefits have an adverse supply side impact. Nickell (1997) finds that the replacement ratio (of 
benefits to wages) has a positive impact on the unemployment rate. We then combine this 
elasticity with a measure of the impact of the CBI on the replacement rate to obtain an 
estimate of the resultant shift in the real wage curve. Of course, the shift implies upward 
pressure on wages and the unemployment rate.53 
Given that we are here dealing with a substantial CBI, which is in fact paid irrespective of labour 
market status, the results should be regarded as illustrative. Table E.1 presents the short and 
long run results of a 0.08% increase in the bargaining power of workers. The scale of the shift 





                                                          
51 Micro–level studies have found evidence supporting the disincentive effect (e.g. Lalive, 2007; Card et al., 
2015). 
52 In fact, Biegart (2017) tests separately for the impact of minimum income benefits but finds not statistically 
significant impact on unemployment. 
53 To calculate this shock we calculate the change in UK replacement rate to be 7.59%. This change multiplied by 
the Nickell (1997) coefficient (-0.011) gives a shock of -0.08%. 
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Table E.1. Short and long run impacts of increase in bargaining power of workers 
 SR LR 
GDP (£m) -0.007% -0.016% 
Consumption 0.003% -0.003% 
Investment -0.023% -0.015% 
Total Exports -0.010% -0.022% 
Total Imports 0.001% 0.000% 
Nominal Gross Wage 0.030% 0.025% 
Real take home wage 0.025% 0.017% 
CPI 0.005% 0.008% 
Real cost of capital 0.004% 0.006% 
Unemployment Rate (pp difference) 0.013% 0.017% 
Employment -0.013% -0.018% 
Total HH Tax 0.013% 0.004% 
Income Tax 0.017% 0.007% 
Transfers to HH from Gov 0.000% 0.000% 
Real Scottish Government Consumption 0.000% 0.000% 
HG1 (Lowest) Consumption  -0.001% -0.005% 
HG2 Consumption  0.000% -0.005% 
HG3 Consumption  0.003% -0.004% 
HG4 Consumption  0.006% -0.002% 
HG5 (Highest) Consumption  0.005% -0.003% 
 
Not surprisingly, the increased wage pressure immediately pushes up wages and prices and 
the unemployment rate. In the short-run there is a contraction in economic activity and in 
employment (by 0.007% and 0.013% respectively), reflecting the reduction in competitiveness, 
but consumption actually increases, with the stimulus to real wages over this interval (0.025%) 
dominating the fall in employment (0.013%). However, the responsiveness of labour demand 
to the wage rise, and the scale of the contraction, increases over the long-run as capacity 
contracts, and employment falls further (by 0.018%). In the long-run GDP falls by 0.016%, as 
does consumption (by 0.003%). Exports ultimately fall (by 0.022%) reflecting reduced 
competitiveness. The distributional effects are, of course, also negligible, but mildly regressive, 
as we would expect. 
 
Benefits as a subsidy to search activity 
Some have argued that generous benefits can reduce unemployment by acting as a subsidy to job 
search (Gangl, 2004, 2006; Nelson and Stephens, 2012; Biegert, 2017). Biegart (2017) argues that 
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the impact of increased benefits is likely in general to vary with labour market institutions and, 
in particular, that the weaker is the bargaining power of “insiders” (those in employment, 
particularly those on permanent contracts) and the greater availability of employment 
opportunities, the more likely it is that increased benefits may reduce unemployment in the 
long-run. In these circumstances outsiders (who may be unemployed or precariously 
employed, for example, on zero hours contracts) are enabled by enhanced benefits to search 
the labour market more extensively and secure better (higher productivity, higher wage) 
employment. In fact, Biegart (2017) finds a negative long-run association between the level of 
unemployment benefits and the rate of unemployment. 
We also explore the impact of benefits by using an estimate of the coefficient of the level of 
benefits on the unemployment rate taken from Biegert (2017). Here the coefficient implies a 
positive supply shock to the bargaining function, reducing workers bargained wage at any given 
rate of unemployment.54 This implies a 0.08% fall in the bargaining function at any given 
unemployment rate.55 
The results should be regarded as indicative, given the qualifications around the parameter 
estimates reported by Biegert (2017). Not surprisingly, however, the qualitative results are 
exactly the opposite of those associated with the traditional bargaining view: there is a stimulus 
to economic activity and employment that increases in scale in the long-run as capacity adjusts. 
However, the scale is again very modest, with GDP increasing by 0.16% and employment by 
0.18% in the long-run. 
 
  
                                                          
54 This could be accompanied by an increase in productivity, but we consider this separately in the next section. 
55 Similar to the previous bargaining power case the change unemployment rate (7.59%) is multiplied by the 
Beigret coefficient (0.011).  
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Table E.2 Short and long run impacts of increase in bargaining power of workers 
 SR LR 
GDP (£m) 0.007% 0.016% 
Consumption -0.003% 0.003% 
Investment 0.023% 0.015% 
Total Exports 0.010% 0.022% 
Total Imports -0.001% 0.000% 
Nominal Gross Wage -0.030% -0.025% 
Real take home wage -0.025% -0.017% 
CPI -0.005% -0.008% 
Real cost of capital -0.004% -0.006% 
Unemployment Rate (pp difference) -0.013% -0.017% 
Employment 0.013% 0.018% 
Total HH Tax -0.013% -0.004% 
Income Tax -0.017% -0.007% 
Transfers to HH from Gov 0.000% 0.000% 
Real Scottish Government Consumption 0.000% 0.000% 
HG1 (Lowest) Consumption  0.001% 0.005% 
HG2 Consumption  0.000% 0.005% 
HG3 Consumption  -0.003% 0.004% 
HG4 Consumption  -0.006% 0.002% 
HG5 (Highest) Consumption  -0.005% 0.003% 
 
Benefits and the Social Wage 
If the Social Wage case holds, there is no rationale for the adverse supply side impact; workers 
simply accept that they are no worse off after the introduction of the CBI, so there is no wage 
push effect. However, if the payment of the CBI effectively acts as a subsidy to search (and 
other) activity (see the discussion of productivity below), this positive supply side impact could 
be additional to the wage dampening effects of the Social Wage. In these circumstances, the 
short and long run impacts of the introduction of the CBI would be more likely to be positive, 
although the estimated “direct” impacts of benefits are extremely small relative to, for 






Summary of the likely direct effects of the CBI on unemployment 
The empirical evidence on the direct effects of benefits on unemployment is conflicting. 
However, it is the case that the strongest evidence in favour of the conventional bargaining 
view is now rather dated and in any case seems to imply a minimal macroeconomic impact 
here, whereas that favouring the positive supply shock is more recent. Furthermore, it is the 
case that union power – and therefore probably the power of insiders – has been experiencing 
a decline, and other things being equal this would lead us to expect benefits to have a more 
positive labour market impact. However, the evidence on this remains fairly thin, tends not to 
extend in a straightforward way to benefits as a whole (rather than unemployment benefits) 
and again seems to imply negligible change in our analysis. Furthermore, it is not clear whether 
wage bargaining behaviour may alter as labour markets tighten and opportunities for outsiders 




Annex F: The macroeconomic impact of a CBI in the 
presence of a disaggregated labour market 
We begin by considering the impact of an income-tax-financed CBI using the skill-
disaggregated model, assuming fixed nominal wages (and no migration) for both skill groups. 
Fixed nominal wages 
Table F.1 summarises the short and long-run impacts of an income-tax-financed CBI, given 
fixed nominal wages for both skilled and unskilled labour. The results are directly comparable 
with the results of the fixed nominal wage aggregate model reported in the first two columns 
of Table 4.3. It is clear that the overall macroeconomic impact of the CBI is basically unaffected 
by skills disaggregation in this case. For example, GDP, aggregate consumption, investment, 
exports and imports exhibit the same very slight changes in the skill disaggregated model as in 
the aggregate model (of 0.1%, 0.00%, 0.46%, 0.00% and -0.01% respectively). The 
macroeconomic impacts of the increase in the consumption of lower income households 






Table F.1 Short and long run impacts of an income tax-financed, Policy Option 1 with skill 
disaggregation. (Fixed nominal wage with no migration) 
 SR LR 
GDP (£m) -0.15% 0.10% 
Consumption -0.13% 0.00% 
Investment 0.19% 0.46% 
Total Exports -0.30% 0.00% 
Total Imports -0.08% -0.01% 
CPI 0.06% 0.00% 
Transfers to HH from Gov 117.37% 117.37% 
Unskilled Unemployment Rate (pp difference) 6.31% 6.18% 
Skilled Unemployment Rate (pp difference) 6.28% 6.12% 
Unskilled employment -0.33% -0.20% 
Skilled employment -0.30% -0.12% 
Unskilled Real Net Wage -13.10% -13.06% 
Skilled Real Net Wage -13.10% -13.06% 
HG1 Lowest income group’s consumption  30.67% 30.76% 
HG2 Second quintile’s consumption 15.10% 15.22% 
HG3 Third quintile’s consumption 3.53% 3.65% 
HG4 Fourth quintile’s consumption -6.46% -6.32% 
HG5 Highest income group’s consumption -12.62% -12.48% 
 
Of course, the skill-disaggregated model does provide information on the impact of the CBI 
across skill groups. In this case, however, the impacts are extremely modest in scale. In the 
long-run both skilled and unskilled employment fall by 0.12% and 0.20% respectively. The 
consumption of low-income households appears to be slightly more skill-intensive than that of 
high-income households, although the changes here are all very small in scale. The reduction 
in the real net wage is the same for both skilled and unskilled workers here given that: the 
nominal wage is fixed; prices ultimately return to their original levels; and the impact of the 
higher income tax rate for both groups is the same (given that this is represented by changes 
in the average tax rate in the model).  
We find that skill differentiation makes no difference to the aggregate macroeconomic impact 
of the CBI when nominal wages are inflexible, and there is very little difference in the impacts 





The short and long run macroeconomic impacts of an income-tax-financed CBI in the skill-
disaggregated variant of the conventional bargaining model are summarised in Table F.2 and 
Figure F.1. These results are directly comparable to the aggregate results of the conventional 
bargaining model, which are reported in Table 7 in the text. The most striking feature of the 
macroeconomic results is how closely they resemble those of the model with the aggregated 
labour market.  
There is a major contraction in GDP and employment, of 8.4% and 9.4% respectively, slightly 
less than occurs in the aggregate model (8.8% and 9.7%). The skill disaggregation of the labour 
market provides it with marginally enhanced flexibility, which results in a slightly smaller 
contraction. The main driver of the macroeconomic outcome here is identical to that in the 
aggregated model: the substantial fall in real take home pay – here of both skilled and unskilled 
workers - drives a wage push effect that exerts a very substantial contraction in economic 
activity. 
Table F.2. Short and long run impacts of an income tax-financed, Policy Option 1 with skill 
disaggregation. (Conventional bargaining with no migration) 
 SR LR 
GDP (£m) -2.56% -8.44% 
Consumption 0.39% -4.46% 
Investment -7.42% -7.53% 
Total Exports -3.37% -10.10% 
Total Imports -0.18% -1.70% 
CPI 1.59% 3.84% 
Transfers to HH from Gov 117.37% 117.37% 
Unskilled Unemployment Rate (pp difference) 10.72% 15.71% 
Skilled Unemployment Rate (pp difference) 10.14% 14.43% 
Unskilled employment -5.02% -10.33% 
Skilled employment -4.40% -8.97% 
Unskilled Real Net Wage -6.29% -10.22% 
Skilled Real Net Wage -6.10% -10.00% 
HG1 Lowest income group’s consumption  29.77% 26.85% 
HG2 Second quintile’s consumption 14.80% 10.90% 
HG3 Third quintile’s consumption 4.01% -0.11% 
HG4 Fourth quintile’s consumption -5.12% -10.06% 
HG5 Highest income group’s consumption -11.97% -18.14% 
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Figure F.1 GDP and skilled and unskilled employment responses to an income-tax-financed, 
Policy Option 1 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander 
 
The skill-disaggregated model provides additional information on how the CBI-induced 
contraction in economic activity impacts differentially across skill groups. From the fix wage 
simulation, it is apparent that the consumption expenditure of lower income groups is slightly 
relatively skilled intensive and here skilled employment and real net wages ultimately fall by 
9.0% and 10.0% respectively, whereas the unskilled labour market is more adversely impacted 
(employment falls by 10.3% and the real take home wage by 10.2%). The negative 
macroeconomic impact on the unskilled on employment is much greater than that on the 
skilled and furthermore, this differential increases with the induced contractions in the capital 
stock. The scale of the contractions in skilled and unskilled labour demand depends on a whole 
range of factors, including the: capital and skill intensities of each sector’s production; ease of 
substitution of capital for labour and of skilled for unskilled labour; degree of openness of 
relevant product markets and the sensitivity of these to changes in competitiveness.  
The distributional impacts across households are very similar to those generated by the 
corresponding aggregate model, but are rather different from those associated with the skill 
disaggregated model with a fixed nominal wage. 
Overall, the disaggregation of skills makes little difference to the estimated macroeconomic 
impact of an income-tax-funded CBI irrespective of the whether wages are determined in real 
net of tax terms or through a fixed nominal wage.  However, the behaviour of wages continues 
to have a critical impact on the overall macroeconomic outcome. Under conventional 
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reduction in take home pay of workers, which stimulates a major wage-push effect with 
adverse impacts on economic activity. Again, a key factor in the macroeconomic impact of a 
CBI is the extent to which workers can be persuaded that the financial benefits to them and 
their families, combined with the social benefits of a more equal society, merit a “passive” 
response (in terms of wage claims) to the introduction of an income-tax-financed CBI.  
 
Sectoral disaggregation 
We also explore the impact of allowing for separate labour markets across sectors. The public 
sector is distinctive in typically having a much more centralised bargaining system than the 
private sector: unionisation is much higher (with average unionisation rates of 60.8% 
compared to 14% in the private sector)56 and bargaining is “as if” with a single employer. 
Accordingly, we explore the impact of distinctive labour markets for the public and private 
sectors. The demand for labour is simply obtained for the public and private sectors by 
summing demands across their constituent sub-sectors. The supply side of each sector’s labour 
market would typically be characterised by distinctive wage bargaining functions (and, as 
appropriate, sector-specific migration functions). As for the skill case we explore the 
consequences of sectoral disaggregation for the impacts of the CBI by considering the case 
where both sectors are characterised either by a fixed nominal wage or a (net of tax) real wage 
curve. However, here we also allow for a case of asymmetric bargaining across sectors. 
Fixed nominal wages 
Table F.3 summarises the short and long-run impacts of an income-tax-financed CBI, given 
fixed nominal wages for both the private and public sectors. The results are directly 
comparable to the results of the fixed nominal wage aggregate model reported in the first two 
columns of Table 4.3. It is clear that the overall macroeconomic impact of the CBI is basically 
unaffected by sectoral disaggregation in this case. For example, GDP, aggregate consumption, 
investment, exports and imports exhibit the same very slight changes in the sectorally 
disaggregated model as in the aggregate model (of 0.1%, 0.00%, 0.46%, 0.00% and -0.01% 
respectively).). The impacts of the increase in the consumption of lower income households 






                                                          




Table F.3 Short and long run impacts of an income tax-financed, Policy Option 1 with sectoral 
disaggregation. (Fixed nominal wage with no migration) 
 SR LR 
GDP (£m) -0.15% 0.10% 
Consumption -0.13% 0.00% 
Investment 0.19% 0.46% 
Total Exports -0.30% 0.00% 
Total Imports -0.08% -0.01% 
CPI 0.06% 0.00% 
Transfers to HH from Gov 117.37% 117.37% 
Public Unemployment Rate (pp difference) 6.57% 6.50% 
Private Unemployment Rate (pp difference) 6.19% 6.01% 
Public Employment -0.61% -0.53% 
Private Employment -0.20% -0.01% 
Public Real Net Wage -13.10% -13.06% 
Private Real Net Wage -13.10% -13.06% 
HG1 Lowest income group’s consumption  30.67% 30.76% 
HG2 Second quintile’s consumption 15.10% 15.22% 
HG3 Third quintile’s consumption 3.53% 3.65% 
HG4 Fourth quintile’s consumption -6.46% -6.32% 
HG5 Highest income group’s consumption -12.62% -12.48% 
 
Of course, the sectorally disaggregated model does provide information on the impact of the 
CBI across sectors. In this case, however, the impacts are extremely modest in scale. In the 
long-run private employment decreases negligibly (0.01%), while public employment falls (by 
0.53%). The consumption of low-income households appears to be slightly more private-
intensive than that of high-income households, although the changes here are all very small in 
scale. The reduction in the real net wage is the same for both private and public workers here. 
Given that the nominal wage is fixed, prices ultimately return to their original levels and the 
impact of the higher income tax rate for both groups is the same given that this is represented 
by changes in the average tax rate in the model.  
Sectoral differentiation makes no difference to the aggregate macroeconomic impact of the 







The short and long run macroeconomic impacts of an income-tax-financed CBI in the sector-
disaggregated variant of the conventional bargaining model are summarised in Table F.4 These 
results are directly comparable to the aggregate results of the conventional bargaining model, 
which are reported in Table 7 above. The most striking feature of the macroeconomic results 
is how closely they resemble those of the model with the aggregated labour market. There is 
a major contraction in GDP and employment, of 8.43% and 9.7% respectively, slightly more 
than occurs in the aggregate model (8.43% and 9.5%). The sectoral disaggregation of the 
labour market imposes marginally increased frictions, which result in a slightly larger 
contraction. The main driver of the macroeconomic outcome here is identical to that in the 
aggregated model: the substantial fall in real take home pay – here of both public sector and 
private sector workers - drives a wage push effect that exerts a very substantial contraction in 
economic activity. 
Table F.4 Short and long run impacts of an income tax-financed, Policy Option 1 with sectoral 
disaggregation.( Bargaining, no migration) 
 SR LR 
GDP (£m) -2.56% -8.43% 
Consumption 0.33% -4.54% 
Investment -7.33% -7.48% 
Total Exports -3.33% -10.02% 
Total Imports -0.20% -1.72% 
CPI 1.61% 3.91% 
Transfers to HH from Gov 117.37% 117.37% 
Public Unemployment Rate (pp difference) 9.10% 10.90% 
Private Unemployment Rate (pp difference) 10.77% 16.30% 
Public Employment -3.29% -5.22% 
Private Employment -5.08% -10.96% 
Public Real Net Wage -4.55% -6.47% 
Private Real Net Wage -6.78% -11.30% 
HG1 Lowest income group’s consumption  29.79% 26.87% 
HG2 Second quintile’s consumption 14.79% 10.91% 
HG3 Third quintile’s consumption 4.01% -0.08% 
HG4 Fourth quintile’s consumption -5.13% -10.02% 




The sector-disaggregated model does, of course, provide additional information on how the 
CBI-induced contraction in economic activity impacts differentially across sectors. From the fix 
wage simulation it is apparent that the consumption expenditure of lower income groups is 
slightly relatively public sector intensive.  However, here public sector employment and real 
net wages ultimately fall by 5.2% and 6.5% respectively, whereas the private sector labour 
market is more adversely impacted (employment falls by 11.0% and the real take home wage 
by 11.3%). The negative macroeconomic impact on the private sector on both employment 
and the real net wage is much greater than that on the public sector and furthermore, this 
differential increases with the induced contractions in the capital stock. The scale of the 
responses to the contractions in public and private sector labour demand depends on a whole 
range of factors, including the: capital and skill intensities of each sector’s production; ease of 
substitution of capital for labour, the degree of openness of relevant product markets and the 
sensitivity of these to changes in competitiveness. These last two factors provide the main 
explanation of the differentiated sectoral impacts; the public sector is sheltered from the 
adverse competitiveness effects. 
The distributional impacts across households are very similar to those generated by the 
corresponding aggregate model, but are rather different from those associated with the 
sectorally disaggregated model with a fixed nominal wage. 
Overall, the disaggregation by sectors appears to make little difference to the estimated 
macroeconomic impact of an income-tax-funded CBI irrespective of the whether wages are 
determined in real net of tax terms or through a fixed nominal wage. However, we have 
assumed up to now that sectoral wages are modelled in a symmetrical way. We now relax that 
assumption. 
 
Conventional bargaining in the private sector, social wage in the public sector 
Recall that a key distinguishing feature of the public sector is the extent of centralisation of its 
wage bargaining process relative to the private sector. This suggests the possibility of 
differentiated bargaining behaviour across sectors: in particular, the conditions in the public 
sector are more conducive to the introduction of a social wage arrangement. Accordingly, we 
explore the impact of a social wage within the public sector combined with conventional 
bargaining in the private sector.57 
                                                          
57 Given the low average union membership rate in the private sector, approximately competitive markets might 
be assumed instead. The micro-to-macro case assumes universally competitive labour markets. 
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Table F.5 summarises the results of assuming a social wage in the public sector and 
conventional bargaining in the private sector. 
Table F.5 Short and long run impacts of an income tax-financed, Policy Option 1 with sectoral 
disaggregation: bargaining in the private sector with social wage in public sector 
 SR LR 
GDP (£m) -1.86% -5.29% 
Consumption 0.26% -2.80% 
Investment -5.23% -4.59% 
Total Exports -2.49% -6.39% 
Total Imports -0.15% -1.07% 
CPI 7.04% 7.69% 
Transfers to HH from Gov -8.16% -11.17% 
Public Unemployment Rate (pp difference) 9.47% 12.23% 
Private Unemployment Rate (pp difference) 9.05% 11.40% 
Public Employment -3.69% -6.63% 
Private Employment -3.24% -5.74% 
Public Real Net Wage -17.57% -22.09% 
Private Real Net Wage -4.54% -6.99% 
HG1 Lowest income group’s consumption  30.03% 28.30% 
HG2 Second quintile’s consumption 14.89% 12.51% 
HG3 Third quintile’s consumption 3.89% 1.29% 
HG4 Fourth quintile’s consumption -5.49% -8.66% 
HG5 Highest income group’s consumption -12.13% -16.02% 
 
Not surprisingly, the macroeconomic results are intermediate to those reported for the case 
of universal real net wage bargaining and the social wage (Tables 7 and 8 respectively). In the 
long run the overall contraction in GDP, at 5.3%, is under half that which occurs under universal 
bargaining and falls in other aggregate variables are similarly limited.  
The sectoral results again reflect the comparative insulation of the public sector from 
competitiveness changes. However, the presence of the social wage in the public sector now 
results in its real net wage falling very substantially, by 22.1%, and a 6.6% reduction in public 
sector employment in the long run.  In contrast in the private sector, labour’s attempt to 
restore its pre-tax wage ultimately results in a 6.7% reduction in the real wage and a fall in 
employment of 5.7%. The separation of the sectoral labour markets creates some tension, at 
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least with the long-run results; we would expect the large wage differential to stimulate some 
labour mobility between sectors over the longer term. 
Overall, the main message is, again, that the response of wages to the introduction of the CBI 
has a critical impact on the overall macroeconomic outcome. Under conventional bargaining, 
with skills or sectoral disaggregation, the key is the resultant substantial reduction in take home 
pay of workers, which stimulates a major wage-push effect with seriously adverse impacts on 
economic activity. This can be mitigated if the social wage characterises the behaviour of at 
least some sectors (here the public sector), and more than wholly offset if the social wage 
prevails generally. 
The example of heterogenous wage determination across public and private sectors does tend 
to reinforce the importance of persuading labour and labour market institutions of the value 
of the CBI prior to implementation. The more sectors/ workers/ unions are persuaded to link 




Annex G: A case-study based illustrative micro-to-macro 
analysis of a CBI-type intervention 
Here we provide an illustrative micro-to-macro analysis based on a case study of the Alaskan 
Permanent fund. Jones and Marinescu (2018) report an increase in part-time employment of 
17%, which even if we accept (probably conservatively) that total employment is unaffected, 
implies an overall decrease in full-time-equivalent labour supply of 12.88%.  
Table F.1 reports the macroeconomic impact of such a contraction in labour supply in Scotland, 
assuming a completely wage-inelastic supply curve. (This effectively maximises the 
macroeconomic impact, so is of course purely illustrative.) 
Table G.1  Alaskan labour supply impacts (wage-inelastic case) 
 SR LR 
GDP (£m) -7.88% -11.80% 
Consumption 3.16% -2.45% 
Investment -23.41% -10.75% 
Total Exports -10.72% -15.93% 
Total Imports 0.99% 0.11% 
Nominal Gross Wage 34.97% 21.22% 
Real take home wage 27.93% 14.07% 
CPI 5.51% 6.27% 
Real cost of capital 3.95% 4.92% 
Unemployment Rate (pp difference) 0.00% 0.00% 
Employment -12.88% -12.88% 
Total HH Tax 12.99% 3.67% 
Income Tax 17.59% 5.61% 
Transfers to HH from Gov 0.00% 0.00% 
Real Scottish Government Consumption 0.00% 0.00% 
HG1 Lowest income group’s consumption  -1.42% -3.67% 
HG2 Second quintile’s consumption 0.18% -3.81% 
HG3 Third quintile’s consumption 2.58% -2.61% 
HG4 Fourth quintile’s consumption 5.40% -1.67% 




The significant reduction in labour supply represents an adverse supply shock, which pushes 
up real wages, reduces competitiveness, exports and investment. In the long run investment 
falls by 10.8%, GDP by 11.8% and employment by 12.9%, so that there is some substitution 
away from labour whose real wage is push up substantially (by 14.1% in the long-run). GDP per 
capita falls by less than GDP: the fall in GDP exceeds that in population. 
Table G.2 summarises the results of the same shock, but assuming that labour supply is 
responsive to the real wage. Again there is a negative impact on economic activity, but here it 
is reduced: the impacts on employment and the real wage are smaller than under the perfectly 
wage-inelastic case, as we would expect. 
 
Table G.2  Alaskan labour supply impacts (positive wage elasticity) 
 SR LR 
GDP (£m) -6.62% -10.75% 
Consumption -2.80% -5.06% 
Investment -23.97% -9.82% 
Total Exports -6.85% -12.66% 
Total Imports -2.15% -1.72% 
Nominal Gross Wage 22.05% 16.27% 
Real take home wage 18.50% 10.86% 
CPI 2.99% 4.88% 
Real cost of capital 3.77% 3.84% 
Unemployment Rate (pp difference) -2.41% -1.61% 
Employment -10.64% -11.39% 
Total HH Tax 23.25% 13.44% 
Income Tax 9.06% 3.03% 
Transfers to HH from Gov 0.00% 0.00% 
Real Scottish Government Consumption 0.00% 0.00% 
HG1 Lowest income group’s consumption  -1.35% -2.94% 
HG2 Second quintile’s consumption -1.73% -3.68% 
HG3 Third quintile’s consumption -1.65% -4.23% 
HG4 Fourth quintile’s consumption -1.51% -4.79% 
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